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Introduction 
Since the Reform Act of 1867, parliamentary government in Great 
Britain has steadily yielded to the primacy of party government. 
Members of Parliament were first and foremost members of a political 
party, and their behavior and attitudes were guided by this con- 
straint. Parliamentary politics were understood in terms of front- and 
backbenchers, leaders and followers, policy-makers and policy- 
ratifiers. Through this tight nexus of party dominance, Parliament's 
purpose seemed to be to ratify what had been decided elsewhere. 
The leaders of the largest party in the House of Commons returned at 
the last general election became the nation's executive branch, re- 
tained their legislative seats in the House, organized the majority 
party in the legislature, and dominated the proceedings, timetable, 
and agenda of the House. Perhaps Parliament was sovereign, but the 
cabinet had become supreme. 
This accepted notion of party and executive control over the 
House of Commons has served to inhibit closer scrutiny of the inter- 
nal political changes in the 1960s and 1970s, changes that coincided 
with the creation of a new committee system for the House of Com- 
mons. In the House, nascent committees were created in the mid- 
1960s to investigate politically safe policy domains, such as 
agriculture or science and technology. When committee members ac- 
tually undertook parliamentary inquiries into executive policies, the 
majority party in power had them abolished. But during the 1960s 
and particularly the 1970s, the cracks in party solidarity began to ap- 
pear. As Norton (1975; 1978; 1980b) has so ably demonstrated, back- 
bencher~ were rebelling in greater numbers on more occasions and 
with more effect than had been the case since the introduction of 
party government into the House in 1867. Outside the House, voters 
were deserting the two major parties at the polls, decreasing their 
partisanship and loyalty to Labour and Conservatives, and showing 
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up in smaller and smaller numbers on polling days (Crewe, 1985). 
And despite the traditional notion of national parties contesting na- 
tional elections based on national manifestos, local constituents in- 
creasingly expected their local MP to serve his or her constituency, 
even if that meant voting against the party's leaders and campaign 
promises (Cain et al., 1987). 
American political scientists generally embraced this pre-1970 
view of parliamentary government (APSA, 1950; Kirkpatrick, 1971) 
and lamented its passing when they became cognizant of the changes 
taking place (Epstein, 1980). The Westminster Model had provided 
order, efficiency, and strong government at a time when American 
political institutions were challenged by constitutional and policy 
struggles between the legislature and the executive as well as a po- 
litically unaccountable Supreme Court whose decisions increasingly 
changed the laws of the land and challenged its social fabric. Parlia- 
mentary sovereignty in Britain, however, had bestowed all such 
questions and issues on one democratic institution: the "Mother of 
Parliaments." The executive was drawn from the legislature and con- 
stitutionally accountable to it. Laws and government policies could 
not be declared unconstitutional precisely because they were Acts of 
Parliament and had been subject to parliamentary assent and legiti- 
macy. There was no judicial review left to another institution com- 
prised of politically appointed jurors-for-life. Democracy, efficiency, 
and accountability. These were the watchwords, the marvelous at- 
tributes of the Westminster Model. 
Of course, from an institutional and constitutional perspective, 
the differences between the American Congressional Model and the 
British Westminster Model are fairly stark. Nevertheless, supporters 
of the British polity would also still bemoan continental parliamen- 
tary governments for their (perceived) gross shortcomings. Britain's 
European counterparts appeared to be a hodgepodge of ignoble pro- 
ceedings and practices. Governments were more often than not 
forged by coalitions of several parties, the largest of which may have 
received not more than a third of the vote in the previous election, 
e.g. Italy. These countries were subject to continued government cri- 
ses and collapse; the French Fourth Republic had twenty-seven sep- 
arate governments in twelve years before the regime itself collapsed 
in 1958. France's written constitution provided for a strong legisla- 
ture, but the multiparty system it engendered created representation 
of many parties in the National Assembly, most of which were not 
cohesive and were plagued with internal fractions and fissures. In 
theory the legislature could be a strong policy-influencing body, but 
its powers were exercised primarily negatively-to block parliamen- 
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tary reforms and topple governments. Electoral systems based on 
proportional representation widely used in various forms on the 
Continent seemed to remove the voters from their "representative." 
The party lists presented to German voters, for example, seemed to 
remove the important democratic link between the citizen and his or 
her representative. To whom would one petition for redress of griev- 
ances? While party had indeed come to predominate in Great Britain, 
its parliamentary system, unlike those on the Continent or the Con- 
gressional Model in the United States nevertheless continued to fa- 
cilitate democracy, efficiency, and stability. 
In 1979, the newly elected Conservative government under the 
leadership of Margaret Thatcher introduced legislation into the 
House of Commons to establish a comprehensive select committee 
system. Several members of Parliament (MPs), including the Leader 
of the House, Norman St. John-Stevas, greeted the proposals as "the 
greatest parliamentary reform of the twentieth century." New com- 
mittees whose task it is to monitor the executive were subsequently 
established. Backbenchers, those MPs who do not hold government 
or Opposition leadership positions, alone are eligible to sit on these 
committees. Unlike previous committee experiments, then, these re- 
forms were designed specifically to remove party leaders from, and 
their institutionalized influence on, investigatory committees. 
The British House of Commons is currently working under this 
new committee system and has been doing so since 1979. This new 
system, proposed by a Special Procedure Committee report (HC 588- 
I,II, 1977/78), is composed of fourteen departmentally-related com- 
mittees. (Scottish Affairs was not reconstituted following the 1987 
election, reducing the number to thirteen). These committees and 
their members are to monitor and scrutinize corresponding govern- 
ment departments. Party loyalty, however, suggests that MPs would 
continue to be reluctant to criticize party leaders and to assert Par- 
liament's constitutional role of scrutiny and accountability. The Pro- 
cedure Committee's report is all the more pathbreaking precisely 
because of what is expected of members of Parliament. For the pro- 
posed committee system to be successful, members' attitudes about 
their jobs, about Parliament, and about committee service necessarily 
had to differ sharply from the assumptions predicated in previous 
Procedure Committee reports that continued to advocate the subser- 
vient status of Parliament and backbenchers in the Westminster 
Model. 
To understand fully the implications of this new system for Par- 
liament and its members, this study recognizes two important par- 
liamentary features characteristic of legislative dynamics in Great 
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Britain. On the one hand, one must recognize the traditional role of 
backbench MPs, which remains consistent with the "textbook image 
of representation and government in Great Britain. On the other 
hand, one must also be aware of Parliament's institutional role in 
governing andlor formulating policy vis-A-vis the executive and ques- 
tion whether the theory is indeed consistent with practice. In short, 
I suggest that the theory and realities of the roles of Commons and of 
backbench MPs within it have met serious challenges in the past two 
decades. The subsequent committee reforms in particular can thus be 
seen as recognizing contemporary realities while at the same time ad- 
justing to the expressed goals and desires of many backbenchers, 
thereby extending both the formal and the informal role and capaci- 
ties of Parliament. 
Comparative Legislative Change 
From a comparative perspective, the calls for reform were not unique 
to Britain, nor should one presume that strong parties in other leg- 
islative settings prohibit parliamentary influence. Throughout the 
Old Commonwealth, Britain's former colonies, including Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand, adopted similar legislative reforms in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Westminster Model had come un- 
der reform worldwide. In Ireland, however, the select committees es- 
tablished by Fine Gael to monitor the executive were summarily 
dismissed in 1988 when Fiana Fail returned to power. After fifty years 
in Opposition, Fine Gael, under the leadership of Garret FitzGerald, 
sponsored a number of reforms for the Dail, notably select commit- 
tees. With Ireland the exception to the rule, the 1970s were also a wa- 
tershed era for a variety of "types" of parliamentary legislatures in 
Europe (Norton, 1990). 
In the case of Italy, for example, Furlong (1990) argues that Par- 
liament undeniably has power and influence in policy making and 
that rather than talk of the decline in Parliament in Italy, it is more 
appropriate to understand the constitutional impasse in which gov- 
ernment and Parliament find themselves because they have been un- 
able to develop a stable and effective working relationship. Specific 
parliamentary reforms in 1971 further allowed parties and deputies 
outside the pentapartito (the five-party coalition) access to the organi- 
zation of parliamentary time. Article 23 of the new rules also trans- 
ferred effective power over the legislative agenda to the Conference of 
Party Group Leaders (the capigruppo). Moreover, there must be unan- 
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imous support for the agenda within the capigruppo. This means that 
even the minor groups in Parliament have a say over what will be dis- 
cussed in the chamber. The 1971 reforms marked a clear recognition 
that the government, or its majority in Parliament, does not have the 
power to determine the legislature's activities, unlike the situation in 
Great Britain. As Della Sala (1990) has pointed out, these provisions 
are important because the government does not have any legal or 
constitutional guarantee of priority passage for its legislation. All leg- 
islative proposals are considered equal, governments do not have the 
power of closure, and there are no limits on the areas allowed to be 
introduced by private members. And because governments in Italy 
do not have an electoral mandate to carry out a policy program, they 
do not have the political leverage to pressure Parliament to consider 
their legislative proposals. Like governments in Fourth Republic 
France, those in Italy cannot exert effective leadership on the legisla- 
tive agenda. 
The 1971 reforms in Italy also diffused power not only between 
legislature and executive but also within Parliament. As Della Sala 
notes (1990, 7), committees act as important gatekeepers in that they 
may decide which legislation will be scrutinized and which bills will 
not. This is much different from the pre-1971 situation in which the 
effective gatekeepers were the committee chairpersons who, more of- 
ten than not, simply carried out decisions taken by the governing ma- 
jority (Leonardi et al., 1978). Moreover, 80 percent of the legislation 
passed in Italy never reaches the full chamber for a vote; in many pol- 
icy areas and under a variety of circumstances, parliamentary com- 
mittees alone have the constitutional right to approve or reject 
legislation. 
Recent legislative scholarship suggests that parliaments are de- 
clining and thus rejects this revanchist theme of the 1970s. The Ger- 
man Bundestag may quite possibly be reactive, but it is certainly not 
a powerless legislature. In spite of party discipline, the government 
does not normally have the capacity to impose its will on the legis- 
lature, let alone on the coalition's parliamentary parties, or fraktionen 
(Saalfeld, 1990). Despite the number of leftlright and confessional/ 
secular parties in the Netherlands, and despite the possible erosion 
of consociational democracy, developments over the past two de- 
cades suggest that parliamentary influence upon national policy 
making has actually increased (Gladdish, 1990). And since Sweden 
introduced a unicameral Riksdag and a revised electoral system in 
1971, small specialist committees, minority governments, and votes of 
no confidence have emerged. As a consequence, Arter (1990) suggests, 
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the Riksdag has strengthened itself as a policy-influencing assembly. 
Even in France, where the president legally and constitutionally pos- 
sesses seemingly more power vis-a-vis the National Assembly com- 
pared to that of any other European democracy, the legislature cannot 
be said to be in decline (Frears, 1990). Fitzgerald (1990) too notes in 
his study on the Finance Committee in the French National Assembly 
that despite the intentionally constrained role of the parliament in 
the Fifth Republic, careerists in the legislature have been responsible 
for asserting its one basic monopoly, the legitimate right to make 
laws, and these deputies have continued to find power potential in 
parliament. He concludes: "In contrast to the modernization theo- 
rists who predicted the constant decline of legislative bodies every- 
where, the recent years of French experience show that their best 
days may lie ahead  (Fitzgerald, 1990, 26). 
Careers in the House of Commons 
From a comparative perspective, the reforms introduced in Britain 
were consistent with parliamentary developments elsewhere in Eu- 
rope, although this seems to be overlooked by many parliamentary 
scholars. Notwithstanding, these proposals were absolutely path- 
breaking for the British Parliament, not least of all because the Pro- 
cedure Committee's report placed high expectations on the proposed 
departmentally-related select committees. They were to be "the eyes 
and the ears" of the House in its relation with government de- 
partments. Committee members hoped the result would be greater 
participation in the parliamentary process by backbenchers and im- 
proved information access for MPs. For the institution, this also 
meant increased accountability of the executive to the legislature and 
a reassertion of the role of the House in policy influence and evalu- 
ation. To achieve these desired aims, the onus of responsibility would 
fall to members of the new committees. Although the necessary in- 
stitutional structures were created, they would remain relatively in- 
effectual without a corresponding interest, dedication, and will 
among their members. For the new system to be successful, the back- 
bencher~ would need to possess attitudes commensurate with those 
expected and anticipated in the Procedure Committee's report. 
These reforms and active MPs would not necessarily be welcome 
news to all parliamentary actors and institutions involved in the na- 
tional policy process. Backbench specialization through committee 
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work could very well undermine the authority relationship inherent 
in party government. Specialization would result in diffusion of au- 
thority, authority that up until recently has been monopolized by 
party leaders. The norms of the House of Commons reflect the values 
of the most important and powerful actors in Parliament and have 
served to support the heretofore existing distribution of power and 
status quo. David Judge's research (1981) indicates that as long as 
backbenchers remain convinced that their political careers should be 
oriented to the attainment of executive office, then they will continue 
to conform to those norms most likely to secure this goal. Attaining 
executive office or achieving influence in the legislature, however, 
were not considered the primary goals or duties of many MPs. The 
notion of amateur, part-time "legislator" fit well with the Westmin- 
ster Model, in which politics and policies are dominated by the re- 
spective party elites supported by loyal backbenchers. Contrary to 
this perception of the role of MPs, Norton (1975, 1978, 1980b) indi- 
cates that members have proved increasingly unwilling to be used as 
lobby fodder. Instead, they have proved willing to rebel against party 
leaders. Norton posits that rather than becoming an accepted and en- 
trenched characteristic of parliamentary government in Great Britain, 
frontbench dominance and prerogatives have eroded during the past 
two decades. 
Of course, as long as executive office is the only available career 
goal and as long as party loyalty is the only avenue or career ladder 
to pursue, MPs are subject to the logical demand of pursuing those 
"choices" that ultimately serve to legitimate party government and 
the authority-hierarchical relationship. Should alternative career op- 
portunities and structures be created in Parliament, party loyalty and 
party unity would diminish in importance as means of achieving ca- 
reer goals. My research (Jogerst, 1991) suggests that select commit- 
tees can indeed be viewed as alternative "career structures," allowing 
MPs to specialize and therefore removing them, to a degree, from the 
dictates of party leaders. Second, as several MPs have commented in 
debates and testimony, committee posts grant backbenchers more ac- 
tive and rewarding participation in the governing process than 
would be possible through years of service as mere loyal party men 
and women. Third, committee service can also guarantee parliamen- 
tary careers to those persons for whom the call to executive office will 
never come. Finally, whereas backbenchers achieve a degree of free- 
dom in policy influence with party leaders in Opposition but not 
when in power, the creation of departmental select committees could 
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provide the structural prerequisites necessary to maintain a sense of 
continuity in backbench influence over the executive, whether it be a 
Labour or a Conservative government. 
Research and Organization 
In 1979, Lees and Shaw, commenting on the state of comparative leg- 
islative committee research, could write with confidence: "When one 
searches for published material on committees in legislatures other 
than the American Congress, one becomes aware of a grotesque im- 
balance of systematic information. Knowledge on this subject is spe- 
cific to only a few countries, and such non-American literature as 
exists is often legal and formalistic" (Lees and Shaw, 1979, 5). 
Virtually all the existing literature on the new select committees 
in Britain also remains descriptive. Englefield and Drewry, for ex- 
ample, have produced works highlighting committee assignmGnts, 
the number of reports issued, the costs of committee proceedings, 
lists of witnesses, and the number of pages printed per committee 
per year. It is unclear, however, why and how this information is im- 
portant or compelling to the understanding of contemporary parlia- 
mentary politics. Second, such works lack any theoretical framework 
and do not suggest what, if any, ramifications exist based on their as- 
sembled information. 
The fundamental question that academics, when asked, remain 
unable to answer is why members of Parliament wanted to establish 
these committees and why they chose to serve on them. These ques- 
tions can usefully be addressed through survey research and per- 
sonal interviews. During the 1986-87 parliamentary session, I 
conducted interviews in Great Britain with over one-hundred mem- 
bers of Parliament, committee clerks, and House of Commons staff. 
Three panels of MPs were used for this research project. Group A 
consisted of those members who had remained with the committees 
since 1979. Group B was a statistically-drawn random sample of MPs 
who had served on the committees but had left their posts. Group C 
was a statistically-drawn random sample of all MPs, front- and back- 
bench, who had never served on one of the Select Committees. 
Dividing the interviewees into three groups was important for a 
number of reasons. First, I wished to avoid skewing my results by re- 
lying solely on the attitudes of committee members. My questions on 
members' attitudes toward parliamentary service and particularly on 
the role and importance of the select committees would likely reflect 
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biased perceptions if I relied on Groups A and B alone. It would be 
extremely misleading to suggest that Conservative or Labour MPs 
shared a common attitude about executive-legislative relations, com- 
mittee importance, or Parliament as a debating forum if the subject 
sample consisted solely of committee members. 
Second, since I maintained that members sought committee as- 
signments to pursue individual goals that could be realized through 
rewarding committee service, it was necessary to interview members 
who resigned their committee assignments as well. Why did some 
members stay and other move on? Did members who left their com- 
mittees find committee service frustrating, or did they perceive it as 
a "stepping stone" in their legislative careers? Is it then fair to suggest 
that committee members from Group A are less likely to be con- 
cerned about frontbench positions than those in Group B? If Group B 
MPs do indeed view committee service as a means to end, i.e., front- 
bench posts, are they less likely to pursue vigorously the inquiries 
and questions that may be critical of their party leaders? The answers 
to these questions are important in understanding potential select 
committee influence and highlighting the degree to which committee 
service is rewarding and satisfies members' goals. 
Third, the inclusion of Groups B and C allowed me to include 
frontbench MPs, some of whom were promoted to those positions 
subsequent to their committee service. Others from Group C were 
frontbench MPs who had not served on select committees. In order 
to extend the influence of committee recommendations and reports, 
responsive, or at the very least nonhostile, ministers and frontbench 
spokesmen are crucial. Are select committees considered an irritant 
by members of the frontbench, and do the perceptions of committees' 
utility seem to alter when one has moved from a committee post to an 
official government or Opposition position? These questions, and 
their possible implications for Parliament, are addressed in later 
chapters. 
The survey questionnaire I prepared was divided into two parts 
and is presented as Appendix A. The first part was subdivided fur- 
ther into three sections consisting of ope-ended questions. Section 
One asked members about their attitudes toward their jobs as MPs. 
The second section focused on their attitudes toward Parliament as 
an institution and its role vis-a-vis the executive. The third and long- 
est section required members to answer several questions about the 
select committees created in 1979. Some questions were amended 
slightly to ensure that they were appropriate for the member inter- 
viewed. For example, question 27 for MPs in Group A read, "Does 
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your committee assignment have any link to your constituency inter- 
ests?" while members in Group B were asked, "Did your committee 
assignment have any link to your constituency interests?" And mem- 
bers of Group C, who had not served on committees, were asked, 
"Do you think there is any link between select committee members 
and their constituencies' interests?" Instances in which amended 
questions were presented to the three groups of MPs are clearly 
noted throughout the text. 
Part two of the interviews consisted of closed-ended questions. 
These questions were typed on index cards and handed to the inter- 
viewees. As Appendix A illustrates, these questions ranged from ask- 
ing members to rank the tasks best performed by Parliament to 
describing their own ideological positions within their parties. 
All member of Parliament were assured in writing and immedi- 
ately prior to the interview that their identity would remain anony- 
mous and their statements "nonattributable." Some members 
indicated that what they had to say was clearly "on the record" and 
did not object to being quoted (indeed, encouraged it). Where this 
was the case, I have attributed particular quotes to their sources. In 
all other cases, however, anonymity has been maintained. 
Before beginning each interview, I asked the member if he or she 
would allow our interview to be tape recorded in order to ensure an 
accurate and precise account of his or her views and statements. It 
also meant that I was not encumbered by the need to write as quickly 
as words were spoken. Every member agreed to be recorded, and the 
interviews averaged slightly more than an hour in length. In order to 
preserve the precise context of members' responses and to present 
both contextual and statistical analysis, all taped interviews were 
subsequently transcribed verbatim. 
Once I had transcribed all the interviews, each open-ended ques- 
tion was coded for further statistical analysis. The coding of some 
questions was straightforward. For example, question 8 asked mem- 
bers, "Do you consider yourself a specialist in any particular policy 
area?" The answers were either yes or no. For other questions, how- 
ever, members' responses were coded into as many different catego- 
ries as there were response types. For example, I asked members in 
question 41, "In what ways would the select committees you would 
like to see a generation from now differ from those of today?" There 
were six different response categories for this question, and they 
were coded accordingly. 
I also constructed individual "characteristic profiles" for each 
member interviewed. These profiles included a number of variables 
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that would prove useful when identifying which "types" of MPs 
tended to share certain attitudes. These variables, which were also 
useful in subsequent analysis, were: (1) party, (2) sex, (3) age, (4) ed- 
ucation, (5) occupation prior to Parliament, (6) year first elected to 
Parliament, (7) number of years in Parliament, (8) percentage of the 
vote in the last election, (9) percentage of the majority in the last elec- 
tion, (10) committee assignment, (11) other committee assignments, 
(12) length of time on the select committee, and (13) background or 
expertise in the committee topic. 
In this book I assert that members' attitudes on parliamentary 
service are not only incompatible with (and indeed may undermine) 
the traditional interpretation of the Westminster Model, but consti- 
tute a significant change from those commonly shared-or presumed 
to be shared-by their predecessors. Longitudinal comparisons are 
best made when either the subjects remain constant or the variables 
subject to evaluation can be observed, measured, and tested with 
precision from one era to another. Although the research design used 
for the purposes of this research can be replicated and used in future 
studies, the lack of previous academic work on British parliamentary 
committees based on attitudinal survey research poses obvious diffi- 
culties. 
These difficulties notwithstanding, useful and reliable compari- 
sons can nevertheless be made. Suggestions for reforming the House 
of Commons have been made for decades, many of them funnelled 
through the Select Committee on Procedure. The importance of iden- 
tifying these reforms rests not in describing what they were but 
rather in discovering why they were proposed, who supported them, 
and what their implications were for parliamentary influence. 
If indeed there has been an attitudinal shift among MPs concern- 
ing their perceived roles in Parliament and the role of Parliament 
as well, I would expect this change to be reflected in the arguments, 
testimony, reports, and recommendations of successive Procedure 
Committees. As I point out in the following chapters, Procedure 
Committee members began to press for increased parliamentary as- 
sertiveness in the early 1960s, especially after Labour's victory in 
1964. In particular, committee members questioned the control exer- 
cised by the government over the affairs and proceedings of the 
House. This marked a significant departure from the interpretations 
of parliamentary-executive relationships offered by previous Proce- 
dure Committees. 
Both of these approaches are useful and appropriate in analyzing 
attitudinal change and institutional assertion. Robert McKenzie used 
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a similar approach when he wrote British Political Parties (1964). As 
with Jennings's reliance on biographies, memoirs, and conference re- 
ports, McKenzie had to face the problem of the relevance of the past 
to the present. McKenzie examined the contemporary situation by in- 
terviewing current politicians "to find whether they really thought 
as their predecessors had done and recognized the same customs" 
(Butler, 1958, 46). Although much of the American congressional lit- 
erature focuses on aggregate voting scores, contextual analysis has 
also made significant contributions. In his American Political Science 
Association presidential address, Richard Fenno noted that "obser- 
vation is a crucial part in understanding and theorizing about legis- 
lative politics. It has an important role in political science" (Fenno, 
1986, 5). 
This research, then, is designed to move away from the descrip- 
tive, sometimes anecdotal, analysis of legislative politics in Great 
Britain. It examines the establishment and dynamics of party govern- 
ment in Britain, relies on comparisons of past and present committee 
proceedings, and uses survey research methods to order, arrange, 
and otherwise quantify members' attitudes. 
These research methods allow me to present my argument that 
contemporary members of Parliament are indeed more likely to be 
"professional" legislators than were their predecessors. Colin Mellors 
suggested that the criteria for distinguishing professionals from am- 
ateurs can take the form of either counting electoral victories or mea- 
suring the duration of parliamentary service (Mellors, 1978, 82). In 
his study of British MPs, Philip Buck chose the former approach and 
claimed that "on the occasion of his third election a contestant loses 
amateur standing and becomes a professional" (Buck, 1963, 78). Don- 
ald Matthews (1984), on the other hand, favored the "length of ser- 
vice" approach in his study of American senators' political career 
patterns. For him, the demarcation between amateur and profes- 
sional was ten or more years in public service. 
Both of these approaches define professional status as a conse- 
quence of length of tenure in a legislature. The assumption, of 
course, is that seeking reelection and continued membership signify 
an individual's commitment to a legislative career. Buck further 
points out that between 1918 and 1959 more than 70 percent of all 
government posts and 98 percent of all cabinet ministries were held 
by MPs who had achieved professional status (Buck, 1963, 81) This 
definition, however, is inappropriate and misleading for my pur- 
poses. I make a distinction between the notion of MP as "gentleman 
amateur" (the textbook image) and that of the professional legislator 
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who wants to pursue an activist role in Parliament. Therefore, I char- 
acterize a "professional MP" as one whose own role orientation in 
Parliament and attitudes toward the role of Parliament depart signif- 
icantly from the traditional understanding of British MPs. In contrast 
to amateur MPs, the professional legislator would reflect the follow- 
ing characteristics: 
1. Desires an active role in influencing or forming national policies. 
2. Supports parliamentary reforms that give backbenchers and pri- 
vate members increased participation in Parliament. 
3. Seeks opportunities to focus on and specialize in particular policy 
areas. 
4. Rejects the assumption that they can be used as "lobby fodder" by 
party leaders. 
5. Possesses identifiable goals that are pursued and satisfied in 
Parliament. 
6. Considers the job of an MP as full-time and supports as well as 
uses increased resources to be able to accommodate the burdens im- 
posed by increased legislative-related activities. 
On Buck's and Matthews's definitions, however, a member of Parlia- 
ment who had less than ten years' experience or fewer than three 
consecutive election victories would be considered an amateur with- 
out necessarily possessing the characteristics outlined above. It 
seems that Buck and Matthews are primarily concerned with legis- 
lators' ability to or interest in maintaining a position in a legislature. 
I suggest that it is more appropriate to understand how and why leg- 
islators define their jobs and the likely implications this has for leg- 
islative politics. Whether members have been in the House for three 
sessions or three elections is less important than the attitudes they 
share and the behavior they display during that time. 
Select committees are a useful unit of analysis in addressing the 
issues and questions highlighted above. If Parliament is indeed a re- 
active legislature whose role has been reduced to rubber-stamping 
government-sponsored legislation, how can one explain the pressures 
to create committees to monitor government departments? Commit- 
tee members often criticize party leaders' policies and propose alter- 
native policy options. Promotion to the frontbench, however, is 
usually predicated upon demonstrated party loyalty. If members of 
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Parliament seek committee assignments as first rungs on the minis- 
terial ladder, this apparent contradiction must be explained. On the 
other hand, if MPs do not envision advancement to the frontbench 
for themselves, one needs to explain why, unlike members in the 
past, they are not content to leave policy formation exclusively in the 
hands of party leaders and to enjoy the relatively burden-free and 
easy life which welcomes them on the backbench. I suggest that 
members are not willing to absolve themselves of the duty to fulfill 
Parliament's constitutional role of scrutiny and accountability. They 
do not seek to devolve policy formation to party leaders in order to 
pursue extraparliamentary interests and duties. They want to be 
knowledgeable and informed during debates and policy discussions 
and to participate in them; therefore, they seek ways to acquire spe- 
cialization and expertise. They recognize the cost and benefits of na- 
tional policies for their constituencies and seek means to pursue their 
constituencies' interests. For many, the call to the frontbench will 
never come, or has come and will not be repeated. These members, 
nevertheless, want to lead active careers in Parliament. The select 
committees created in 1979 provide the opportunity for them to fulfill 
these desires. 
Organization 
The following chapters are organized under two broad sections. Sec- 
tion one, comprised of chapters 2 through 5, examines the dynamics 
of party government and the associated constraints imposed on the 
development of parliamentary select committees. Section two, com- 
prised of chapters 6 through 9, highlights the development of the 
current committee system and presents the results of my survey 
research. 
Party domination of a parliamentary legislature should not be 
considered a natural or necessary phenomenon. Influential roles for 
members and committees with broad powers are not incompatible 
with parliamentary government, as the workings of the German 
Bundestag and the Canadian House of Commons show. Chapter 2 
explains the consequences of party control in Britain over the atti- 
tudes and behavior of MPs and why party dominance ensured exec- 
utive control of the legislature's power and agenda-setting capacities. 
The important point to be made here is not merely that party gov- 
ernment did emerge in Britain. Rather, it is imperative to explain why 
the Opposition frontbench and generally the backbenchers of the ma- 
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jor parties acquiesced in abdicating parliamentary powers and pre- 
rogatives to the executive. 
Once this newly-defined relationship between the legislature and 
the executive became entrenched through formal procedures and in- 
formal norms, fulfilling the House's constitutional role of making the 
executive accountable was virtually impossible, even for the few who 
may have believed this still was Parliament's role and wanted to up- 
hold it. I suggest, then, that today the only viable means of breaking 
the mold of executive control is the creation of alternative "role 
routes" in the House: alternative parliamentary avenues for influ- 
ence and activism for backbenchers. 
Given the influence of political parties over the organization of 
the House of Commons between 1867 and 1979, few parliamentary 
committees seemed necessary. In particular, development of policy 
proposals was monopolized by the leaders of the majority party, not 
by select or standing committees. Chapter 3 discusses the early use of 
committees in the Commons and the limited room for maneuver they 
had in monitoring the executive in any meaningful way. Committees 
were hampered by executive domination of the legislature through 
formal rules and party discipline, members' commonly shared atti- 
tudes about their parliamentary roles, which reinforced their subser- 
vient status, and the apparent development of a constitutional 
doctrine prohibiting Parliament from questioning government min- 
isters and their policies in a committee forum. A number of scholars 
and politicians have lamented this "decline of Parliament," but I 
suggest that this perceived "decline" in truth reflected a normative 
concern with the current state of parliamentary influence in compar- 
ison to the constitutional and theoretical powers that the institution 
possessed. 
With the high turnover in membership following the 1964 general 
election, the new parliamentary entrants pressed the Wilson govern- 
ment to ensure that members would have the opportunity to influ- 
ence policy decisions. Chapter 4 demonstrates that the ensuing 
Crossman Reforms served as a catalyst for further and more compre- 
hensive committee reform proposals. And I argue that this did not 
occur simply because MPs were given a taste of power and wanted 
more. Instead the government grossly miscalculated the degree to 
which members of its own party would use their committee posts to 
develop bipartisan, "parliamentary views" on a policy issue and will- 
ingly criticize party leaders and their policies. The ensuing row 
between the Labour frontbench and the Labour backbench was trans- 
formed into an institutional confrontation pitting a heavy-handed 
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and duplicitous executive against a sovereign legislature invoking its 
constitutional powers. It is one of the great legislative challenges to 
executive ascendancy in the twentieth century that complacency and 
obsession with the "decline of legislatures" leitmotif have caused leg- 
islative scholars to overlook and ignore. 
In subsequent governments, both Labour and Conservative lead- 
ers recognized that calls for committee reforms could no longer be 
avoided. They could, however, appear sympathetic to members' de- 
mands by accepting some Procedure Committee recommendations, 
but only those recommendations that would be beneficial to the gov- 
ernments of the day. In this respect, governments continued the tra- 
dition so clearly pursued in the decades following the introduction 
of party government of supporting parliamentary reforms that were 
in the best interest of the executive. In concluding section one, chap- 
ter 5 focuses on the 1977-78 Select Committee on Procedure report 
that recommended the creation of a comprehensive system of se- 
lect committees to monitor all executive departments. Implement- 
ing the committee's proposals could have far-ranging consequences 
for legislative-executive relations and the role to be played by back- 
bencher~ in the policy process. Most members, including the newly 
chosen Conservative prime minister, failed to appreciate these pos- 
sibilities-essentially because they failed to appreciate how much the 
attitudes and backgrounds of fellow members had changed. The 
views presented in testimony, the breadth of the Procedure Commit- 
tee's investigation, the changed perception of executive-legislative 
relations, and the final recommendations represented a sharp depar- 
ture from the proceedings and reports of previous procedure commit- 
tees. This change in the nature of this committee's report compared 
to previous ones was facilitated by a corresponding change in mem- 
bers' attitudes about their obligations and roles as MPs and the duties 
that Parliament as an institution should be performing. 
If indeed this attitudinal shift has occurred, one should find that 
members' attitudes on a variety of job- and parliamentary-related 
questions differ from those commonly assumed to have been held by 
their predecessors. In chapter 6 I present the evidence collected from 
my survey research. This chapter argues that backbenchers do in- 
deed want opportunities to be active in the legislature and disagree 
sharply with frontbenchers who argue that enough opportunities al- 
ready exist. There are also sharp differences between what members 
spend their time and energies doing in Parliament and what they 
would like to be doing. This gap between their preferred and actual 
roles serves to create frustration and impatience among members. 
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For some, the solution is either to reform Parliament and make it 
"backbench-friendly" or to recognize and accept finally the institu- 
tional and party constraints of the House and abandon any intentions 
of a career in public service at the national level. 
Members who seek more involvement in the policy process must 
have the structural avenues necessary to secure their goals. That MPs 
are discouraged by their present job orientations in Parliament may 
also suggest that they are dissatisfied with the current institutional 
capacities and procedures of Parliament. Indeed, the evidence pre- 
sented in chapter 7 suggests that a gap also exists between those 
tasks Parliament performs best and the tasks members state it should 
be performing. Furthermore, it appears that members do indeed 
have different career goals and have structured corresponding ave- 
nues to secure these goals. 
When members spoke of their goals in Parliament, their jobs as 
MPs, and the role of the legislature in national politics, select com- 
mittees were often identified as forming crucial components in all 
three of these facets of parliamentary life and legislative reform. 
Chapter 8, then, focuses on their attitudes toward select committees, 
addressing why some members chose committee service and others 
did not, why some committee members remained on and others left 
their respective committees, and which goals they hoped to pursue 
on their committees. Where applicable, comparisons are made be- 
tween those who selected committee service and those who did not. 
Because the Procedure Committee in 1978 expressed a desire for a 
normative subculture to develop among committee members, com- 
parisons between the two groups highlight the differences and sim- 
ilarities in their attitudes toward select committees specifically and 
parliament generally. 
This study makes clear that in the Westminster Model, the duties 
and tasks of a committee member differ substantially from those as- 
sociated with chamber-related activities. Committee members need 
to specialize in a subject area, whereas on the floor of the House an 
MP may be expected to move adroitly from one subject to another as 
debate progresses. In debate, an MP's oratorical skills are crucial; in 
committee they are pointless. Questions raised in chamber serve to 
score debating points or embarrass the Opposition. In committee 
they are probing, sustained and nonconfrontational. 
Chapter 9 addresses the qualities and skills that MPs assume are 
important to be effective committee members, how members define 
their committee jobs, and how they perceive the role of select 
committees. Members have found committee service rewarding, es- 
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pecially through access to information and opportunities for special- 
ization. They benefit personally and professionally, but they also 
emphasize that parliamentary government benefits from select com- 
mittee activity. Select committee service may not be attractive to all 
members of Parliament, but even non-committee members recognize 
the role these committees have played in the House and their poten- 
tial for development. 
Far from being "wound up" by the government, as was the case 
just twenty years ago, and with consistently high attendance rates 
and low annual turnover, these select committees appear to be a 
prominent feature of the parliamentary landscape and have served 
both Parliament as an institution and its members individually. 
Party Government in 
a Parliamentary Forum 
The introduction of a comprehensive system of committees whose 
task it is to monitor and scrutinize the executive breaks with parlia- 
mentary tradition and practice, given the primacy of party govern- 
ment. Members of Parliament and political scientists have long noted 
the underlying foundations and practices necessary to support and 
sustain the Westminster Model. Most important among these char- 
acteristics are a strong two-party system, party cohesion and loyalty 
both in and out of Parliament, large numbers of amateurs or part- 
time backbenchers who primarily leave day-to-day governing and 
policy making to a small leadership elite, and party interests that are 
to take precedence over local or parochial interests in an MP's vote in 
a division and his or her behavior on the floor of the House. Indeed, 
while in this view the chamber was seen as the primary arena for 
debating policy, the House has come to have little impact on influ- 
encing the nature of a particular policy or the outcome of the ensu- 
ing vote. 
But Parliament was not always vastly overshadowed by the 
whims and power of the executive. Nor was the floor of the House 
a mere "talking shop where Members speak past each other," know- 
ing their speeches will largely be futile attempts to exercise policy in- 
put or alteration. While the House of Commons and some form of 
parliamentary government have been in existence for centuries, 
those characteristics attributed to the Westminster Model are of rel- 
atively recent origin, beginning in the mid- to late nineteenth century 
with the introduction of party government into the parliamentary 
equation. 
This chapter offers an analysis of the role party dominance plays 
in parliamentary processes and reforms in the House of Commons. I 
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examine both the reasons for reform and how they came about. This 
examination is important in understanding longitudinal shifts in 
members' behavior and attitudes as well as in comparing institu- 
tional changes. Having established a historical and institutional 
framework from which to proceed, I will in my next chapter examine 
in greater detail the calls for reform from the late 1950s to the early 
1970s and early experiments with departmentally-related select com- 
mittees. And I will demonstrate in the following chapters that the na- 
ture of reform proposals and debates changed as members' attitudes 
about the role of Parliament and select committees changed. 
Constitutional Powers and Parliamentary Practice 
Both scholars and members of Parliament note the "Golden Age" of 
Parliament, a period in the mid-nineteenth century when the legis- 
lature was comprised of relatively independent legislators, when the 
chamber was undoubtedly the locus of power, and before party 
government had firmly superimposed itself on parliamentary gov- 
ernment. But the era of independent legislative action and parlia- 
mentary supremacy passed out of existence certainly by the turn of 
the century, and contributors to the prevailing "Decline of Parlia- 
ment" thesis in the 1960s appeared to be primarily comparing the 
reality of Parliament's role in Great Britain with the idealized institu- 
tion of a century previous. Moreover, a common omission in this lit- 
erature is the impact of political parties in organizing parliamentary 
functions and processes. The evidence offered by many authors to 
describe decline or decay could easily be seen as a phenomenon nat- 
urally accompanying the introduction and subsequent maintenance 
of party government. Party dominance of Parliament relied upon 
and was sustained by tight party discipline, institutional hierarchy 
defined by intraparty positions, members pledged to support na- 
tional party manifestos but elected by local constituencies, and the 
majority party's (executive) monopoly of expertise and information 
coupled with control of the timetable and debates of the legislature. 
Nevertheless, the issues raised by these academics, civil servants, 
MPs, and journalists were important in setting the parliamentary 
reform agenda during the first Wilson government in particular. 
Their contribution, arguments, and implications will be examined 
more thoroughly in chapters 3 and 4, where I address the "Crossman 
Reforms." 
The challenge facing many legislative scholars, particularly those 
concerned with an institution as enduring as the British House of 
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Commons, is one of appreciating routinized procedures and institu- 
tional norms. Many parliamentary customs and practices represent 
responses to political and social phenomena of decades past. The 
problem is not merely one of deciding if the way in which a situation 
was handled in the days before politicians were professionals and 
suffrage was universal will influence the way in which it will be han- 
dled in the present era of rigid parties and a mass electorate. As 
David Butler adds, so many political customs have such intricate 
roots in the distant past that "a clear exposition even of obsolescent 
precedents can be an invaluable aid to the understanding of current 
practices" (Butler, 1958, 45-46). 
Chief among the political customs from the distant past that 
shape and direct contemporary politics is the organization of legisla- 
tive activity by political parties. Indeed, party is central to an under- 
standing of the House of Commons in the twentieth century-its 
composition, procedure, and output, as well as the voting behavior 
of MPs and their activity on and off the floor of the House. Formally, 
political parties are unofficial bodies and as such are not recognized 
as part of the constitutional structure; they are, however, at the heart 
of British politics (Norton, 1981,26). Norton's distinction between the 
formal and the theoretical foundations of British government on the 
one hand and the commonly accepted practices on the other encap- 
sulates the debate between reformers and traditionalists. For ex- 
ample, some critics of reform and select committee scrutiny assert 
that because the Constitution provides for a sovereign and supreme 
Parliament, the House of Commons must give its approval to all 
executive-initiated legislation. Thus Parliament as an institution ful- 
fills its constitutional role mainly through its power of assent. 
Several MPs and academics, however, have questioned whether 
Parliament can indeed fulfill its constitutional obligation given the 
paucity of information and expertise available to individual members. 
With the few institutional mechanisms available for scrutiny, moni- 
toring, or policy input, constitutional assumptions are undermined 
by the day-to-day reality of parliamentary government organized 
through political parties. When Gladstone addressed the House in 
the late nineteenth century about its role and the role of its members, 
he said, "You have been summoned here, not to legislate or to gov- 
ern, but to be the constant critic of Government" (Ryle, 1977, 104). 
His dictum appears to have been accepted and practiced throughout 
much of the twentieth century as well. 
During the period between the first two Reform Acts (1832-67), 
the relationship between the government and the House of Com- 
mons was one of almost mutual dependence. The House expected 
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the government to exercise the executive authority, and the govern- 
ment looked to the House for support. The dynamics of this 
relationship prohibited the House from being taken for granted, as 
the outcome of votes was not a foregone conclusion and the House 
could, and did, replace one government with another. Although the 
executive continued to be chosen from Parliament, the relationship 
between the two changed significantly after 1867. 
The Reform Act of 1867 stimulated a certain amount of national 
organization in order to increase voter registration and provide a list 
of possible candidates for constituencies lacking suitable local pros- 
pects. The national organization-at the time usually headed by the 
party's chief whip in the House of Commons-might encourage con- 
stituency organizations to name candidates wherever local party 
leaders had failed to do so or to attempt to arbitrate when the local 
party leaders were split. The Reform Act of 1867 also prompted the 
growth of constituency organizations in order to attract the new 
working-class voters. The first prominent example was the "Birming- 
ham caucus," established by Joseph Chamberlain (Arnstein, 1976, 
132). The individual Birmingham voter had the right to elect the cau- 
cus, or leadership, of his constituency party organization. But since 
most voters then, as now, did not bother to attend party meetings, 
this leadership remained in the hands of party workers and activists, 
who tended to choose party nominees. This procedure subsequently 
became standard in most constituencies. 
The emergence of a large electoral role, the growth of party com- 
petition, and the development of large, centralized party organiza- 
tions also changed the position of members within Parliament. 
Increased activity by the constituency party caucuses, together with 
the improvement in communications, served to tighten the relation- 
ship between an MP and his local organization (Butt, 1967, 90). Con- 
sequently, the parliamentary activity of an individual member was 
no longer only his own concern or that of a limited few; it was now 
also that of his constituents and party. Moreover, conflicts between 
constituent interests and party policy seemed rare or even irrelevant, 
for the electors no longer identified with members as individuals but 
increasingly with party, and it was on the strength of their party la- 
bels that members were elected (Norton, 1981, 16). And as mass par- 
ties assumed positions of dominance, the effect on Parliament and 
parliamentary life was profound. Norton notes that the organization 
of government and politics around party resulted in members of 
Parliament being dependent upon a party label for election to West- 
minster and deferring to party leaders once there. He adds: "The 
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House became a party-dominated institution, heavily dependent 
upon a Government for information and the generation of public pol- 
icy. By the 20th century, the House was a marginal actor in the mak- 
ing of public policy. The relationship between the two was almost one 
of master (the Government) and the servant (the House)" (Norton, 
1986a, 69). 
Parliament's subservient position vis-a-vis the executive appears 
inconsistent with the formal, constitutional theory of a supreme and 
sovereign Parliament. But consistent with the demands and expecta- 
tions imposed by party government, one would expect increased vot- 
ing along party lines to occur in the House. Indeed, in 1836 the 
percentage of divisions where both parties cast party votes (90 per- 
cent voting on the same side) was only 23 percent. Voting cohesion 
diminished to 6 percent in 1860, when the fragmentation of parties 
was greatest. Following the Reform Act of 1867 and more centralized 
political parties, the percentage of party votes rose almost uninter- 
ruptedly to 76 percent in 1894. And by 1899, the number of divisions 
in which neither side of the House cast a party vote almost vanished 
to less than 3 percent of all recorded votes (Butt, 1967, 83). For one of 
the earliest "behavioral" works on voting in the House, see also 
Lawrence A. Lowell, The Government in England (New York: Mac- 
millan, 1924). 
Despite the restrictions imposed by party government on parlia- 
mentary assertion, nineteenth-century Britain's leading scholar and 
commentator on Parliament and the Constitution, Walter Bagehot, 
suggested other roles for Parliament. Writing in the year of the Sec- 
ond Reform Act, he identified a number of deliberative functions for 
the House of Commons. These extended well beyond "watching and 
checking ministers of the crown," a primary constitutional principle 
that tended to be neglected in subsequent decades. Bagehot con- 
ceived Parliament to have an "expressive" function: "All opinions ex- 
tensively entertained, all sentiments widely diffused, should be 
stated publicly before the nation. We must take care to bring before 
[the] . . . legislature, the sentiments, the interests, the opinions, the 
prejudices, the wants of all classes of the nation" (quoted in Bagehot, 
1974, 6: 195). 
Bagehot also perceived Parliament to have a "teaching" function, 
and to him this "teaching" or enlightenment necessarily implied 
change and reform. It did not mean that government's task was to 
maintain the status quo: "A great and open council of considerable 
men cannot be placed in the middle of society without altering that 
society. It ought to alter it for the better. It ought to teach that nation 
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what it does not know" (Bagehot, 1974, 173). Perhaps not surpris- 
ingly, many of the members of Parliament I interviewed who com- 
plained of Parliament's subservient status placed a strong emphasis 
on Parliament's ability to educate the public about government poli- 
cies. In fact, they felt that one of the most important functions of the 
post-1979 select committees was their teaching and educating role. 
A third function of Parliament, according to Bagehot, was its "in- 
forming" role, which is to say the House of Commons was an arena 
of debate for issues not faced by either principal party: "Any notion, 
any creed, any feeling, any grievance which can get a decent number 
of English to stand up for it [is] . . . possible-an opinion within the 
intellectual sphere, an opinion to be reckoned w i t h  (Bagehot, 1974, 
174). Of course, Bagehot's sweeping generalities of the endless 
"valid" opinions-and opportunities to present them-seem unreal- 
istic, but it is precisely this opportunity for debate that has been 
pointed to as confirming the constitutional relationship between the 
government and Parliament. It is also a function that opponents of 
reform through investigatory committees suggest is the most impor- 
tant one for the House, and committee service would only tend to 
deplete the attendance during such debates. 
Bagehot also stresses the "elective" function of the House of 
Commons. His understanding of Parliament's elective role consists of 
two features. First, the House elects whom "it likes" for executive of- 
fice and also exercises the power and privilege of dismissing those 
whom it dislikes. Second, the House is able to make such decisions 
because of the free will in judgment allowed to its members. He ar- 
gues: "The house only goes where it thinks in the end the nation will 
follow; but it takes its chance of the nation following or not following 
it; it assumes the initiative, and acts upon its discretion or its ca- 
price. . . . Because the House of Commons has the power of dis- 
missal in addition to the power of election, its relations to the Premier 
are incessant" (Bagehot, 1974, 172). 
While Bagehot stresses the formal constitutional powers of Par- 
liament, executive-parliamentary relations changed considerably 
with the introduction and maintenance of party government. And al- 
though Bagehot's descriptive and constitutional analysis may have 
been fairly accurate at the time of the Reform Act, the influence of 
individual members and the House as a whole over government pol- 
icy began to dwindle as party politics became increasingly important 
in the Westminster equation. Rather than being responsible to Par- 
liament as the sovereign legislature, which the Constitution pre- 
sumes, the prime minister was responsible to the party with the 
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largest majority in the House. Indeed, party not only was the "tie 
that binds" but also served to restrict the Commons and its members. 
The advent of mass suffrage and the growth of party deprived the 
House of Commons not only of its elective function, but also of an- 
other function ascribed to it, namely, the legislative function. One 
might expect a legislature to legislate and legislators to initiate legis- 
lation. But the degree to which a legislature's policy-initiating and - 
monitoring domain is free from other constraints (i.e., party 
dominance, executive popularity, and interest groups) can and does 
vary markedly. The executive, or government, assumes its authority 
not only through its majority of members in Parliament pledged to 
support its programs, but also because it can claim support from the 
electorate through the democratic, electoral process that sent repre- 
sentatives to Westminster. Because voters were presented with mem- 
bers of Parliament standing as party representatives and elected 
them on the basis of the candidates' party affiliation, a key voter-MP- 
government link was forged. Political parties developed party pro- 
grams and manifestos that delineated the differences between 
parties as well as delivering to the electorate reasonable expectations 
and assurances of the likely policies the winning party would pursue 
in the next Parliament. In turn, government would enjoy the support 
of a majority in the House to facilitate its legislative program and to 
keep its electoral pledge with the voters. This relationship of mutual 
dependence through expectations and obligations allowed the gov- 
ernment to claim a mandate not only for the pledges made during the 
election campaign but for subsequent policies pursued until the next 
election. 
The notion of governing by a mandate became equally important 
in the executive's control of the parliamentary timetable. Redlich 
points out that, as the notion of the mandate developed, government- 
sponsored legislation, which was promised at the polls, began to be 
given precedence over the bills of private members. Moreover, pri- 
vate members had neither the facilities nor the information and ex- 
pertise to prepare the complex bills that were becoming a feature of 
parliamentary life (Redlich, 1908). The result was a gradual domina- 
tion of Parliament by the executive. 
Executive ascendancy was also aided in the 1880s when ministers 
and backbenchers sought means to protect themselves from Irish 
obstruction in the House over the lingering issue of Home Rule. 
The reforms, introduced by Gladstone, "represented the watershed 
between the old and the new Government-managed Parliament" 
(Butt, 1967, 88). Closure, which has now become an institutionalized 
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instrument for curtailing debate, was introduced, followed by the 
guillotine (in effect, a timetable motion). The traditional right of 
members to raise adjournment debates on what were considered 
matters of urgency was also severely restricted. The Speaker of the 
House was empowered to order a member to stop his speech if the 
Speaker deemed it irrelevant or repetitive, and the Speaker's power 
to "name" a member (usually resulting in temporary expulsion from 
the chamber) was strengthened (Norton, 1981a, 19; Redlich, 1908; 
Butt, 1967,83-9; Mackenzie, 1950,137-43). These procedural reforms 
may appear rather more evolutionary than revolutionary, especially 
in comparison to contemporary legislatures that have varied arrays of 
rules and procedures to process heavy legislative agendas. Neverthe- 
less these and several other similar reforms that followed over the 
next twenty years did indeed mark "a watershed for an institution 
that was to be manned by independent-thinking gentlemen who 
were in the House to debate "the great issues of the day." Such 
changes diminished the power of the individual MP and of minori- 
ties, while strengthening the government backed by its parliamen- 
tary majority. And although Gladstone introduced and justified such 
reforms in response to Irish obstruction, Redlich has observed that 
the action of the Irish members helped accelerate the reforms but 
were not the true cause of them: "The real motive power came from 
the alteration in the nature of British Government itself" (Norton, 
1981a, 19). 
The introduction of parliamentary reforms to dispense with the 
Irish problem served the government effectively in overcoming ob- 
struction from other private members, including the Opposition 
frontbench. Moreover, these reforms were not repealed when the 
stated motive for their introduction (obstruction by Irish members) 
had been resolved. Governments ensured that the reforms remained 
in place and initiated further reforms to increase their powers and 
prerogatives in Parliament. The most important feature common to 
all these reforms was the restrictions placed on backbenchers and 
other private members to regulate the proceedings of their House 
and to debate freely issues important to them. Instead, control of the 
parliamentary timetable, the structure of chamber debates, and the 
introduction of legislation became the prerogative of the executive. 
Paradoxically, the developments that made the Commons the 
dominant element of Parliament-the rise of a mass electorate, 
growth of national political parties, and the demands of the new elec- 
torate-also served to shift the locus of decision-making and policy 
formulation from the House to other bodies. Of the functions iden- 
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tified by Bagehot, the House lost its two most important: the elective 
function (choosing the government), which it lost to the electorate, 
and its function of legislation, which effectively passed to the cabinet. 
As Norton points out, party served as the conduit for this transfer: 
"Contact with the new electors could only be made through highly 
organized political parties and the support of the voters obtained 
through promising the passage of measures salient to their interests; 
such passage was possible only by the presence in the House of Com- 
mons of a party majority. The initiative for promising measures 
passed to the party leadership; election success resulted in the party 
leadership becoming Prime Minister and his lieutenants serving in 
the Cabinet. The Cabinet depended upon the support of a majority in 
the House; party ensured that the majority was usually forthcoming" 
(Norton, 1982a, 7). 
Defining a Role for Parliament 
What role, then, did or does Parliament play in the governing pro- 
cess? How can one reconcile party government through democratic 
elections with what the Conservative Lord Hailsham has termed "an 
elected dictatorship"? These questions form the central issues in un- 
derstanding subsequent parliamentary reform and institutional 
change. Party government is an abstraction of European parliamen- 
tary democracy in the era of mass suffrage and can be seen as one 
historical answer to the problems of mass politics and class confron- 
tation. Katz has argued that although most clearly based on academic 
interpretations of British practice, the party government model is an 
intellectual construct whose logic is far more coherent than is the ac- 
tual operation of any real government (Katz, 1986,42-43). He sees the 
party government model as representing the adaptation of the insti- 
tutions of bourgeois parliamentary democracy (which were adapta- 
tions of the institution of royal government) to democracies with 
electorates numbering in the millions rather than the thousands. 
Katz suggests that this model retains legitimacy with democratic the- 
ory because government is made accountable to the general public by 
entrusting government to individuals organized into parties who 
owe their positions to electoral choice. But, although party govern- 
ment was to produce governments based on organizations account- 
able to the electorate, political parties in time "shifted from the 
channeling function (social demands and preferences brought to the 
consideration of policy-makers) to the steering function (their own 
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ability to guide the socio-political process of allocation of resources)- 
their problem-solving capacity" (Pasquino, 1986, 139). 
Parliament as an institution was the key in this shift by retaining 
its constitutional role as a sovereign and supreme body and by pro- 
viding formal accountability to the electorate through elected repre- 
sentatives. And indeed accountability remained more formal than 
real. The responsibility of government to Parliament is a political re- 
lationship and as such it is not a matter of precise definition nor to be 
found in codified texts (Norton, 1982a, 98). Even if the power to de- 
feat government were used more frequently, the fact would still re- 
main that Parliament is not the government and does not govern. In 
a strictly procedural sense Parliament does formally decide many 
matters, but most votes are cast along party lines, and many issues 
are not discussed at all. 
The issue of whether the House of Commons should properly be 
described as a "rubber stamp" is, to Rush, a different matter, "for 
whether Parliament is effective or not there is no mistaking its basic 
political function: to examine and question government policy and 
activity (or lack of it)" (Rush, 1986,273). One cannot, however, so eas- 
ily separate the issues of effectiveness and functions as Rush sug- 
gests. While one might support Rush's claim that examination and 
questioning of government policy and activity are a "basic political 
function", this role is also a constitutional one. As such, determining 
Parliament's ability to fulfill this constitutional obligation and respon- 
sibility to a very large extent assists in understanding its institutional 
effectiveness. Many current MPs interviewed stated that Parlia- 
ment's role was indeed to examine and question the government's 
policy, but added that the institution had abandoned this role. They 
also envisioned the new select committee system as a means of as- 
serting the House's constitutional responsibility. Furthermore, they 
added that party government carried the onus of responsibility for 
hampering the Commons from performing its scrutiny and monitor- 
ing functions. 
Although Parliament effectively ceased to be involved in the 
making of public policy, it theoretically would execute its constitu- 
tional role through scrutiny and influence. But while governments 
were seeking even greater powers through procedural reforms in the 
House to expedite their expanding legislative programs more quickly, 
the Commons was not being allowed to develop correspondingly ex- 
pert methods of scrutiny or information-gathering. The effects of 
streamlining procedures and of delegating more power to Whitehall, 
coupled with party discipline, resulted in drastically reduced oppor- 
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tunities for critical analysis by backbenchers (Downs, 1985, 55). Sec- 
ond, while scrutiny and influence are analytically separable terms, 
Norton argues that they may be conjoined as a single function of Par- 
liament: "Scrutiny without any consequent sanction to effect influ- 
ence is of little worth; and influence is best and most confidently 
attempted when derived from prior scrutiny" (Norton, 1985, 6). 
Members of Parliament are aware of the House's constitutional 
authority and role in scrutinizing the government. And they tend to 
agree with Norton that their collective influence is best achieved 
through prior scrutiny. Select committees offer opportunities for Par- 
liament both to influence and to scrutinize government activity. 
When I asked members in an open-ended question to describe the 
importancelpower of Parliament, the response given most often was 
its role of scrutinizing the government. Moreover, when they were 
asked, "Do you think that the executive has become too powerful vis- 
a-vis Parliament?" more than 75 percent of the respondents replied 
yes. Of those who felt that there was indeed an imbalance between 
the two institutions, a follow-up question asked what they thought 
should be done to change the balance in this relationship. In re- 
sponse to this open-ended question, 85 percent believed that the ex- 
panded select committee system provided the means "to claw back 
power from the executive." Calls for parliamentary reform prior to 
the 1950s and 1960s almost invariably meant streamlining procedures 
within the House of Commons for the sake and benefit of the gov- 
ernment. The legislature appeared to be perceived by the executive as 
the legitimator of cabinet policies. And indeed, Parliament's role be- 
came one of legitimizing what had been decided elsewhere. 
Paradoxically, the very institutional trappings sought by party 
leaders to dominate the chamber, control the timetable, and ensure 
passage of most legislation through party discipline would also en- 
sure reduced influence by those men when in Opposition. The po- 
sitions adopted by party leaders on procedural reforms and the needs 
of the executive to govern efficiently differ markedly when out of 
power than when in government. For example, during his tenure as 
a cabinet minister and later as prime minister, David Lloyd George 
had little sympathy for parliamentary interference with the proposals 
of his ministry or government. His controversial "People's Budget" of 
1909 was resisted by Conservatives in the House of Commons and 
took seventy sittings and 554 divisions before it was passed by a 
Liberal-Labour-Irish Nationalist coalition. Although stalling tactics 
could be used effectively by an organized Opposition, party govern- 
ment ensured victory. Nevertheless, in 1931, nine years after losing 
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the premiership, Lloyd George testified before the House of Com- 
mons Select Committee on Procedure. The committee's remit was to 
gather evidence to consider what reforms, if any, might be needed for 
the House to address more efficiently the economic problems facing 
Britain. Lloyd George declared: "My . . . criticism would be that the 
control of the Executive by the House of Commons is confined to 
rather perfunctory dimensions, which does not excite any real inter- 
est, apart from an element of censure which is conducive to excite- 
ment, but does not achieve the real purpose of establishing control 
over the Executive. . . . The fact of the matter is that the House of 
Commons has no real effective and continuous control over the ac- 
tions of the Executive" (Norton, 1981a, 201-2). 
Several parliamentary scholars, including Marsh, Pasquino, and 
Norton, have argued that the increased involvement by government 
in the social and economic affairs of the nation has also served to de- 
crease Parliament's role in the policy process. The growth of the Wel- 
fare State and the managed economy generated larger governmental 
departments and greatly increased expenditure accompanied by a 
mass of legislation difficult for Parliament to process because of its 
extent and, more significantly perhaps, because of its complexity. Ac- 
cess to information and expertise remained the province of the exec- 
utive. Because debates in the chamber were the only significant 
means available for other MPs to challenge government policy, these 
debates were dominated by the government frontbench because of 
the expertise and specialist knowledge to which it alone realistically 
had access. Parliament failed to generate an institutional capacity to 
keep abreast of the increased legislation or to create avenues through 
which it could acquire expert advice on government-sponsored initi- 
atives. But alternative forums for the purpose of gaining necessary 
specialist knowledge in order to create, initiate, or influence policies 
are incompatible with the theory and practice of party government. 
In short, these parliamentary tools would be unnecessary and redun- 
dant in an institutional environment whose members accept and pro- 
mote the rules and norms of party government. 
As government intervention in the economic and social life of the 
nation expanded, ministers became more dependent on diverse 
groups operating in these sectors. Policy increasingly was made by 
government in conjunction with outside groups, and the locus of 
policy making and influence moved even further from Parliament 
(Richardson and Jordan, 1979). Indeed, policy formulation was a pro- 
cess carried out between the elected (cabinet ministers), those who 
would execute the policy (civil servants and interest groups), and 
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those who would be most immediately affected by the policy (interest 
groups). Tight party cohesion generally ensured passage of the leg- 
islation; members were assured of its acceptability, feasibility, and le- 
gitimacy because all relevant groups had been consulted and had 
given their assent. Marsh offers an interesting analysis of this process 
and Parliament's role in it by differentiating between the "private" 
and "public" dimensions of policy making in party government. In a 
two-party system of party government, a parliament is conceived as 
the setting for a "continuing election campaign." While the public 
face of politics is based on a contest for executive office between the 
parties, Marsh suggests that this struggle for office often distorts de- 
bate about the merit of issues (Marsh, 1986, 101). Indeed, lacking the 
expertise and specialized information available to the government 
frontbench, backbenchers and the Opposition often base their criti- 
cisms of government policy on moral or philosophical arguments. 
Furthermore, the government retains the advantage in defending 
technical and complex policies with, appropriately, technical argu- 
ments and justifications. On the other hand, the Opposition is 
largely left with scoring debating points in the chamber. Most of the 
MPs I interviewed argued that while debates and Question Time in 
the House are in theory opportunities to scrutinize and criticize the 
government and its policies, the chamber was "a farce," "a talking 
shop," "irrelevant," and "useless." In practice, given the lack of in- 
formation to which they had access, members claimed the chamber 
was reduced to a forum for embarrassing a minister or scoring de- 
bating points. 
The "benefit" of focusing public attention on general debate be- 
tween adversarial parties is to leave policy making a "private" activ- 
ity between ministers and departments. Cabinet ministers essentially 
deliver the agreed-upon policy to the House for ratification. Party 
government normally ensures passage. Marsh, too, points out that 
this process rests upon certain assumptions consistent with demo- 
cratic values: "The 'private' character of policy-making and the con- 
centration of the power of initiative in the hands of ministers 
presumes elections settle the 'political' dimension of policy-making. 
'Private' policy-making presumes the parties are the exclusive agents 
for general interests and that they are capable of mobilizing sustained 
majority support" (Marsh, 1986, 101). 
The current relationship between the executive and the House 
was one that was forged a century ago, and the Parliament that took 
shape in the late nineteenth century reflected the contemporary so- 
cial and political environment. The House of Commons provided a 
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forum for discussion and debate, but its members were not involved, 
nor did they wish to be involved, in detailed policy formulation. Par- 
liament did not convene until 2:30 p.m. so that its members could 
pursue their professional and personal interests during the morning 
and attend to their "government service" sometime after lunch. For 
the most part in this laissez-faire, sociopolitical environment, MPs 
were content to defer to their party leaders. It is important to remem- 
ber that the relationship that developed between the executive and 
the House was based upon mutual interests-ensuring support and 
passage of the majority party's election mandate. While the party in 
Opposition may have had little influence over government through 
Parliament, it did have an incentive in maintaining party government 
and a subservient role for the House of Commons. Given the alter- 
nating pattern of party control of the House (and by extension of the 
executive), reforms championed while in Opposition to change the 
institutional relationship would only hamper the party when next in 
power. 
The rubber-stamping role often attributed to Parliament appears 
to be one the House has, until recently, accepted. The extent of back- 
bench subservience can be understood in a like manner. Given that 
backbench MPs usually outnumber their frontbench counterparts by 
a ratio of three to one, why is it that a majority of MPs in the gov- 
erning party willingly accept discipline from the minority who hold 
government positions? The most often offered response is party iden- 
tification (Rose, 1981, 78). Party identity is claimed to be the tie that 
binds frontbench and backbench MPs to maintain a government in 
power. Moreover, members of the governing party share some col- 
lective goals, both ideological and instrumental. Although they may 
differ among themselves, they are united in wishing to secure their 
own and their party's victory at the next general election. Thus the 
goals of the individual MP are commensurate with the party's, al- 
though the former were often subordinate to and sacrificed for the 
latter. Until recently, any substantial division within a party on gov- 
ernment legislation would force a government to resign and call for 
new elections, plunging all into political uncertainty. 
John Mackintosh also views the members of a parliamentary 
party as like-minded individuals who form one politically cohesive 
and homogeneous whole. In addressing the issue of executive dom- 
inance over the legislature through party control, he ignores the 
possibility of any overt manifestations of intraparty dissent. He 
maintains: 
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To understand party loyalty, it must be appreciated that most MPs have spent 
years in their party before election to the House. They have joined it, worked 
for it and probably stood as candidates once or twice before election. They 
identify themselves with the party's general approach and any serious fail- 
ures of high policy are personal calamities for them. They may want to 
change aspects of policy, they may at times disagree with members of the 
Cabinet including the Prime Minister, but despite this they still wish the 
party to be successful. Because of this, they will defend the party in public 
which means supporting the Prime Minister's action in the lobbies and in the 
constituencies. [Mackintosh, 1977, 62-63] 
While it is agreed that Conservative or Labour MPs will share 
broad, fundamental views, simple identification with the "party's 
general approach" remains an inadequate explanation of party cohe- 
sion and parliamentary subservience. In identifying four possible 
factors accounting for party unity, Anthony King extends the version 
offered by Mackintosh: 
1. The majority party wants to sustain a government in office; if too 
many MPs on the Government side rebel, that may be the end of the 
Government. 
2. MPs fall into line because they hope to hold office or already do; the 
Executive remains the primary source of patronage. 
3. There is an absence of positive, constituency-inspired incentives for 
breaking with the party. 
4. There is the sense that the public will punish a divided party at the 
polls; most voters vote only for the party and MPs know it. [King, 1974, 
81-83] 
Although a combination of these four factors may provide strong ex- 
planatory variables for party unity, it seems unlikely that any single 
factor could produce the type of party cohesion that has traditionally 
characterized British politics. For example, the first factor does not ex- 
plain unity on the Opposition side. Nor does it account for the whips' 
passion for mustering the full government majority. It also does not 
take into account that governments have indeed been defeated on 
major pieces of legislation without being followed by a resignation or 
parliamentary elections. 
G. R. Strauss, a former Labour MP, supports some of King's as- 
sertions. Writing about the influence of Labour backbenchers upon 
a Labour government, Strauss maintains that the opinions of the 
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backbench are rarely listened to. Nor do backbenchers wield any 
influence in setting the government's legislative agenda: "With La- 
bour in Government, the influence of the backbencher on policy is 
small. Decisions are made in the secrecy of the Cabinet. Prior con- 
sultation with backbenchers is impossible and subsequent rejection 
politically impracticable. . . . The possibility of an early election 
makes it essential to avoid the image of an indecisive Government 
that can be diverted from its course by backbench pressures" 
(Strauss, 1972, 226-27). 
The only time when Labour backbenchers are able to exert any 
influence appears to be in Opposition. These MPs are then subject to 
the frustrations of having achieved some influence in preparing 
party programs, manifestos, and orientations while their party is 
out of office but then being denied any role precisely at that moment 
when access to decisionmaking would be most important-when 
their party forms the government. Although some party members 
will be promoted to the frontbench, most will remain on the back- 
bench to be joined by a few former frontbenchers who have been ex- 
iled, at least temporarily, to the backbench. 
This lack of backbench influence is a manifestation of party gov- 
ernment and a recognition of the principles of party government and 
party representation. As David Judge (1981) points out, this doctrine 
maintains that the MP is primarily a representative of his party, a del- 
egate whose task it is to carry out the program offered to the elector- 
ate at the last election. Since candidates stand for Parliament on a 
party manifesto listing the policies to be pursued if the MP and party 
are victorious, the party is then committed to translate the manifesto 
into action. Individual MPs, pledged to these promises, are conse- 
quently obliged to support the party's program in the House. 
Committees in a Party Government 
The dominance of party government and the accompanying 
authority-hierarchical relationship between the executive and Parlia- 
ment, and the government and backbenchers, also affects the voting 
behavior of MPs. In making the decision on how to vote and the 
stance to take on complicated bills in a complex world, the member's 
task was made easy by following the party cue. Judge suggests that 
conformity to the "party line" provides the backbencher with a rela- 
tively cost-free mode of decisionmaking, allowing him to reach a de- 
cision on any particular issue without necessarily having a detailed 
Party Government in a Parliamentary Forum 35 
understanding of the subject involved (Judge, 1981, 11-12). But per- 
haps the more interesting point to be raised is the likely result of 
cross-pressuring cues. What might be the effects of an MP's receiving 
expert information from a bipartisan select committee when that 
committee's recommendations or evidence deviate substantially 
from the official "party line"? Unfortunately, this question has yet to 
be subject to academic scrutiny and thus no definitive answer can be 
given. Nevertheless, it would seem plausible to suggest that an al- 
ternative and equally respected or feared cue-giving structure could 
seriously erode both the necessity and the practicality of party dom- 
inance over Parliament. It could precipitate a critical reexamination of 
party government. Indeed, several members I interviewed stated that 
they had voted against their parties' positions on the floor of the 
House based on the recommendations of bipartisan select committee 
reports. 
Challenges to party government are not a new phenomenon in 
British politics, nor are they limited to the postwar era. Backbench 
specialization through committee work, however, would further un- 
dermine the authority relationship inherent in party government. 
Specialization would result in further diffusion of authority, author- 
ity which up until very recently had been monopolized by party lead- 
ers. The norms of the House of Commons reflect the values of the 
most important and powerful actors in Parliament and so support the 
existing distribution of power and status quo. Thus Judge's research 
on backbench specialization in the House of Commons has led him to 
conclude: 
In conforming with these norms, backbenchers have been led to accept as 
imperative the need for party loyalty . . . and, above all, the advisability of 
performing the generalist role within the House. Moreover, backbenchers 
have been socialized into the belief that conformity will positively assist their 
career prospects in the House. . . . And he adds: The perpetuation of gen- 
eralist values in the House is in the basic interest of the executive, and as long 
as backbenchers remain convinced that their political careers should be ori- 
ented to the attainment of executive office, then they will continue to con- 
form to those norms most likely to secure this goal. Uudge, 1981, 13-14; 221 
The second sense of persistence of party government relates to 
the continued adherence of those in power to its norms. Party gov- 
ernment should persist in this sense so long as the structure of in- 
centives that led individuals to adopt that strategy remains in place. 
Pasquino's research on party government leads him to conclude: 
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"Although party government involves costs for some people, once a 
system of party government is established, those who come to the 
top have a vested interest in its continuation, as well as in the con- 
tinuation of their own parties. At the same time, many of the condi- 
tions of party government are subject to conscious manipulation. 
Thus barriers may be erected against those who attempt to pursue a 
nonparty strategy" (Pasquino, 1986, 63-64). 
As long as executive office is the only available career goal and as 
long as party loyalty is the only avenue, or career ladder, to pursue, 
MPs are subject to the logical demand of pursuing these "choices" 
that ultimately serve to legitimate party government and the 
authority-hierarchical relationship. Should alternative career oppor- 
tunities and structures be created in Parliament, party loyalty and 
party unity would diminish in importance as means of achieving ca- 
reer goals. I believe select committees can indeed be viewed as "al- 
ternative structures," allowing members to specialize and therefore 
removing them, to a degree, from the dictates of party leaders. At the 
same time, as several MPs have commented during debates and tes- 
timony, committee posts grant backbenchers more active and reward- 
ing participation in the governing process than would be possible 
through years of service as mere loyal party men and women. Com- 
mittee service can also guarantee meaningful parliamentary careers 
to those persons for whom the call to executive posts will never 
come. Furthermore, whereas backbenchers achieve a degree of free- 
dom in policy formulation in Opposition but not when in power, the 
creation of departmental select committees would provide the struc- 
tural prerequisites necessary to maintain a sense of continuity in 
backbench influence toward the executive, whether it be a Labour or 
a Conservative government. 
Because party leaders are the granters of patronage, the power 
rests with them not only to reward MPs with parliamentary and ex- 
ecutive posts, but also to remove noncooperative members from 
these positions. This situation becomes problematic for backbenchers 
who are assigned to committees by party whips. If these MPs are per- 
ceived as becoming too independent, the whips are able to remove 
them from the committees. In effect, then, Parliament can only scru- 
tinize the executive if committee members understand, a priori, that 
they must respect party ties, placing them in a double-bind that ef- 
fectively prohibits any real scrutiny. As Leader of the House in the 
mid-1960s, Richard Crossman understood this dilemma. His reforms 
were intended to provide legislators the opportunity to have careers 
as parliamentary specialists who would not be forever subject to the 
Party Government in a Parliamentary Forum 3 7 
norm of party loyalty. But Crossman realized that the whips, acting 
within the rationale of party government, found such independence 
unacceptable: "They [whips] have to be able to impose discipline by 
giving people jobs and by taking them away and he simply can't un- 
derstand why if members of the party behave awkwardly on a Select 
Committee he shouldn't remove them. Yet I want to see these Spe- 
cialist Committees develop as a really effective control over the Exec- 
utive. For this purpose they need to have a core of members who 
grow old and hoary in their service, not unlike the cadres of the 
American Congressional Committees" (Crossman, 1976, 327). Recog- 
nizing this problem, parliamentary reformers ensured that back- 
bencher~ serving on the select committees created in 1979 would not 
be subject to placement or removal by party whips. 
The acceptance of the principles of party government, in both 
theory and practical-career terms poses an obvious dilemma for 
would-be reformers of the House. The reassertion of Parliament's 
power is dependent upon the fragmentation of the executive's power, 
but centralization of power in the hands of the government effectively 
means that it alone has the capacity to sanction the diffusion of power 
necessary for the rejuvenation of the legislature. Later discussion will 
address the peculiar circumstances that allowed the 1979 reforms to 
occur. The distinction between parliamentary government and party 
government should be made clear. The issue at hand is not merely 
* the (re-)birth of a committee system within a parliamentary frame- 
work, but rather its rebirth within a legislative environment that is 
overshadowed by a traditionally strong party system. This dilemma 
posed several challenges for successive governments-Labour and 
Conservative. In the following chapters I examine governments' re- 
form initiatives and subsequent responses to select committee exper- 
iments in the House of Commons. 
Parliamentary Committees under 
Party Government 
The development and dynamics of party government highlighted in 
the previous chapter had obvious ramifications for the creation and 
functions of parliamentary committees. In this chapter I examine 
more closely the use of parliamentary specialist committees prior to 
the 1966 Crossman Reforms. Given a system of party government 
supported by amateur and generalist members of Parliament, one 
would expect few calls for procedural reforms that would result in the 
creation of legislative committees. And for those committees that 
were created, one would surmise they were little involved with policy 
matters and prirharily functioned as extensions of the executive in 
the House. 
While these earlier committees may not have been completely 
subservient to the whims of the cabinet, it seems clear that the gov- 
ernment would only support creating committees whose aims and 
purpose would be consistent with a government's overall interest in 
fiscal efficiency and management. Political constraints prevented 
committees from developing in the way traditional organizational 
theory and division of labor might suggest. Consequently, substan- 
tive procedural and institutional reform could not occur until a 
change in MPs' attitudes toward the role of Parliament and their 
place within it also shifted significantly. 
Members were party men and women, and it was to party that 
they owed their primary loyalty. Moreover, as Norton illustrates, 
members characteristically stressed the centrality of the floor of the 
House, an emphasis that was consistent with prevailing notions of 
representation. Parliamentary committees were associated with spe- 
cialization, but the principle underlying constituency representation 
was that of the generalist (Norton, 1986a, 10-18.) 
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Committees under Party Government 
The committees created in the nineteenth century shared a common 
focus of ensuring efficiency and "value for money" for the govern- 
ment's policies. But these early committees were hampered in their 
efforts both by the lack of expertise and specialization of their mem- 
bers and by the growing interference of party politics in committee 
hearings and proceedings. Just as leaders of the majority party sup- 
ported procedural reforms that would allow the government in- 
creased influence over proceedings in the chamber, so too was party 
pressure exerted on committees of the House. As legislative initia- 
tives became more controversial, the executive's need for political 
control of committee proceedings led to greater emphasis on political 
considerations in determining their memberships (Walkland, 1979b, 
245). Thus, these legislative committees lost many of their investiga- 
tory and deliberative characteristics and instead increasingly reflected 
the nature and spirit of the parent chamber. The committee chair- 
men, much like the Speaker of the House, adopted the role of im- 
partial moderator between government and Opposition supporters 
who were placed on the committee by their respective party leaders. 
Moreover, leadership of the committees was granted to represen- 
tatives of the government, including the ministers responsible for 
a particular bill. The experience and characteristics of these early 
legislative and financial parliamentary committees underscore the 
environment and expectations that would surround subsequent par- 
liamentary committees. 
Most observers of legislators and legislative politics point to leg- 
islatures' "power of the purse" to demonstrate their roots of power 
and influence. Indeed, the granting of supply to the government in 
return for consideration of grievance petitions was a centuries-old 
constitutional doctrine governing the relationship between king and 
nobles, Crown and Parliament, and later government and the House. 
But in practice, the granting of supply constitutes one of the formal 
rather than the real functions of the House. The introduction and 
continued importance of party government ensured that no govern- 
ment with an overall majority was likely to be denied supply. 
Moreover, the Committee of Supply was in essence a committee 
of the whole House; the chamber suspended and reconstituted itself 
as the Committee of Supply. The ability of such an unwieldy body of 
several hundred members to subject the government's raising and 
spending of money to detailed and rigorous scrutiny proved virtually 
impossible for a number of reasons. First, and most obvious, the 
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sheer number of potential participants made sustained scrutiny im- 
practical. Second, the House of Commons and its members lacked 
the resources and information available to the government in ap- 
praising the merits of specific supply issues. And in fact, the Com- 
mons was dependent upon the government for information, a 
situation that began to change significantly only in the latter half of 
the twentieth century. Third, although the entire membership of the 
House was formally allowed to attend and debate during a Commit- 
tee of Supply, few members attended and fewer still took an interest 
in financial matters (Norton, 1981a, 162-63). Indeed, members' atti- 
tude toward rigorous scrutiny of the government's supply figures 
was consistent both with the prevailing notions of representation and 
with the role members were to play within the confines of party gov- 
ernment. Since members did not seek to become policy specialists 
and since members of the majority party would not mount attacks on 
their party's leadership on supply issues, it is not surprising that the 
Committee of Supply was characterized by rather general debate led 
by the Opposition frontbench. Norton has conclude that "with the 
steady growth of public expenditure, both in volume and complexity, 
and the increasing presence of legislation on parliamentary time, the 
Committee of Supply tended during the nineteenth century to be- 
come more and more an instrument for the criticism of administra- 
tion rather than of finance as s u c h  (Norton, 1981a, 163). 
Supply days eventually were recognized as de facto Opposition 
Days; for approximately twenty parliamentary days the Opposition 
was allowed to set the agenda for debate. Although these days were 
set aside ostensibly for financial enquiry into the government's ex- 
penditure plans, they were utilized instead for sustained criticism of 
the government of the day by the Opposition-one of the only re- 
courses available to the Opposition to define the parameters of debate 
and force the government to defend its policies, agenda, and record. 
As a consequence, however, the scrutiny of expenditure was negli- 
gible. And just as Irish obstructionism allowed the government in- 
creased control of the chamber, so too did this issue allow it extended 
protection from private members when the House went into the 
Committee of Supply. The ancient privilege of the House to raise its 
grievances before granting supply was finally eliminated. 
This inability to undertake sustained and effective scrutiny of 
government expenditure had not gone on unnoticed by several mem- 
bers of the House. In 1902 a specially appointed select committee was 
created "to inquire whether any plan can be advantageously adopted 
for enabling the House, by select committee, or otherwise more effi- 
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ciently to make an examination not involving criticisms of policy, into 
the details of National Expenditure" (Norton, 1981a, 163). Although 
the committee noted the advantages of select committees to gather 
expert information in an environment relatively free from the sharp 
party political divide characteristic of proceedings in the chamber, no 
action was taken as a result of this report. 
This occurrence highlights two features of parliamentary life that 
tended to stifle an active and critical House. For one, despite some 
members' support for select committees to undertake the tasks han- 
dled so ineffectively by the whole House (Committee of Supply), they 
were nevertheless clear that any alternative should not be involved in 
any "criticisms of policy." Their attitude about the role of the House 
and its members on policy issues was consistent with their represen- 
tative roles as they appear to have defined them, as well as congruent 
with and supportive of a parliamentary-executive relationship de- 
fined by party parameters. Second, the response of the executive not 
to pursue this report was also expected. There was little incentive for 
the executive to support a more efficient scrutiny of its expenditure 
plans by the Commons, despite assurances that policy matters would 
not fall within the proposed committee's remit. Any such committee 
would undermine the government's monopoly of information and 
expertise on expenditure matters, information that was presented to 
the House by the government and ostensibly at least formed the ra- 
tionale for the members of the majority party to vote with the gov- 
ernment on supply matters. Members enjoyed little, if any, access to 
alternative sources of detailed information that would contradict or 
undermine the government's position. Clearly it was in the govern- 
ment's interest to keep it that way. 
Successive attempts by Parliament to monitor the government's 
expenditure plans were also ineffectual. In 1912 an attempt was made 
"to force Parliament to direct its attention to Supply, by the establish- 
ment of a select committee for that purpose" (Hanson, 1970, 44). But 
committee members soon realized they did not possess the specialist 
information nor access to informed specialist advisers that could 
match the resources available to the Treasury. Consequently, the com- 
mittee functioned primarily as a useful tool for the government to ex- 
amine ways in which policies could be executed more cost-effectively. 
Again the committee was not allowed, nor did it realistically expect, 
to question the merits of any policy. Indeed it focused on adminis- 
trative efficiency "by choosing appropriate votes simply as a peg on 
which to hang its enquiries" (Hanson, 1970,44; Chubb, 1952; Johnson, 
1966; Reid, 1966). 
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As long as members of Parliament maintained this general lack of 
interest in the government's expenditure plans, or at the very least 
accepted that a select committee's role was not to consider the merits 
of government policies, any "checking of the executive" through 
committee was virtually nonexistent. In fact, such committee work 
aided the government; the Estimates Committee in practice was an 
additional instrument available to the executive to achieve adminis- 
trative efficiency and lowered costs for the government. And because 
the merits and rationale for these policies were exempt from discus- 
sion, the government could look forward to money-saving rewards 
without political costs. 
A select committee on National Expenditure, appointed in 1917, 
concluded that the form of the Public Accounts and the Estimates was 
inadequate for any realistic control over expenditure, whether it be 
departmental or parliamentary. But the committee's perception of 
what constituted "control" is substantially different from the conno- 
tation present-day parliamentary reformers would give this function. 
Members of the Expenditure Committee did not envision that control 
of expenditure included influence over or input into the policy/ 
expenditure process. This concern with value for money as opposed 
to the nature and merits of the policies themselves is in sharp con- 
trast to the attitudes of committee members and other members of 
Parliament displayed after a comprehensive select committee system 
was introduced in 1979. 
As the levels of government expenditure grew and Britain's eco- 
nomic vitality appeared to worsen in the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
so too did criticism of Parliament increase both from within and from 
outside the House. Butt has suggested that the most important rea- 
son for the new criticism of Parliament was the enlarged activity of 
the executive in the social and economic affairs of the nation. He 
wrote: "The flood of new government business with which members 
of Parliament were required to cope: the increased influence df the 
Cabinet and the bureaucracy: the sheer complexity of government ac- 
tivities-these were the new facts of political life which, after the First 
World War, raised the question whether Parliament was still ade- 
quate to exercise control over the executive and to guard the rights of 
the citizen" (Butt, 1967, 105). 
Butt, however, wrote as an apologist for Parliament and seemed 
to overlook the question of whether the legislature had exercised any 
effective control over the executive during the previous thirty or forty 
years. Furthermore, he neglected to address whether Parliament and 
its members expressed any substantial desire to control the executive. 
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The prevailing norms of party government and the experience of 
those committees relating to supply and expenditure suggest little in- 
terest on the part of MPs. Although constitutionally empowered to 
maintain a more than adequate control over the executive, in practice 
the dynamics of party government, supported by the prevailing atti- 
tude of generalist and amateur parliamentarians, prevented any sub- 
stantial exercise of the formal powers ascribed to the House. The 
result of procedural and parliamentary reform during this era under- 
scores three identifiable characteristics defining the executive- 
parliamentary relationship: (1) the strengthening of the disciplinary 
and administrative powers of the Speaker; (2) the continuous exten- 
sion of the rights of the government over the discretion of all parlia- 
mentary action in the House; and (3) the suppression of the private 
member, both as to his legislative initiative and as to the scope of ac- 
tion allowed him by the rules (Redlich, 1908, 206). 
A more realistic appraisal should note the symbiotic nature of in- 
tentions and politics. Clearly, the tight political relationship of Par- 
liament and the executive largely accounts for the relatively sketchy 
committee structure. 
Procedure Committees' Examination of the Reform Question 
The apparent subordination of the legislature to the needs of the ex- 
ecutive had not escaped the attention of all members of Parliament. A 
Select Committee on Procedure was appointed in 1932 to examine 
what some viewed as a decline of the institution, and the committee 
recognized in its report that "one of the chief reasons for their ap- 
pointment was the existence of a large body of criticism of Parlia- 
ment, both by members and by representative citizens . . . " (HC 129, 
1932, iii). Although the committee's remit was quite broad, it never- 
theless refused to pronounce on any constitutional principles, which 
included commentary on executive-parliamentary relations. Rather, 
the Procedure Committee noted that such criticisms had existed since 
the Reform Act of 1832 and consequently various committees had 
considered the practice and procedure of the House since then and 
appropriate amendments had been introduced to the rules of Parlia- 
ment. The committee concluded that the result of the rules changes 
was a reduction in the opportunities of the private member and con- 
versely an increase in the powers of the executive so that the House 
might be able to process efficiently the ever increasing volume of of- 
ficial business that confronted it (Butt, 1967, 131). 
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The Select Committee on Procedure recognized the declining in- 
fluence of the House over the executive, but at the same time it 
pointed to an adapting institution whose procedural reforms facili- 
tated efficient and expeditious processing of government business. 
The report displayed little concern with the legislature's admittedly 
weakened position in the governinglpolicy process and instead ren- 
dered a favorable assessment of Parliament's efficiency in processing 
the government's agenda. 
The committee's sole substantial recommendation was to enlarge 
the Estimates Committee; otherwise it maintained that the procedure 
of Parliament was "sufficiently flexible to meet all the demands made 
upon it," a conclusion described by Jennings at the time as ludicrous 
(Norton, 1981a, 202). In fact, when giving evidence to the Procedure 
Committee, the prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, stressed that 
the role of Parliament was to expedite the business of government. 
And he supported the system of governing through the "usual chan- 
nels," a euphemism for party elites' eschewing institutional con- , 
straints and formal rules. Having gone through the usual channels, 
party loyalty ensured relatively problem-free executive initiatives (HC 
161,1931,5). When MacDonald was a member of the Opposition dur- 
ing the early years of Labour representation in Parliament, he argued 
before a select committee in 1914 for increased opportunities for pri- 
vate members to monitor and criticize government and supported a 
more active role for them in policy formation. Like many of his suc- 
cessors, MacDonald's enthusiasm for an expanded role for MPs and 
Parliament diminished with his transition to executive frontbench 
status. 
Despite the disparate calls for constitutional changes emanating 
from within and outside of Parliament in the 1930s, the prevailing at- 
titude toward reform remained essentially that contained in the 1932 
Procedure Committee Report. 
Shortly after the war, in 1946, a Select Committee on Procedure 
again considered the status and procedure of the House of Com- 
mons. The committee concluded that Parliament's reputation was as 
high as ever and that there was not, at the time, any compelling rea- 
son or support for changing the nature of the House. Of course, what 
remains most important in this committee's analysis of Parliament is 
the role committee members ascribed to Parliament and then used in 
evaluating it. 
This favorable appraisal of the House's status rested on the a 
priori assumption that the legislature was of course not to legis- 
late; rather, it should be able to process efficiently the government's 
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business presented to it. This task, the committee concluded, was 
handled quite well by Parliament. But Parliament's formal and con- 
stitutional obligations of holding the executive accountable for its ac- 
tion received scant attention. The opportunities to challenge the 
government in the chamber on "the great issues of the day," coupled 
with the comparatively limited select committee work in reviewing 
cost efficiency appeared to satisfy the Procedure Committee's criteria 
for parliamentary accountability. 
The committee's report suggested that the necessity and dynam- 
ics of party government had clearly displaced institutional preroga- 
tive and members' capacity to influence policy as a legitimate basis 
for evaluating parliamentary effectiveness. Moreover, while the At- 
tlee government's reconstruction and welfare programs required un- 
paralleled amounts of legislation and expenditure, a series of 
Procedure Committee reports recommended that standing commit- 
tees should be used more extensively. The use of standing commit- 
tees would allow the House to expedite even more quickly the 
government's legislative agenda; the government obviously wel- 
comed the proposals. But as Downs also points out, the reforms were 
clearly one-sided, as the Attlee government was not prepared "to 
compensate for its increased use of standing committees with an en- 
hanced role for select committees to help scrutinize the extra business 
that Parliament was technically obliged to oversee" (Downs, 1985, 
55-56). 
The distinction between standing committees and select commit- 
tees is an important one. Standing committees, comprised of perhaps 
dozens of loyal party men and women, were useful for the executive 
in speedily processing legislative initiatives. Select committees, much 
smaller in membership, focused on information-gathering and fact- 
finding activities. As long as these latter committees also adopted the 
prevailing norms of party loyalty and discipline found on standing 
committees and in the House in general, government was realisti- 
cally free from sustained scrutiny and effective criticism through par- 
liamentary committees in toto. 
Specialist Committees 
While the use of committees by the House clearly has precedent, the 
contemporary departmentally related or subject-oriented select com- 
mittees are essentially of recent origin. One of the first such commit- 
tees was formed in the 1950s: the Select Committee on Nationalised 
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Industries. Following what was considered extensive nationalization 
by the postwar Labour government, Conservative backbenchers ex- 
erted pressure on their leaders to act more enthusiastically in the in- 
terest of private enterprise. These members did not wish to have 
these industries become inefficient organizations absorbing billions 
of pounds a year from the public purse in return for low productivity 
and competitiveness. 
What these backbenchers wanted was a committee through 
which the state-run industries could be accountable to a minister in 
Parliament. Consequently, the government set up a select committee 
in 1953 to consider the relationship between the industries and the 
House. The specially appointed committee recommended that a Na- 
tionalised Industries Committee be created. It was not until two years 
later, however, that the government moved with extreme caution to 
appoint such a committee. The terms of reference for the new com- 
mittee were so limited as to make any thorough examination of the 
state-owned industries impossible. When the Select Committee on 
Nationalised Industries met, Labour and Conservative members de- 
cided its terms of reference indeed were inadequate. Committee 
members received such strong support from the Conservative back- 
bencher~ that the government "capitulated and agreed to expand 
the committee's terms of reference (Butt, 1967, 207). 
Any discussion of select committees in the House of Commons 
usually includes an account of the Nationalised Industries Commit- 
tee, but several significant features are often overlooked. For one, 
calls for reform emanated from the government backbench, not from 
party leaders seeking an extension of the executive's influence 
through the legislature. The existence of a Select Committee on Na- 
tionalised Industries was incongruent with the established pattern of 
utilizing Parliament for expediting and processing the government's 
agenda. This committee also received a much narrower but more po- 
litically sensitive remit than most previous committees. It was not to 
examine the forms of the estimates, accounts, or expenditures while 
searching for cost-efficiency; instead, it was to seek political account- 
ability from a particular government sector and policy arena. Finally, 
it is also essential to note that backbenchers did not seek accountabil- 
ity to Parliament, ostensibly fulfilling a constitutional role. Rather, 
what was sought was accountability of an industry's activity to a min- 
ister in Parliament. The House was not about to request, nor would 
the government grant, a supervisory role for Nationalised Industries. 
Members of Parliament were clear in their calls for a committee 
through which state-owned industries could be held accountable to a 
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member of the executive. They were not seeking a committee to 
which state-owned industries could be held accountable to Parlia- 
ment. The government was nevertheless reluctant to create such a 
committee, but party leaders were secure enough in their power to 
nominate the committee's membership. 
Four years after the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries 
was created, the Select Committee on Procedure of 1958-59 consid- 
ered the question of employing specialized committees in the House. 
The terms of the committee's inquiry focused almost exclusively on a 
proposed Colonial Affairs Committee. Suggestions to review or de- 
bate the work of departments were not new, and the committee 
pointed out in its report that evidence was given on the subject before 
the Select Committee on Procedure of 1931-32-albeit twenty-seven 
years since evidence was last given to a Procedure Committee on the 
topic (HC 92-1, 1959, xxiv). 
The committee's final report recommended that specialist com- 
mittees not be employed by the House. In rejecting this particular 
method of parliamentary inquiry, committee members noted their 
concern with the constitutional difficulties specialist committees 
would present. The Procedure Committee concluded: "The main ar- 
gument against this proposal, and one which convinces us, lies in the 
nature of the committee, which in our view would constitute a radical 
constitutional innovation." The report also stressed that such a com- 
mittee would ultimately involve itself in controlling rather than crit- 
icizing the policy and actions of a particular department. The result, 
committee members claimed, would be to usurp a function which the 
House itself had never attempted to exercise. The report added: "Al- 
though the House has always maintained the right to criticise the ex- 
ecutive and in the last resort to withdraw its confidence, it has always 
been careful not to arrogate to itself any of the executive power. The 
establishment of a colonial committee would not only involve this 
principle, but would also lead to the establishment of other similar 
committees" (HC 92-1, 1959, xxi). 
The committee's interpretation of legislative-executive relations 
provides interesting insights. For one, it is not so readily apparent 
nor accurate to state that Parliament has universally chosen not to in- 
vade the executive's prerogative over the House. It would be more 
accurate to stress that Parliament has been reluctant to venture into 
what has come to be considered the government's purview, and has 
generally accepted its subservient role since the introduction of 
party politics into the parliamentary system. The political realities of 
party government that serve as mitigating factors in the relationship 
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between government and Parliament should not be confused with 
the constitutional theory defining that relationship. Nevertheless, 
the Procedure Committee report tends to suggest that the organiza- 
tion of institutional relations through political parties has become 
embedded in constitutional principle. Upsetting this relationship 
would upset this now defined constitutional formula as well as the 
fundamental underpinnings of party government. No procedure 
committee would be prepared to recommend an alteration of this del- 
icate balance. 
Decline of Parliament? 
The Procedure Committee's consideration of specialist committees 
for the House, amid continued debate in and out of Parliament re- 
garding that institution's alleged decline in influence and impact on 
national politics and policies, reflected the criticisms levelled by aca- 
demics and political commentators outside of the legislature. As early 
as 1949 Christopher Hollis's Can Parliament Survive? was published; in 
1950 Lord Cecil of Chelwood called attention in a Lords debate to the 
growing power of the cabinet, and in 1952 Lord Campion in a similar 
vein noted the increasing subordination of the Commons to the ex- 
ecutive. Analyses of parliamentary decline, and perceptions as to 
how that decline might be arrested or reversed, became a persistent 
theme in the late 1950s and continued throughout the 1960s. Bernard 
Crick's influential Fabian tract, Reform of the Commons, was published 
in 1959 and was followed five years later by his book The Reform of 
Parliament. An article by Professors Hanson and Wiseman, urging 
committee reform, also appeared in 1959, as did Michael Foot's Par- 
liament in Danger! and Paul Enzig's The Control of the Purse. 
Both Norton and Butt identify Britain's economic woes as the ma- 
jor catalyst to the "Decline of Parliament" debate. Norton suggests 
that postwar calls for parliamentary reform were offset by an evalu- 
ation of the social and economic reforms achieved by the Attlee gov- 
ernment and the prosperity of the early and mid-1950s. These 
achievements, Norton argues, conferred greater legitimacy on the 
Westminster Model. The country appeared to be faring rather well, 
so there was little motivation to question the operation of the political 
system (Norton, 1982a, 100-101). 
Butt, too, assesses the new reform era as a consequence of Brit- 
ain's failure to solve its fundamental economic difficulties. But he 
does note that the critical examination of Parliament was part of a 
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larger introspection of British politics and society, including a series 
of books published by Penguin, each of which asked what was wrong 
with one aspect or another of British life and institutions. Butt further 
contends that the prevailing "What's Wrong with Britain?" mood was 
undoubtedly heightened by the growing disillusion with the perfor- 
mance of the Conservative government under Macmillan in the early 
1960s (Butt, 1967, 6). 
Although Norton, Butt, and others suggest that previous criti- 
cisms of Parliament and concomitant calls for reform were associated 
with macroeconomic travails (particularly in 1929-31), remarkably 
less explanation is offered as to why reforms were accepted in the 
1960s and not previously. While criticism and scrutiny of Parliament's 
role may be a necessary antecedent to provoke substantial reform, it 
appears that a shift in members' attitudes about Parliament's role 
and their role within it is equally necessary. As I pointed out above, 
earlier inquiries into Parliament's status by successive procedure 
committees yielded few results. This rejection of reform proposals re- 
flected members' understanding and acceptance of a limited, subser- 
vient House vis-a-vis the government. What is starkly obvious in the 
1960s, however, is an apparent frustration on the part of several MPs 
of both major parties with their own and Parliament's inability to 
have any significant influence on national policies. 
Second, after the "Thirteen Wasted Years" in Opposition, the La- 
bour leadership formally committed its party to an energetic and 
reform-oriented reign following the 1964 general election. That elec- 
tion not only brought Labour to power for the first time since 1951 but 
also marked a significant turnover in parliamentary membership. 
Walkland suggests that although members' "initial surge of en- 
thusiasm in the 1960's" had complex causes, the predominant one 
was the belated recognition by MPs of government's expanding role. 
The growth in influence of corporate agencies, particularly in the 
economic sphere, coupled with the increasing practice of policy mak- 
ing by government through a process of collaboration with producer 
groups, served to diminish the role of Parliament as the importance 
of primary legislation was reduced and the role of discretionary ac- 
tion by the civil service was enhanced (Walkland, 1985, v-vi). These 
developments were perhaps best epitomized by the creation of the 
National Economic Development Council in 1962. 
Also important was a book by a group of Conservative MPs pub- 
lished by the Conservative Political Centre. Its fundamental message 
was that Parliament no longer had the capacity it had once possessed 
to oversee the executive. Their argument was predicated on the view 
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that the government's involvement in an increasingly vast and com- 
plicated network of detailed and highly technical activity-particu- 
larly concerned with the economy-made it difficult for Parliament 
in its present form to scrutinize, control, or even understand these 
policies (Parliament and Government, 1963). William Rees-Mogg, a 
former Conservative candidate for Parliament, deputy editor of the 
Sunday Times and future editor of the Times, also wrote an indictment 
of Parliament: "The position of a member of Parliament in Opposi- 
tion is now difficult enough, but the position of a backbench MP sup- 
porting a government in power has become almost absurd. . . . The 
ordinary Member of Parliament is by-passed on every side" (Rees- 
Mogg, 1964, 3). 
Conservatives certainly were not alone in their criticisms of Par- 
liament. Prior to the 1964 general election, a group of twelve Labour 
members of Parliament, ten from the House of Commons and two 
from the House of Lords, published a paper criticizing the inability of 
Parliament to perform its constitutional role ("Three Dozen Parlia- 
mentary Reforms," in Socialist Commentary, 1964). Like the Conserva- 
tives, they were critical of the executive's use of Parliament as simply 
a processor of government proposals. 
Another article appearing that year in Political Quarterly summa- 
rized both the frustrations and the hopes of these Conservative and 
Labour reformers. In it, W. A.Robson wrote: "The status of Parlia- 
ment has declined to a serious extent during the post-war era: and if 
this tendency is to be reversed the House of Commons must be pre- 
pared to assert its rights and authority more forcibly than it has done 
in recent decades. After all, the power of Parliament is intact; it is the 
will to exercise it which is lacking. No government, whatever its po- 
litical complexion, is going to make the first move towards enhancing 
the status of Parliament: the initiative must come from the House of 
Commons" (Robson, 1964,34). What was more evident in this article 
than in the works by parliamentarians, however, was an implicit rec- 
ognition of the prior necessity of concerted action by a sufficient 
number of MPs to assert the institution's will. 
Bernard Crick's Reform of Parliament, also published in 1964, was 
the principal academic work on the decline and reform of the House. 
It reflected the views of some Labour members and their academic 
supporters-including Professors Hanson and Wiseman and MPs 
John Mackintosh and Richard Crossman. Crick had no sympathy 
with the argument that Parliament had declined from some "Golden 
Age" in which it "governed," or for the idea that rule of 630 indepen- 
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dent minds would either be possible or preferable to party govern- 
ment. Clearly Crick wanted Parliament to fulfill what Bagehot re- 
ferred to as Parliament's educative/communicative role. He envisaged 
pre-legislation committees as the bridge between informal opinion, 
interest groups, and the executive. Above all, Professor Crick wanted 
to see members of Parliament, rather than external bodies or officials, 
involved in the task of scrutinizing government policy because he re- 
sisted the contemporary practice of depoliticizing political issues. 
That is to say, he opposed removing governmental problems from 
Parliament only to place them in the hands of Royal Commissions, 
Special Enquiries, and other extra-parliamentary bodies. 
But the fundamental problem for realizing this plan of reform lay 
in the belief by Crick (along with other reform-minded MPs and aca- 
demics) that parliamentary committees established to keep political 
issues in public debate through Parliament would not be a challenge 
to the government of the day. Parliament's communicative role em- 
phasized by these early reforms, moreover, remained consistent with 
the prevailing frontbench interpretation of Parliament as processor- 
whether it be processor of legislation or processor of information. In 
both roles, parliamentary-executive relations would continue to be 
defined and guided by party politics that served to maintain execu- 
tive privilege and prerogative in the House. Labour members gener- 
ally agreed with Crick's observation that "Parliament should not and 
does not threaten the ability of the government to govern" (Crick, 
1965, 79). 
Most observers point to 1963-66 not only as the starting point of 
the parliamentary reform movement by academics but also as the be- 
ginning of a change in attitude among MPs concerning Parliament's 
role. Butt points out that while discontent is commonplace among 
new entrants to Parliament, the disillusion was particularly bitter 
among the new intakes of the 1964 and 1966 parliaments. A group of 
Labour MPs tabled a long and detailed motion setting out their pro- 
posals for reform of parliamentary procedure. The motion high- 
lighted the frustration felt by several MPs with their inability to take 
an active role in the policy process. One of the members, Dr. Kerr, 
said: "We take the view that new members bring in new ideas and we 
have noticed the tendency that the longer people stay here in Parlia- 
ment the more they regard the system as perfect and not needing im- 
provement. . . . The present divorce of government policy-making 
institutions from the MPs is something we want to reverse" (quoted 
in Butt, 1967, 183). 
5 2 Reform in the House of Commons 
In a House debate three years later, a leading Labour MP, Charles 
Pannell, queried the frustrations of members arriving to Parliament 
since 1964: "What is it that so discontents new members? What do 
they believe to be lacking? I believe that they ask from the House 
something which it cannot give them. They ask for participation in 
legislation and they want a voice in legislation before it has crystal- 
lized in a Governmental view. . . . If that is so all I can say with great 
regret the answer to that is further committees" (HCD, 1966167, 
745:622). I include this particular reference because it encapsulates 
and echoes the opinions of several anti-reform, status quo-oriented 
MPs during the early parliamentary reform movement in the 1960s. 
Pannell and others like him in the House clearly understood that dif- 
ferent kinds of committees offered a practical means for members to 
take part in legislation and the policy process. They did not, however, 
believe that was an appropriate role for the House and its members. 
There is also an explicit recognition in this speech of an institu- 
tion bifurcated from its members. It is not the House as an abstract 
ideal that bestows powers and authority on its members. It is the 
members who give themselves, and consequently the House of Com- 
mons, authority to act. When reflecting upon this discontent and dis- 
illusion, Hanson identified the need for an attitudinal change among 
MPs. Although he questioned whether a body of amateurs, however 
public spirited and industrious, could have meaningful input into the 
policy process, he argued that parliamentary institutions are far 
more adaptable to new needs than is usually imagined: "We shall as- 
sume that an attempt at adaptation is worth making, and that some- 
thing useful can come of changes in procedure, provided that they 
are accompanied by corresponding changes in attitudes" (Hanson, 1970, 42 
[emphasis mine]). 
These two features must be present for Commons to alter the dis- 
mal state perceived by parliamentary reformers and to make effective 
any mechanism for scrutiny Parliament might devise. Both institu- 
tional adaptation and attitudinal change are necessary prerequisites. 
Procedurally, committees could be created yet committee members 
retain their relatively amateur status vis-a-vis the executive if those 
committees were not given power to acquire and utilize expert and 
detailed information-regardless of how committed to a new role 
these members might be. Conversely, a committee bestowed with 
information-gathering and specializing capacities could fail to meet 
the goals of parliamentary reforms if the members still saw their role 
as a subservient one that should be confined to activity on the floor 
of the House. 
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The 1964-65 Procedure Committee Report 
In 1965, once again, a Select Committee on Procedure examined Par- 
liament's role "to carry out its functions as a check upon the execu- 
tive more effectively, to bring that part of our operation more up to 
date" (HC 303, 1965, 26). Of course, checking the executive "more ef- 
fectively" and bringing that "role up to date" can imply a variety of 
means, but the end result clearly points to increased scrutiny of gov- 
ernment with potentially serious ramifications for party government. 
The chairman of the committee asked the assistant clerk to the 
House, D. W. S. Lidderdale, as an expert witness, if historically there 
had been greater use previously of select committees for conducting 
inquiries into matters of government administration. Lidderdale 
noted that while such committees were probably used for that pur- 
pose, they had rarely been used in the previous half-century. And he, 
too, pointed out Parliament's failure to keep up with government ac- 
tivity: "I would think that it is a failure, as it were, of the House to 
keep up with what has been happening outside, that the whole op- 
eration of Government has expanded and become more complicated 
and instead of the House taking more steps to scrutinize these vari- 
ous new fields it has allowed that to be done much more by depart- 
mental committees or things of that kind" (HC 303, 1965, 23). 
The interpretation of the role select committees might play in in- 
creased scrutiny differed significantly between civil servants and aca- 
demics. Unlike 1959, when the advice of reforming academics was 
shunned by the Procedure Committee, members of the Study of Par- 
liament Group were asked to give extensive testimony in 1964-65. 
Members of the SPG, Professors Wiseman and Hanson in particular, 
supported the creation of select committees with the power to inves- 
tigate government policy. Civil servants objected to any committees 
that would be enabled to monitor their departments' policies, and 
they also objected to the academics' assertion that civil servants 
should be expected to appear before a committee and answer ques- 
tions about policies within their respective departments. 
Unlike previous procedure committees, the 1964-65 committee's 
inquiry was based on the premise that the House had indeed de- 
clined in its ability to monitor the executive effectively. In particular, 
the committee recognized the need to improve the sources of infor- 
mation available to the House in carrying out its duty of examining 
government expenditure and administration. But in its report, the 
committee stressed it was "convinced that a main purpose of Parlia- 
mentary reform must be to increase the efficiency of the House of 
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Commons as a debating chamber" (HC 303, 1965, v). Committee 
members were convinced that Parliament's role in the governing pro- 
cess was the traditional one of providing an arena of debate for public 
scrutiny and criticism of the government. But to perform this task 
"efficiently" and "effectively," members must have access to expert 
and technical information. The committee concluded: "In order to 
achieve this latter purpose, Your Committee have come to the con- 
clusion that more information should be made available to members 
of the way government departments carry out their responsibilities, 
so that, when taking part in major debates on controversial issues, 
they may be armed with the necessary background of knowledge. 
This requires that the House should possess a more efficient system 
of scrutiny of administration" (HC 303, 1965, v). 
The more "efficient system of scrutiny" would take place on the 
floor of the House by members who would gather the necessary in- 
formation through committee work. consequently, the committee 
recommended the establishment of specialist committees as subcom- 
mittees of a new select committee developed from the Estimates 
Committee. The purpose of the new committee would be to examine 
how the departments of state carry out their responsibilities and to 
consider their estimates of expenditure and ensuing reports. 
This inquiry and subsequent report were important for a number 
of reasons. First, the committee accepted a priori that MPs require 
better access to information. Given that Parliament was primarily an 
auxiliary to the executive to process its agenda, recognition of the ne- 
cessity of specialist information suggests an ensuing alteration in 
parliamentary-executive relations. It was also apparent that individ- 
ual MPs accepted increased scrutiny as part of their parliamentary 
duties. Second, the committee remained loyal to the perception of the 
House as a debating forum. Committee activity and inquiries were 
important in fulfilling Parliament's constitutional scrutiny function 
only inasmuch as it produced more adequately prepared speakers in 
debate. Third, criticism of policy was still not considered to be the 
focus of the proposed committees; that focus remained scrutiny of ad- 
ministration-consistent with what had become an essentially reac- 
tive role for Parliament in the policy process. 
The debate that followed the appearance of this report was ex- 
traordinary, with representatives of all parties denouncing Parlia- 
ment's alleged decline and placing the blame on successive 
governments for trampling the rights and duties of MPs and the 
House through party government. 
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Indeed, there was considerable discussion at the time whether or 
not structural changes in Parliament would be sufficient to arrest Par- 
liament's declining influence and inability to scrutinize the executive 
properly. Many members recognized that a substantive alteration in 
the relationship between the executive and Parliament was realisti- 
cally possible only when MPs themselves changed their perceptions 
of the House's role and acted upon them. In concluding the House 
debate on the Procedure Committee's report, Sydney Silverman, an- 
other Labour MP, effectively summarized the major theme of the bi- 
partisan reformers: "Never at any time in our Parliamentary history 
has the average back-bench Parliamentarian had so little influence on 
any of the Parliamentary functions as he has now. We have little or no 
influence on policy. We have virtually no control over public expen- 
diture. . . . We shall not make Parliament efficient, respected or 
worthwhile unless we succeed in attracting into our membership re- 
ally energetic, progressive-minded young people anxious to make a 
career of the j o b  (HCD 1964165, 718:1231-32). 
As important and necessary as new MPs with correspondingly 
"new" attitudes may be for reform, Silverman overlooked the party's 
role in candidate selection. There is little incentive for the parties to 
recruit "energetic, progressive-minded" men and women to stand for 
Parliament, persons who want to be more active in the policy process 
and to assert Parliament's authority. Such members would be trou- 
blesome to party leaders and a challenge to the authority-hierarchical 
relationship between the backbench and the party leaders. 
There were several opponents of the Procedure Committee's sug- 
gested reforms. Included among the opponents were members of the 
Opposition and government frontbenches, members who perceived 
and accepted their roles as amateur, part-time positions, and those 
who did not wish to remove scrutiny and the locus of power from the 
chamber. But even among this latter group were several MPs, includ- 
ing Michael Foot, who felt that Parliament's ability to hold govern- 
ment accountable was in serious decline. As I will demonstrate later 
in further detail, later debates on parliamentary reform were often 
divided between those supporting specialist committees and those 
who claimed that Parliament's role was and should be primarily to 
provide a debating forum. Moreover, it was Michael Foot who was 
Leader of the House when the Procedure Committee of 1977-78 is- 
sued its report calling for a comprehensive system of departmentally 
related select committees. Foot was hostile to that report and would 
not act upon it. His argument was essentially the same in 1965 as in 
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1978; he feared that more specialist committees would only serve to 
take important issues out of the chamber-out of the glare of public 
debate. Conversely, he wanted to strengthen Parliament's role 
through debates. 
The Fourth Report of the Procedure Committee (1964-65) 
stressed that committees were to be used to give ordinary MPs more 
information, thereby making them more effective in debates. More- 
over, what became an essential feature of subsequent committee pro- 
posals, the right to question ministers, was not even considered in 
the early 1960s. In fact, in comparison to subsequent proposals, these 
proposed reforms were exceedingly limited. 
These early attempts at parliamentary reform were stifled by a 
number of obstacles. Chief among them was the persistent reluctance 
of successive governments to create committees in the House that 
would examine the executive's action and potentially threaten its pre- 
rogatives and hegemony in Parliament. The government of the day, it 
seems, would have little to fear from members of its own party under 
the norms of party government. But governments would be ill- 
advised and ill-served to establish institutional mechanisms through 
which Opposition members could publicize and criticize executive 
shortcomings. Equally important was the apparent reticence of many 
members of Parliament to undertake committee service for the pur- 
poses of monitoring executive policies. In order to foster an environ- 
ment conducive to parliamentary reform, a perceptible shift in 
attitudes among MPs about their roles and the role of the House was 
necessary. This is precisely what appears to have occurred in the 
1960s, a fact supported by my survey research of members in the 
1980s. 
The debates, the committee reports and testimony, and the aca- 
demic critiques of Parliament highlighted in this chapter underscore 
a shifting understanding of the purpose of parliamentary reforms. 
While early appraisals acknowledged concerns with the then current 
parliamentary procedures, they were dismissed on the grounds that 
these procedures allowed the government to process its legislative 
agenda expediently. Subsequent reform discussion focused on Parlia- 
ment's legitimate right to be empowered with specialist committees 
corresponding to executive policy areas, i.e., Nationalised Industries. 
A central issue in this debate was a potential committee's venture into 
"political issues." And although the Procedure Committee in 1959 
rejected further specialist committees because of the "radical consti- 
tutional" problems they would engender, reformers remained com- 
mitted to committees that would serve primarily to prepare members 
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for debates in the chamber. The next step in this evolutionary cycle 
occurred with the return of a Labour government in 1964, coupled 
with a high membership turnover in the House. In the following 
chapter, I explore Labour's wavering commitment to specialist com- 
mittees and the problems the government subsequently encountered 
from them. 
Labour Commits to Reform 
With only a slim majority following the 1964 general election, Harold 
Wilson called another election in 1966 in order to strengthen his 
party's parliamentary majority. In this election Labour increased its 
representation in the Commons from 317 seats to 363. Both the 1964 
and the 1966 election brought in several new Labour MPs. A survey 
of new MPs was conducted by the Times shortly after the 1966 elec- 
tion. The ensuing article noted that the MPs canvassed expressed 
considerable discontent with their ability to influence important po- 
litical matters and took "a dim view of the rusty machinery of West- 
minster." The article added: "The class of '66 are full of ideas and 
enthusiasm for reform. A Conservative says that the reformers have 
their remedy in their own hands if they will only use it. Until gov- 
ernment backbenchers use their vote as a weapon against the exec- 
utive, Ministers will ride roughshod over the rights of members, and 
the House of Commons will cease to have any real significance" (Lon- 
don Times, 6 June 1966). But the message contained in the Times article 
was still off mark. While it is true that reform would only be possible 
if members voted for it, the underlying argument (supported by 
many critics at the time) was that MPs lacked the courage to chal- 
lenge party leaders. What were glaringly overlooked were institu- 
tional incentives and routinized norms that benefited incumbent 
MPs who were unlikely to support scrapping their familiar system. 
Second, as I pointed out in my last chapter, there were disputes 
among reform-minded House veterans for the proper route to fol- 
low-through debate or in committee. Furthermore, John Mackin- 
tosh, an academic supporter of parliamentary reform and a member 
of Parliament during the 1960s, pointed out that it was "starkly evi- 
dent" that the House of Commons could not reform itself. Despite 
whatever cross-bench consensus could be reached in creating com- 
mittees to increase parliamentary effectiveness, power nevertheless 
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resided with the cabinet to create or dismantle committees and to de- 
cide who would be appointed or removed from committee posts. In 
these circumstances, he argued, "the only chance of reform is if some 
election throws up an executive willing to undertake such changes" 
(Mackintosh, 1969). 
The Wilson cabinet in 1966 appeared supportive of parliamentary 
reform. Indeed, Wilson conveyed an impression to the public, MPs, 
the press, and academics of reform and modernization on a broad 
spectrum of social and economic issues. Labour was formally com- 
mitted to developing new technologies, administrative methods, and 
innovative policies to address the social, economic, and political 
problems facing Britain. Supporters of parliamentary reform were 
heartened to hear from Wilson during the Queen's Speech Debate 
highlighting the government's priorities that his government in- 
tended "greater participation of Parliament in the process of govern- 
ment." He added: "The last two General Elections have proclaimed 
the determination of our people that not only the government of Brit- 
ain but the structure of our society should be modernised. From this 
modernisation we cannot exclude Parliament" (HCD 66/67, 727:1086- 
87). For Wilson, modernization of Parliament included an extension 
of select committees. 
Crossman's Commitment to Reform 
The task of managing the government's reform agenda for the House 
was given to the new Leader of the House, Richard Crossman. In 
choosing Crossman, Wilson was able to appease backbenchers and 
channel calls for reform through the Executive. Crossman, while con- 
sidered a critic of Parliament's secondary role, was as Leader of the 
House a member of the Labour government and the key person in 
guiding the government's agenda through the House. With Cross- 
man in this key position, the government could provide an avenue 
for criticism and reform while setting the parameters of the reform 
discourse. Wilson may indeed have been genuinely interested in re- 
forming Parliament, but he was not so politically naive as to allow the 
Conservative Opposition and frustrated backbenchers from his own 
party to take the lead in reforming the House so that it could scruti- 
nize, monitor, and criticize his government more effectively. 
Several years after the so-called "Crossman Reforms," many po- 
litical commentators-including MPs-perceived Crossman as a 
great parliamentary reformer who tried assiduously to seek means 
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though which Parliament could reassert its authority. Although the 
legacy of his name is synonymous with reform, Crossman's reform 
goals and those associated with him by latter-day reformers were 
quite different. To be sure, during his first speech as Leader of the 
House, Crossman charged that the authority of the House had been 
declining, was declining, and would continue to decline unless ac- 
tive steps were taken to stop it (HCD 1966167, 738:470-612). Cross- 
man remarked that the main cause of this decline was the fact that 
institutions developed under one set of conditions and designed to 
fulfill certain specific functions had been perpetuated under quite 
different conditions when old tasks had disappeared and new ones 
had been added. He added that an "effective reform must be an ad- 
aptation of obsolete procedures to modern conditions and to the 
functions we should fulfill in a modern highly industrialised commu- 
nity" (HCD 66167, 738:481). 
In stressing Parliament's declining capacity to fulfill its expected 
and constitutional role in a complex, industrial society, Crossman 
echoed the sentiments of virtually all would-be reformers-journal- 
ists, academics, and politicians. But most important, he argued that 
those who wished to restore the pristine powers of the House, to 
which current procedures were irrelevant, were in fact backward- 
looking. Rather than make the case that limited reforms could still 
ensure an effective and efficient parliamentary role, as previous Pro- 
cedure Committees suggested, Crossman instead urged MPs to ac- 
cept their present limited functions largely as they were and adapt 
their procedures to them. In short, the House was being asked to opt 
for what the government perceived as realistic reform and not the un- 
realistic expectation of conducting business as it was done a century 
previous. 
Those members who were wary of reform and their place within 
a reformed House were thus reassured that a new, radical constitu- 
tional relationship such as the 1959 Procedure Committee Report 
feared would result would indeed not arise. For these MPs, Cross- 
man offered "safe reform." And for those members who did wish to 
see substantive reforms and access to the policy process, Crossman 
conveyed a forward-looking scheme of substantially updating parlia- 
mentary procedure without upsetting the political balance between 
the Executive and the legislature. Crossman was quite clear: "It must 
be the Cabinet that runs the Executive and initiates and controls leg- 
islation, and it must be the party machines that manage most of our 
business, through the usual channels, as well as organising what was 
once a congeries of independent back benchers into two disciplined 
political armies. Since this is the structure of modern political power, 
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the task of the reformer is to adapt our institutions and procedures to 
make them efficient" (HCD 66/67, 738:512). 
Like many parliamentary reformers before him, Crossman linked 
parliamentary efficiency with government effectiveness. He accepted 
prima facie that the government must be able to govern and that Par- 
liament's responsibility was to assist, not interfere, in that task. Sub- 
sequently, Crossman strove to achieve "ways in which, while leaving 
the Executive the necessary freedom of action, we can develop insti- 
tutions detailed, continuous and effective in their control." For Cross- 
man these twin aims did not appear irreconcilable "because a strong 
and healthy Executive is all the stronger and healthier if it is stimu- 
lated by responsible investigation and criticism" (HCD 66/67, 
738:513). The operative word here is "responsible," and it would be 
left to the Executive to judge whether a committee was acting respon- 
sibly in its investigation and criticism of government policies. As I 
shall point out below, the Executive and the House witnessed some 
of their most serious confrontations when forced to judge if subse- 
quent committee proceedings were in fact responsible. What 
emerged were two institutional perspectives and two divergent sets 
of criteria. 
The common tie shared by the reformers in the 1960s was not 
only a normative concern with the "decline of Parliament" and an in- 
creasing inability of backbenchers to carve out a useful role in the 
House. They also shared an adherence to the Westminster Model and 
sought changes in parliamentary procedures that would restore the 
Commons to the position posited by the model. Theirs was the task 
of bringing Parliament up to date without distorting Executive- 
parliamentary relations. 
These issues were particularly evident in the interminable debate 
over the committee structure of the House and the specialization of 
MPs, in which the reformers, especially Laski, Hanson, Crick, and 
Wiseman, attempted to design advisory agencies for the Commons 
"which would in no way transform the character of Parliamentary 
government but merely endorse existing tendencies" (Walkland, 
1977). The early reformers displayed a respect for the rights of min- 
isters and civil servants, offering committee secrecy and ministerial 
control of the committee's agenda and proceedings. Above all, the re- 
formers strove not to upset the traditional relationship between min- 
isters and the House. In so doing, there seemed to be little apparent 
awareness of the difficulty of reconciling the twin aims of strong 
single-party government on the one hand with comprehensive bipar- 
tisan investigatory powers for the House on the other. The difficulties 
one would encounter in reconciling these divergent goals were not 
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merely issues for academic debate; they erupted on the floor of the 
House shortly after the Crossman Reforms were in place. MPs ques- 
tioned the government's motives and charged the government with 
trampling on the rights and privileges of the House. 
Committees Created: Proceedings and Assessment 
The Fourth Report from the Select Committee on Procedure (1964- 
65) recommended specialist committees for the House as well as 
specialization of the Estimate Committee's subcommittees. Both rec- 
ommendations were viewed negatively by Bowden during his tenure 
as Leader of the House, and it was not until the 1966 election and the 
replacement of Bowden by Crossman that the government took up 
the report's recommendations. The task of the Estimates Committee, 
through its subcommittees, was to examine in detail the Estimates for 
the current year and to investigate whether the policy implied in the 
Estimates might be carried out more economically. In the process it 
examined the management and spending problems of many depart- 
ments. As the Fourth Report recapitulated, the task of the committee 
was "to examine such of the estimates presented to this House as 
may seem fit to the committee and report how, if at all, the policy 
implied in those estimates may be carried out more economically 
and, if the committee think fit, to consider the principal variations 
between the estimates and those relating to the previous financial 
year" (HC 303, 1965). 
But the examination was carried out through subcommittees 
identified by a letter of the alphabet-A through G. Committee mem- 
bers may have acquired expertise in this particular type of inquiry, 
but they did not engage in or acquire specialization in a particular 
subject, field, or department. Hamilton pointed out in debate that 
while one or two subcommittees might conduct inquiries on military 
spending, for example, for two consecutive years, subcommittees 
were generally not defined by their area of specialization. Further- 
more, an MP newly assigned to the Estimates Committee would not 
know to which subcommittee he or she was to be assigned, nor in fact 
the subject that his or her subcommittee would be investigating 
(HCD 65, 718:172-295). Thus if an MP had a particular policy interest, 
wished to channel his or her area of expertise into parliamentary ac- 
tivity, or was concerned with government plans in a certain area, 
then going to the Estimates Committee would not satisfy these goals. 
If one's interest was in Defense, one would have a one in six chance 
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of being placed on a subcommittee investigating defense-if indeed 
defense was going to be one of the areas under scrutiny at all. One 
scrutinized for scrutiny's sake, without systematic policy direction 
or scope. 
While Bowden was Leader, the government opposed specializa- 
tion of the subcommittees on the ground that this would detract from 
the authority of the House of Commons, as the committee proceed- 
ings would empty the debating chamber. In truth, it was not the au- 
thority diminishing in the chamber that the government feared per 
se. Rather, it was the government's unbridled control of and author- 
ity in the chamber that it desired to sustain. If the government could 
confine the central locus of power and scrutiny of the House within 
the chamber, its policy positions would remain fairly secure, for there 
the government's power and influence remained supreme through 
party whips and party loyalty. Furthermore, the government implic- 
itly acknowledged that the committee forum would be a particularly 
more effective means of scrutiny than the chamber. Members would 
empty the chamber for committee service only if the latter proved 
more effective in fulfilling Parliament's monitoring function. If Par- 
liament's role is to scrutinize, criticize, and perhaps keep government 
accountable, the government's opposition to the Fourth Report was 
indefensible. 
Crossman also established more specific subcommittees for the 
Estimates Committee in the 1966-67 Session. These included sub- 
committees for Social Affairs, Economic Affairs, Technological and 
Scientific Affairs, Defense and Overseas Affairs, and Building and 
Natural Resources. Admittedly, the breadth of a subcommittee sub- 
ject was quite wide; but an MP could now seek a post on a particular 
subcommittee of interest. Moreover, a small group could also develop 
some expertise and specialization in a particular field. As a result of 
the creation of two (later three) specialist committees, however, the 
Estimates Committee was reduced in size from 43 to 36 members and 
the number of subcommittees from six to five. The Estimates Com- 
mittee wished to avoid overlap with the specialized committees and 
as Wiseman points out was persuaded to return to "lettering" sub- 
committees as a means of introducing "a greater element of flexibil- 
ity . . . which would ensure that no subject of particular interest or 
topical importance is overlooked and that every sub-committee has 
an equal chance of having such a subject allotted to them" (Wiseman, 
1970). But although "flexibility" and subjects of "topical importance" 
were possible, specialization and expertise that could have accrued 
were now forgone. Again scrutiny fell to a few members (five) who 
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attempted to monitor the Estimates of government departrnents- 
usually spending no more than one year on the subject-resulting in 
limited and rather ineffectual scrutiny. 
The two specialist committees that were initially established were 
the Select Committee on Agriculture and the Select Committee on 
Science and Technology. During the debate on the Queen's Speech 
in April 1966, Wilson suggested the extended use of specialist com- 
mittees: "Accordingly, the government will enter into discussions 
through the usual channels with the two Opposition parties on the 
suggestion of establishing one or two new Parliamentary Committees 
to concern themselves with administration in the sphere of certain 
Departments whose usual operations are not only of national con- 
cern but in many cases are of intensely human concern" (HCD 66, 
727:1086). While the prime minister paid lip service to supporting an 
extension of House of Commons committees, his remarks indicated 
that such a system would be a matter for the respective frontbenches 
to consider, not the House. And, in fact, when Bowden was winding 
up the Queen's Speech debate a week later, he quite categorically de- 
nied a role for the House as a whole: "I do not think there is any point 
in sending the question to the Select Committee on Procedure. As 
soon as we [the government] have firm proposals we shall discuss 
them with the Opposition and discuss them with the House" (HCD 
66, 727:1087). 
An issue that had traditionally been the domain of the Select 
Committee on Procedure was usurped by the government. That this 
had not occurred previously is explained by the congruency of pre- 
vious Procedure Committees and the governments of the day. Former 
committee proceedings on the subject, i.e., the 1959 Procedure Com- 
mittee, addressed the reform issues consistent with the government's 
perception of the proper role of the House. Once attitudes among 
MPs began to alter on their and the House's role, it was no longer 
politically tenable for the government to permit a Procedure Commit- 
tee to monopolize reform proceedings and recommendations. 
To the Conservatives, Wilson's action appeared to substantiate 
their opinion that the prime minister was making a conciliatory ges- 
ture toward his own backbenchers. Conservative leaders also as- 
sumed their Labour counterparts would be cautious in introducing 
specialist committees and certainly would not allow scrutiny of de- 
partments responsible for major andlor contentious policy areas. In 
short, these would be politically marginal and "safe" committees. 
Butt (1967, 354) points out that in the exchanges between the front- 
benches, Edward Heath, Leader of the Conservatives, let Wilson 
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know that his party would be prepared to support a science and tech- 
nological committee and also one for ad hoc specialized inquiries but 
that he was not anxious to go beyond this. The Opposition front- 
bench must assume the dual position of leading the attack and scru- 
tiny of the government of the day and, as the Shadow Cabinet, be 
prepared to take the reins of power at the next general election. In 
this latter role, Opposition leaders must be wary of reform that 
would temporarily assist their role as critics of government but 
would also serve to hinder their powers and prerogatives when next 
they come to power. 
As discussion continued under Crossman, the government itself 
became more cautious; the idea of specialist committees covering the 
Home Office, Social Security, or Defense were abandoned. Finally, 
on December 14, 1966, Crossman recommended implementing both 
the last report of the previous Parliament and the first report of the 
current Parliament as well as the main proposal in the earlier report 
on specialist committees. In doing so, he was able to give the impres- 
sion that the government was accepting proposals from the House, 
but still retain the government's initiative in selecting those reports 
and specific recommendations as a prelude to reform. In advocating 
the two specialized committees-one on Agriculture, the other on 
Science and Technology, Crossman was charged by members of all 
parties with changing the recommendations and intent of the Pro- 
cedure Committee to suit the government's needs and supporting 
it in the House under the guise of all-party Procedure Committee 
recommendations. 
R. H. Turton, a Conservative former chairman of the Select Com- 
mittee on Procedure, criticized Crossman on the floor of the House 
precisely because Crossman claimed he was implementing the Pro- 
cedure Committee's recommendations on specialist committees. Tur- 
ton stated: "He is doing the reverse; he is completely contradicting it. 
What we recommended on specialist committees, rightly or wrongly, 
was to take the Estimates Committee, broaden it out, extend its ac- 
tivities and make it a more wide ranging and powerful body. This is 
not being done and this is the weakness of the proposals for specialist 
committees" (HCD 66/67, 738:593). 
Turton was correct; Crossman was contradicting the Procedure 
Report. But the government had no incentive to create a "more wide 
ranging and powerful body" to monitor, scrutinize, and criticize it- 
self. Other MPs criticized the government for setting up an Agri- 
cultural Committee with a vague remit over a large department, and 
one on science and technology with a remit covering virtually any 
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department. Few opportunities for specialization or for acquiring ex- 
pertise would be possible from service on these committees. The gov- 
ernment was on record as supporting parliamentary reform through 
committee extension but, more important, the subjects to be covered 
were uncontentious and politically nondivisive. The government 
whips were on for the final vote; there were 264 votes supporting the 
government's proposals and 177 against. Some members, notably 
David Steel, the future Liberal leader, voted against the proposal be- 
cause they thought it would actually hinder further reform. Of those 
persons present to vote who would serve in a Thatcher cabinet, eight 
voted against this proposal, including Thatcher and her subsequent 
Leader of the House, John Biffen. Among those voting for the pro- 
posal were Michael Heseltine and John Nott, both of whom were dis- 
missed by Thatcher following disputes about her leadership style. 
What was also significant about this set of reforms and accom- 
panying debate was the expectation of policy scrutiny. Crossman, 
speaking for the government, belittled those who thought it was still 
possible to make a sharp distinction between policy and administra- 
tion and to form a select committee to deal only with the latter and be 
excluded from consideration of the former. He argued that "even a 
significant study of the work of the Committee on Nationalised In- 
dustries, for example, will reveal that this distinction is often very 
blurred, and that it is the blurring which enables the Committee to 
do its valuable work  (HCD 66/67, 738:485). Such a candid acknowl- 
edgment of the link between policy and administration as a legiti- 
mate area of focus in a committee's inquiry was a remarkable 
statement by any government. Perhaps Crossman felt self-assured in 
making this association, as the proposed committee's proceedings 
were thought to be politically neutral, and in its dozen or so years of 
existence the Nationalised Industries Committee had shown little in- 
dication of criticizing a party's policy nor questioning the Executive's 
prerogatives in this policy area. 
Towards the end of the 1966-67 session, the Select Committee on 
Procedure issued its sixth report, which recommended a legislation- 
proposing role for specialized committees. The report noted that the 
Select Committee on Nationalised Industries had recently considered 
the form of the proposed corporation for the Post Office and offered 
appropriate recommendations. Expecting an expansion of specialist 
committees that would concern themselves with particular subjects 
or departments, the Procedure Committee interpreted the action of 
the Nationalised Industries Committee as a helpful precedent. As 
such, the committee noted that "it will become increasingly possible 
for such committees to consider ideas for legislation referred to them, 
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or for them to propose legislation" (HC 539, viii). An endorsement 
from the Procedure Committee of a legislative role for specialist com- 
mittees highlighted the apparent change in attitude toward the role 
these committees could potentially play in the House. It was cer- 
tainly drastically different from the sort of observations made by the 
Procedure Committee in 1959. 
The Science and Technology committee did not seek to criticize 
Labour or Conservative party policies, but it clearly defined its role in 
policy terms. During the debate on the committee's first report, 
Arthur Palmer, the Labour chairman, stated unequivocally, "It is def- 
initely our business to attempt to help in the formulation of public 
policy, and this we have tried to do" (HCD 67/68, 765:952). He inter- 
preted the committee's wide remit as an asset in enabling it to select 
its own subject of inquiry, hold inquiries into areas of broad public 
policy, and offer recommendations for future public policy. Neither 
he nor his committee members expressed support for the previous 
mode of committee inquiry, which examined past expenditures, pre- 
vious policies, or former administrative practices. 
Given that the committee assumed a policy-shaping role, the 
government's response was predictable. The government waited 
seven months before permitting a debate on the committee's first re- 
port, and it was a "take note" debate only-not a debate on the mer- 
its and recommendations of the report itself. When conducting its 
inquiry into nuclear energy, the Foreign Office refused to make the 
necessary arrangements for the committee's planned overseas inves- 
tigations. The committee charged that the minister of transport was 
not at all cooperative and refused the committee's request for papers 
prepared in his department. Members also complained about the re- 
sentment and disdain from other government ministers, particularly 
in the Treasury (HCD 67/68, 765:951-1071; HC 381-XVII, 1967). 
Backbench MPs from all political parties criticized the govern- 
ment's treatment of the committee, and the Labour frontbench was 
subject to a blistering attack for delaying a debate on the report and 
then scheduling it at 7:30 p.m., when the fewest members could 
likely attend. But Tony Benn, minister of transport, stated that the 
presence in the chamber of so many members who had devoted se- 
rious study and contributed thought and knowledge to a report sub- 
ject to debate was unparalleled in parliamentary history (HCD 67/68, 
765:967). Equally important for executive-parliamentary relations, 
the debate focused less on the nuclear power program and instead 
provided an opportunity for committee members to highlight the 
perceived arrogance and complete lack of cooperation they received 
from the government. 
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The Select Committee on Agriculture encountered considerably 
more difficulty in pursuing its inquiries than did Science and Tech- 
nology. In particular, the Agriculture Committee had planned to 
travel to Brussels to speak with members of the EEC delegation. The 
Foreign Office contacted the clerk of the committee to inquire what 
~recisely this House of Commons committee intended to do in Brus- 
sels, who the members would speak with, and in general learn all the 
details of the committee's inquiry. The clerk was then directed by the 
Foreign Office not to mention the conversation but to keep the min- 
istry informed. Furthermore, the chairman of the committee was 
forced to petition Parliament for permission to leave the country. The 
other committee members had been waiting at the airport for several 
hours when permission was finally granted at 6:30 a.m. (Wiseman, 
1970, 206-9). The government asserted in its defense that the objec- 
tion was not to members of the committee visiting the Commission in 
their capacity as members of Parliament but as members of a House 
of Commons committee. 
As with the Science and Technology Committee, there was a pe- 
riod of several months between the publication of the Agriculture 
Committee's report and the debate on the report. And, as with the 
debate on the Science and Technology report, this latter debate was 
characterized by criticisms and outrage at the government's treat- 
ment of a House of Commons committee. The government was also 
criticized for holding the debate on a day in which the committee's 
chairman informed the government he would be physically unable to 
attend. John Mackintosh, a member of the committee and of the gov- 
ernment's party, criticized his frontbench for the many problems and 
obstacles created by the government in the committee's work. He, 
too, noted the refusal of departments to comply with requests from 
the committee for information: "All these arrangements were turned 
down and we got a reply, a Departmental Observation which said: 
'. . . . but Government departments cannot accept a general obliga- 
tion to produce all papers for which a Parliamentary Committee asks, 
particularly1-and I emphasize these words-'those relating to inter- 
nal administration.' It is precisely the internal administration of a De- 
partment which we were set up to investigate" (HCD 67/68, 764135). 
Despite Crossman's assurance that policy and administration were 
intertwined and provided legitimate, insightful areas of scrutiny, the 
Agriculture Committee was persistently hampered in fulfilling its 
remit. But this committee posed a qualitatively different dilemma for 
government. Other committees of inquiry-Nationalised Industries, 
Science and Technology, for example-would examine the adminis- 
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tration of programs in which various departments might have a role. 
They did not seek to inquire nor to challenge the administrative prac- 
tices of a specific department of state. While Agriculture appeared to 
be the least politically contentious of the departments, the commit- 
tee's actions nevertheless threatened the heretofore unquestioned in- 
violability of ministerial-civil servant relations and confidentiality. 
This perceived intrusion was one that neither ministers nor civil ser- 
vants had any desire to facilitate or allow. Consequently, two sets of 
perceptions emerged. On the one hand, the government could claim 
that the committee's requests would undermine the traditional prin- 
ciple of minister-civil servant relations and ministerial responsibility. 
On the other hand, the committee could claim a right to investigate 
administrative practices because its authority was granted by a reso- 
lution of Parliament, extending from support and recommendation 
of the Executive. Moreover, parliament's constitutional role is to hold 
the Executive accountable, a role that the committee assumed it was 
fulfilling on behalf of the Commons. 
Soon after the Agriculture Committee began encountering diffi- 
culties with the government, Crossman announced details about the 
committee, explaining that the original intention of the government 
(only now revealed) was that a departmental committee should 
spend one session on a department, then move on. The committee 
reported on 3 July 1968 that it would soon complete its current in- 
quiry and asked to be reconstituted. There was no response from the 
government, however, and on 6 November the chairman was told the 
terms of a motion appointing the committee and ordering it to report 
by 31 December. The rest of the committee first saw the motion on the 
Order Paper the next day, 7 November. A government whip quickly 
moved it the same evening, but the late night vigilance of Labour and 
Conservative committee members blocked an order that would have 
required the committee to report in an impossibly short time. After 
the motion had been blocked for several days and an amendment 
had been put down by members of the committee, the government 
withdrew its motion and made a concession extending the life of the 
committee to 28 February. The length of this extension was deter- 
mined by the government without consultation with any committee 
member. 
Crossman was aware of the difficulties these committees were 
creating for the government, and he sought to avoid establishing new 
ones. He persistently argued that one could not go much further in 
setting up specialist committees because of the lack of members to 
serve on them. Nevertheless, the government put forward a motion 
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to extend the membership of the Select Committee on Agriculture 
from fourteen to twenty-five members when the committee became 
troublesome. Not all of the additional eleven members were people 
who wanted to be on the select committee or interested in agricul- 
ture. But they were safe party men, obedient to their respective front- 
benches, and consequently could be depended upon to reign in the 
committee's activities. 
On the 12 February 1969, a Special Report was issued by the Ag- 
riculture Committee outlining its history. The report was a peculiar 
one because it contained nothing about agricultural policies; rather, it 
was wholly a sharp attack on and condemnation of the government. 
One must bear in mind that the chairman and a majority of the com- 
mittee were members of the governing party. Without shrillness or 
hyperbole, the report carefully documented the government's duplic- 
ity, breach of faith, dishonesty, and heavy-handed tactics. Parliamen- 
tarians expect governments to employ the various means available to 
them to maintain their strength and priorities. And, in fact, the gov- 
ernment's response to the committee's activities could not be consid- 
ered surprising. What was surprising, however, was for a House of 
Commons committee to produce a unanimous report in which the 
government's lugubrious tactics and actions were detailed for the 
public record. What had been traditionally considered as "parliamen- 
tary politics" and business through the "usual channels" was now 
presented in terms of the government's "indefensible" actions which 
involved the "repute of Parliamentary government." 
The report claimed the packing of the committee was unjustified, 
that granting a remit of one session rather than one parliament vio- 
lated the government's original commitments, that limiting the num- 
ber of specialist committees because of staffing considerations was 
"indefensible," and that the government had locked out MPs in the 
policy-making process in deference to ministers and producers' orga- 
nizations-essentially only those groups that agreed with the rele- 
vant department's policy position. And finally: "We deplore the 
decision to disband the Committee of Agriculture at a time when it 
was becoming familiar with its task, developing its expertise and had 
identified so many questions which urgently call for further investi- 
gation" (HC 138,1969 [emphasis mine]). If indeed the committee was 
evolving in the manner suggested by this statement, one can appre- 
ciate the government's rationale for impeding the committee's pace 
and, failing that, abolishing it, as the government indeed did. 
In the final analysis, party bonds and party whips were strong 
enough to ensure that the government's motion to disband a House 
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of Commons committee, a move "deplored" by the committee mem- 
bers, was successful. The committee's report recognized but lamented 
the power of the government to control specialist committees. Mo- 
tions to set them up, to nominate, add, or drop members, and mo- 
tions relating to their powers and terms of reference were all brought 
forward by the government. As Shell pointed out, these powers in- 
dicated clearly the subordinate position in which the Commons 
found itself in relation to the government (Shell, 1970). And during a 
debate on the government's "winding up" the Agriculture Commit- 
tee, Alexander Lyon, a Labour MP, spoke out against his party lead- 
ership: "The essence of the issue before the House is this. Should the 
House be the final controller of its own select committee procedure, 
or should the matter be decided by the Front Bench?" (HCD 68/69, 
773: 829). 
During the 1960s the answer to this question was still very clear. 
But what was also striking from the debate, reports, and press con- 
ferences was an embryonic change in the perceived duty of MPs in 
the policy process. In addition to detailing the obstinacy encountered 
from the government in obstructing a committee's inquiry, members 
also criticized the contemporary policy process in which MPs were 
consistently excluded from the consultation of ministers, civil ser- 
vants, and interest groups. Noting the difficulties some of the new 
committees had encountered from ministers and civil servants, as 
well as its own experience over the past twenty-one years, the Select 
Committee on Nationalised Industries decided to conduct an inquiry 
into ministerial control. The committee observed that any committee 
appointed by ministers to undertake a fundamental review of the role 
of ministers themselves and to comment on how they had performed 
this role would understandably be dubious (HC 371-1, 1968). 
The report was highly critical of the policy process that offered 
MPs only a reactive role; it challenged the notion of ministerial con- 
trol and responsibility for assorted departments, boards, and com- 
missions, and it suggested more active involvement for Parliament as 
a whole in both formulating and evaluating national policies. The 
government took eleven months to reply to the committee's report. 
The form of the reply was rather peculiar in that it was not a formal 
listing of specific recommendations followed by a terse reply-as had 
been the case with previous government replies to committee reports 
(Cmnd 4027, 1970). The government instead accepted minor points 
such as "that spending departments should take the initiative in 
bringing together the industries for discussions of common prob- 
lems" (para. 13). It waffled on others: "The Committee proposed that 
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the Air Transport Licensing Board should be abolished. The govern- 
ment will bear this recommendation in mind during its consideration 
of the report of the Committee of Enquiry into Civil Air Transport" 
(para. 25). On others, it simply rejected recommendations: "The Gov- 
ernment have given very careful consideration to the closely argued 
case in the Select Committee's Report for a Ministry of Nationalised 
Industries. They have, however, concluded that the disadvantages of 
a major change in the machinery of government on these lines would 
substantially outweigh the advantages" (para. 32). A close reading of 
the command paper reveals an outright rejection of any and all com- 
mittee recommendations that venture into the internal administra- 
tion and policy domain of a minister's department as well as policy 
recommendations directing the cabinet to act in specific ways. 
Crossman's earlier praise of the Nationalised Industries Commit- 
tee's inquiries that blended administrative and policy concerns was 
now nowhere to be heard. Most important, this sort of committee ac- 
tivity was acceptable, and indeed perhaps welcomed, only when the 
committee's investigations focused on individual industries. It was 
blatantly unacceptable when the committee inquired directly and 
specifically into ministers' administrative and policy options vis-a-vis 
these industries. 
The government's reply extended beyond a formal command pa- 
per. Prior to publishing the response, the Commons experienced an 
extraordinary debate over whether to reestablish this committee at 
all. During more than twenty years of existence, neither Labour nor 
Conservative governments had questioned the committee's exis- 
tence. But its recent report on ministerial control and a proposed in- 
quiry into the Bank of England placed the select committee in 
jeopardy. The committee's activities had transgressed what the gov- 
ernment clearly saw as its exclusive domain, and the committee was 
prepared to continue this type of inquiry. 
In a compromise between committee and government, the com- 
mittee was reappointed with terms of reference allowing it to inves- 
tigate the Post Office, the Independent Television Authority, and 
Cable and Wireless, Ltd. The committee was critical of its inability to 
conduct effective inquiries into these subjects previously; the govern- 
ment conceded the committee's right to hold these inquiries as long 
as the Bank of England was exempted. 
The government defended its stance on the Bank of England is- 
sue ecause of a potential breach of confidentiality in the bank's pro- 
ceedings. This debate also drew senior Labour members in opposing 
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the position taken by their party leaders. Ian Mikardo, who had 
served in Attlee's government, was the current chairman of the com- 
mittee. He reiterated that past inquiries were carried out with com- 
plete discretion when investigating confidential transactions of 
nationalized industries. Mikardo argued: "So the question is not 
whether an investigation into the Bank of England should be carried 
out within limits. That goes without saying. The question is-who 
decides the limits? I do not believe that it can be seriously held that a 
Committee of this House is not capable of deciding its own limits" 
(HCD 68/69, 777:1195-96). 
J. T. Price, a former government whip, echoed the speeches of 
many present in the chamber on the government's treatment of the 
committee: "I think it is wrong for a senior Committee of this House 
to be placed in the invidious position of being at the receiving end of 
decisions about which we know so little. . . . I want to persuade the 
Government to put away childish things and to grow up and be a lit- 
tle more mature about these matters. . . . This is a key matter for us. 
We are in the dark about our financial institutions" (HCD 69, 
777: 1207-8). 
To be sure, it was not the case that MPs were not "in the d a r k  
before and now suddenly found themselves to be so. Rather, many 
members of Parliament no longer felt this situation was justifiable or 
acceptable. This particular issue was not one in which knowledge of 
or access to a policy area had declined in recent years; instead the 
fundamental issue in this case was an assertion of a committee's right 
to inquire into areas it thought the House should be more knowl- 
edgeable of and potentially should involve itself in to a much greater 
degree. To that end, Mikardo, in an extraordinary move, issued an 
amendment on the floor of the House to the Leader's motion on 
limiting the committee's investigation. Mikardo moved "to establish 
the principle that Select and Specialist Committees of the House 
are independent bodies responsible only to the House, and are not 
creatures of Ministers who can limit their activities" (HCD 69, 
7771191). In the ensuing vote, the government (Labour) whips were 
put on, but Mikardo received unanimous support from the Labour 
and Conservative committee members. Thirty-nine other Labour 
MPs voted against their party leaders and supported Mikardo's 
amendment. At issue was a fundamental constitutional principle 
and institutional prerogatives. Although some Conservatives also 
supported the amendment, they by and large abstained. In the end, 
the government won, but only by 40 votes-the same as the number 
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of Labour MPs who could not vote for the government's position 
and subsequently abstained. 
The End of Crossman's Reforms 
The experience of these three specialist committees in the 1960s un- 
derlines four important features. First, the committees moved their 
inquiries beyond a narrowly defined focus on administration of gov- 
ernment policies. Second, the topics they wished to consider were far 
more searching than the government apparently intended when the 
committees were created. Third, there was a widespread acceptance 
among committee members and by several other members of Parlia- 
ment that the committees' activities reflected precisely the sort of 
work the House and its members should be performing. The obser- 
vations and recommendations of the 1959 Select Committee on Pro- 
cedure seemed strangely archaic. And finally, the acrimonious 
procedure debates on the floor of the House and the special reports 
issued by the respective committees displayed frustration among 
MPs from all political parties with the Executive's domination over 
the House and its proceedings. 
Those new institutional arrangements also fostered a change in 
the political relationship between Parliament and the Executive, a 
change that neither side found easy to accommodate. One Labour 
MP who served in Wilson's cabinet was critical of Crossman's duplic- 
ity and the government's retreat in its commitment to specialist com- 
mittees. But she also noted the growing support in Parliament for 
these committees: "Richard Crossman was a liar, a cheat, and a bully. 
He was insufferable. Cabinet meetings at which he presided were 
like academic seminars. He really wanted to see some reform, but he 
did not anticipate the kind of problems and powers that these com- 
mittees would have. Agriculture is an excellent example; the govexn- 
ment was happy to close it down because they produced a great 
report on CAP which embarrassed the government. Harold Wilson 
also wanted to get rid of them as did the rest of the cabinet, but the 
political realities were pointed out to him, so they were allowed to 
stay" (Interview, 2 July 1987). As the Crossman diaries also helped 
to reveal, ministers and their officials were not sympathetic to the 
establishment of bodies designed to keep their work under critical 
review. 
In 1969, the last year of the Labour government, MPs reassessed 
the performance of the specialist committees. During a debate on the 
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Consolidated Fund Bill, which coincided with the Procedure Com- 
mittee's evaluation of specialist committees, MPs defended the com- 
mittee's activities and suggested other committees as well. At the 
heart of their defense of previous committees and support for new 
ones was again a fundamental concern with the technical aspects of 
contemporary government policies. 
Julian Ridsdale, a former Conservative defence minister, called 
for the creation of a Defence Committee. Anticipating the reluctance 
from a government to create such a committee, he stressed that much 
of this committee's proceedings would be in secret and would be de- 
voted to questions of the military's "adequate strength and "pre- 
paredness." He argued that "having been a defence Minister for over 
two years, I do not believe that Parliament can be nearly well enough 
informed to look into all the items it should examine except through 
the median of a Select Committee." And in support of better- 
informed debates, he added: "I do not believe we can adequately dis- 
cuss the nuclear role of Polaris submarines and their effectiveness, 
the American nuclear shield, or the part nuclear warfare will play in 
the future at Question Time or in debates on the floor of the 
House. . . . [W]e must have far more debates in depth than we have 
been having especially in the technical and nuclear world of defence 
in which we now live, and because of the cost of modern weapons 
and their technicality" (HCD 68/69, 778:1453-56). 
Ridsdale's concerns were echoed by many others. One Labour 
member noted that he had become a "convert" to specialist commit- 
tees after attending an all-party defence seminar in which there had 
been more agreement between the parties than had ever been possi- 
ble during defence debates in the chamber. Another Labour MP rose 
to note that debates had suffered because of the shape of the cham- 
ber, which is not particularly well arranged for "logical and cool de- 
bate of technological subjects." The proper forum, he suggested, was 
the Science and Technological Committee, which of course had been 
abolished. He, too, reiterated that Parliament was "in danger of fail- 
ing to cope with the challenge of modern technology in defence." 
Patrick Wall, vice-chairman of the Conservative parliamentary com- 
mittee on defence, summarized the frustrations of many MPs with 
the existing arrangements: "We all realize that Parliament today is 
held in pretty low esteem by the nation. . . . The real reason for this 
state of affairs is that, when we have major debates in the House, ev- 
eryone knows that a decision has been taken already and nothing 
anyone says will alter it. . . . And most Members on the Government 
side and all on the Opposition side have no function at all, except to 
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talk in an attempt to direct policy" (HCD 69, 778:1453-56). Indeed, 
reformers objected both to their reactive roles in the policy process 
and to their inability to discuss complex, technical policy issues with 
the government frontbench in a forum conducive primarily to polit- 
icized exchange and scoring debating points. 
Reformers argued that the superiority and virtual monopoly of 
information possessed by the Executive and its ability to withhold 
this information from Parliament meant that members could neither 
accurately foresee what issues were coming up for discussion nor 
make known their own opinions and preferences prior to decisions 
being taken by the government. As Nevi1 Johnson (1970) points out, 
a strength ening of select committees was intended to help remedy 
this situation. Johnson, however, is critical of the value of information 
as the justification for major extensions of select committee scrutiny. 
With hindsight as his guide, he notes that few attempts were made 
"to work out how additional flows of information might be related to 
parliamentary functions or powers, still less to specific stages of gov- 
ernmental activity." He suggests a vagueness and nai'vetk among par- 
liamentary reformers (including academics like Crick) for valuing 
information as an end in itself that could not be channeled into the 
formative stages of policy development (Hanson and Crick, 1970, 
226-27). 
But Johnson's criticisms of these committees neglect two related 
and important aspects. While the chamber remained the primary av- 
enue available for monitoring and criticizing government policy, se- 
lect committee service provided its members and other MPs with the 
detailed information to be used in debates, which of course they had 
lacked previously. Moreover, opponents of select committees who 
feared this work "upstairs" would detract from the chamber's impor- 
tance were soon to find that committee members desired more time 
in the chamber to debate committee reports and to utilize the infor- 
mation gleaned from their committee service in debates. Second, the 
fact that information was not utilized systematically by the govern- 
ment or to alter substantially the dynamics of the policy process 
can hardly be blamed on backbenchers. It was the government who 
curtailed the life of some committees to avoid the development of ex- 
pertise among their members, restricted terms of reference, packed 
committee memberships, reconstituted committees late in the ses- 
sion, refused to supply papers, hindered efforts to conduct inquiries 
abroad, provided inadequate staffing, and delayed debates on com- 
mittee reports. In short, the government created formidable obsta- 
cles for these committees in collecting, processing, and utilizing 
information. 
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Nevertheless, the committees produced some quite influential 
reports; even Johnson gives due credit to the Science and Technology 
Committee. Its first report covered the nuclear reactor program and 
its second, defence research. In addition, following a request from 
the government it inquired into coastal pollution (as a consequence of 
the Torrey Canyon disaster). Johnson concludes that the committee 
was able to make valuable contributions because "it has not shied 
away from important topics and has shown a preference for weight- 
iness and substance before political glamour" (229-30). The major 
difference between these inquiries and those of other committees is 
not that other specialist committees pursued politically glamorous 
topics at the expense of substantive and important topics. Rather, be- 
cause these inquiries were deemed important and substantive, they 
were also politically controversial for ministers and their depart- 
ments. The Science and Technology Committee operated in a sub- 
stantively different political milieu; it was not associated with 
corresponding ministers and officials to monitor nor with depart- 
mental policies to criticize and scrutinize. 
The committee also succeeded in establishing the principle of a 
select committee meeting regularly in public, of ministers and offi- 
cials giving testimony to a committee when called, and, after a con- 
siderable confrontation between the Executive and Parliament, the 
freedom of a committee to travel and hear evidence from whomever 
it wishes. However, it remained unclear what direction select com- 
mittees would take in the near future. Government still obviously 
had a great deal of leverage in influencing their creation, proceed- 
ings, and abolition. 
When Crossman first proposed establishing committees, he ex- 
plained that he hoped to set up two more of these departmental com- 
mittees each year until all domestic policy was subject to scrutiny. 
Certainly the whole tenor of Crossman's speech reflected this idea, 
and there are no Hansard references to the word "experimental" 
meaning termination after one or two sessions. Three years after the 
announcement of the Crossman Reforms during a debate on the les- 
sons learned from the committees' activities, John Silkin wound up 
the debate for the government with an entirely different message: 
"The time has come for the Government to take stock of this whole 
experiment, for experiment it was, of Select Committees. . . . But the 
House must consider not only the experiment as a whole, but the ex- 
periment individually. . . . This is a matter which must be carefully 
thought out and given some study, and I assure the hon. Gentlemen 
that this is what the Government intend to do" (HCD 68/69, 
778:1471). In his speech, Silkin made it clear that the government 
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certainly had a role in the evaluation of prior committees as well as in 
proposing new changes for the House. 
Four months after this debate, the Select Committee on Proce- 
dure issued its report on the use of select committees in the House of 
Commons. While giving evidence to the committee, F. A. Bishop, 
who served nine consecutive years in the cabinet or as the prime 
minister's private secretary, noted that Parliament's response to pol- 
icy decisions of the executive was controlled by the way in which the 
Executive presents its decisions and its actions. The result, he ar- 
gued, has meant that Parliament has concentrated on scrutinizing 
decisions that are short-term rather than long-term and on their fi- 
nancial implications. For him, the fundamental question was "what 
should Parliament's job be in our modern industrial society?" (HC 
410, 1969, xxxiv). 
Bishop's concerns and questions formed the basis for the commit- 
tee's ensuing report. The committee concluded that the existing sys- 
tem of select committees for scrutinizing policy and its execution 
were inadequate. First, the range and terms of reference of the Esti- 
mates Committee were not wide, and it noted that the recommenda- 
tions of the Procedure Committee's Fourth Report (1964-65) had 
never been implemented. And second, the report referred to the 
manner in which specialist committees had developed, resulting in a 
number of problems with the Executive. Subsequently, the commit- 
tee recommended a restructuring of the House's committee system. 
The committee's goal was to "seek the provision of information for 
the House on the present day system of planning public expenditure 
and to propose means by which the House can scrutinize govern- 
ment decisions on plans and priorities and can check on their execu- 
tion by Departments of State" (HC 410, 1969, lxi). 
The Procedure Committee also noted that the extent of the Com- 
mons' control of public expenditure depended upon the relationship 
between the House and the Executive. These recommendations shied 
away from the problematic issues of direct policy involvement and in- 
stead returned to focus on expenditure and policy execution. But the 
intended role of the proposed system was nevertheless clouded by 
the report's rather vague conclusion: "Although there are limits to 
the degree to which Governments can be expected to disclose their 
plans and future thinking, yet over the years the power of the Exec- 
utive has tended to increase, and this tendency has left its mark on 
the working of Parliament. Your Committee believe that the main 
outline of the proposed changes in procedure should be embarked 
upon without delay if the House is to develop its proper influence in 
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these fields" (HC 410, 1969, lxxii). But what is the House's "proper 
influence"? The respective frontbenches would have a different set of 
criteria than many on the backbench. In the end, the committee rec- 
ommended changing the Estimates Committee to an Expenditure 
Committee and operating through a general subcommittee and eight 
functional subcommittees. The order of reference of the committee 
would be "to consider public expenditure, and to examine the form of 
the papers relating to public expenditure presented to this House" 
(HC 410, 1969, lxxiii). 
The Heath Years 
The Labour government was replaced in 1970 by Ted Heath's Con- 
servatives. As in the past, the incoming government pledged support 
for a Procedure Committee's recommendations but nevertheless 
made substantial arrangements before submitting them for parlia- 
mentary approval. The Conservatives also followed the trend of the 
Labour government in abolishing departmental select committees 
and restricting specialist committees to a few subject areas. And as 
Walkland pointed out, those specialist committees were limited in 
their creation by the government's assessments of the role they could 
play in assisting official objectives (Walkland, 1979a). This well- 
established pattern of utilizing parliamentary procedure and the 
chamber as adjunct and aid to government priorities was thus con- 
tinued. Moreover, one cannot discern a noticeable difference in the 
attitude of the two parties toward parliamentary committees; both 
acted consistently in asserting and defending the prerogatives of the 
Executive. 
The Heath government, with William Whitelaw as Leader of the 
House, proposed a new Expenditure Committee, which the Conser- 
vative frontbench saw as neatly fitting into a packet of administrative 
reforms based on the reports of the Plowden and Fulton committees 
as well as the Procedure Committee of the previous year. Conserva- 
tive support was based on the premise that the Expenditure Commit- 
tee could be useful in realizing more efficient economic planning and 
management. But unlike Labour's early views on the desirability of 
bringing Parliament closer to the policy arena, the Conservatives 
maintained their view that committees could be valuable in seeking 
economies, monitoring profligate Whitehall spending, and pursuing 
efficiencies and rationalizations in spending programs. To this end, 
the Expenditure Committee would function in a manner consistent 
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with the government's aims. Similar aims were instrumental in con- 
vincing an initially skeptical Prime Minister Thatcher to support the 
1979 reforms as a means to control a civil service hostile to her view 
of the role of government and her political philosophy. 
The government, however, was not prepared to surrender its pri- 
mary responsibilities in these endeavors to parliamentary commit- 
tees. Committees could be an auxiliary in the government's attempts 
to find economic efficiencies, but it clearly remained with the latter to 
set the pace and breadth of this agenda. As such, the proposed Ex- 
penditure Committee would consist of only forty-nine members (only 
six more than the Estimates Committee), an insufficient number to 
staff the Procedure Committee's proposed eight subcommittees. The 
result was to limit to six the number of subcommittees that could be 
appointed and to restrict both the range of subjects that could be cov- 
ered and the number of members eligible to serve on a subcommittee 
looking at a particular matter (Cmnd. 4507, 1970; HC 588-1, 1978). 
In addition to changes the government imposed on the Proce- 
dure Committee's recommendations, there seemed to be a fallacy in 
the committee report itself. In moving beyond its formal remit, the 
Expenditure Committee mirrored the experience of previous special- 
ist committees. Members of the Procedure Committee believed that 
members of the Expenditure subcommittees would accept dictation 
from the chairman of the full committee, meeting together with the 
chairmen of the subcommittees, as to how the subcommittees would 
proceed. But subcommittee members decided that the House needed 
them to scrutinize matters generally and not from the narrow and ex- 
clusive viewpoint of expenditure and so determined for themselves 
the scope and focus of their respective inquiries, producing reports 
that were not vastly dissimilar from the reports the Estimates Com- 
mittee had produced before them. 
D. A. M. Pring, senior clerk in the House, noted in later testi- 
mony that although "an academic blueprint" can be produced for 
how committees ought to work, committee members in the end de- 
cided how they would actually work. He further acknowledged that 
a subcommittee usually felt obliged to find some expenditure link be- 
fore it would adopt a subject for study but, once it found one, felt able 
to embark upon the study without limiting itself to questions of ex- 
penditure. And in fact, in the Procedure Committee's report calling 
for the creation of a new and comprehensive system of select com- 
mittees, the Procedure Committee blamed the "unsystematic charac- 
ter" of the then current committee system "because the House has at 
no point taken a clear decision about the form of specialization to be 
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adopted." The House had taken no decision because it was left to 
committees themselves to determine how they were to operate, and 
they consequently interpreted their orders of reference with "consid- 
erable latitude" (HC 588-1, 1978). 
Whatever criteria may be employed, the Expenditure Committee 
did not fulfill the expectations of many parliamentary reformers. 
Walkland charged that the committee reports were not unlike the 
low-key, Royal Commission-type reports issued by the previous Es- 
timates Committee. And he concluded that the Expenditure Commit- 
tee's activities had "probably not resulted in one penny of public 
money being allocated differently" (Walkland, 1979a, 195). Perhaps 
they were not intended to secure these economies, but then one must 
ask what was their role? Ann Robinson also concluded that the 
Expenditure Committee had neither "much concrete impact upon 
Government decisions about public spending" nor more than "a lim- 
ited amount of influence on the policy making process" (Norton, 
1981a, 144). 
On the other hand, some MPs did credit the Expenditure Com- 
mittee with a degree of indirect influence. William Rodgers, chair- 
man of the committee, suggested that the "taking of evidence itself, 
which, of course, is taken in public, widely reported, has influenced 
government policy in a very substantial way" (Granada Television, 
1973, 142). For Rodgers, it was far more important to inform Parlia- 
ment and its members about government policies and priorities than 
to strive for consistent policy influence. There were, moreover, some 
committee reports that appear to have had a marked effect on gov- 
ernment industrial policy. For example, in 1975 the Expenditure 
Committee criticized the conditions of government assistance to Brit- 
ish Leyland, and the matter received widespread publicity. When the 
government gave substantial financial assistance to Chrysler UK in 
December 1976, the terms of the agreement (which was also the sub- 
ject of an investigation by the Expenditure committee) were very 
much tougher and followed most of the committee's recommenda- 
tions for cases of this kind, although no formal acceptance of the rec- 
ommendations had been acknowledged by the government. 
Labour Returns to Power 
Most of the critical Expenditure Reports covering macroeconomic and 
industrial policies were issued during Labour's return to power. Con- 
servatives, in comparison, were treated much more lightly by the 
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committee. Midway through Labour's tenure in office, the Expendi- 
ture Committee was clearly regarded by most parliamentary reform- 
ers as a stop-gap reform. Although the committee system appeared 
more systematic than in the 1960s, it nevertheless lacked, in the words 
of one leading Tory backbencher, the "necessary constitution" to un- 
dertake a vigorous scrutiny role (Downs, 1985, 57; Du Cann, 1976). 
A year after the October 1974 General Election, Labour again 
committed itself in the Queen's Speech to a major review of the prac- 
tice and procedure of Parliament. Shortly thereafter there was a day- 
long debate on procedure. Most of the members taking part were 
backbenchers, many of whom later went on to be active members of 
the present select committees. Some of these MPs, such as Paul 
Channon and Giles Radice, were strong supporters of extended se- 
lect committees and went on to become members of their respective 
frontbenches in the early 1980s. 
Edward Short, as Leader of the House, opened the debate for the 
government. He was particularly concerned with Commons commit- 
tees being transformed into committees resembling the American 
congressional system. The result, he claimed, would "certainly rep- 
resent a shift of power from the Executive to Parliament" (HCD 75/76, 
741:969-70). Acknowledging the resurgent popularity of parliamen- 
tary reform, Short clearly articulated the relationship-as he saw it- 
between the Executive and the legislature. As the government 
spokesman, he left no doubt as to the dynamics of that relationship; 
parliamentary reform must ultimately result in strengthening the 
government. He stated that "clearly the Government must gov- 
ern. . . . They must also be able to secure from Parliament any nec- 
essary extension of their executive powers and to implement their 
election pledges, by legislation or otherwise. Whatever changes we 
introduce should reinforce and not undermine effective government" 
(HCD 75/76, 741:965). He did not deny a role for Parliament, but the 
tasks he outlined for it in this arrangement would constitute mere re- 
actions to the Executive. He mentioned that Parliament should scru- 
tinize the exercise of executive power, monitor its activities, and 
debate the great issues of the day. But he avoided any reference to or 
suggestion of previous government statements calling for Parliament 
to be more active in the policy process. Moreover, the scrutinizing, 
monitoring, and debating duties did not imply that Parliament had a 
role in setting the legislative agenda, nor in fact that government 
need be responsive to recommendations and proposals as a result 
of the fulfillment of these tasks. Above all, government must be able 
to govern. 
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Short also proved very adroit in recalling the basis for reformers' 
arguments in the past and anticipating the same logic in the current 
debate. Previously, advocates of select committees had argued that 
the government had necessarily extended its influence and activities 
into the social and economic spheres of the nation. That successive 
governments had accepted and even encouraged these new duties 
was not questioned. Parliamentary reformers did however contend 
that parliamentary structures and functions had failed to develop 
that could fulfill the accountability expected by the public and re- 
quired by the constitution. Consequently, select committees were en- 
visaged as the means to correct this imbalance. It was clear from the 
government's tone that it did not intend to strengthen Parliament vis- 
a-vis the Executive. What the Labour frontbench did hope to achieve 
was a strengthening of parliamentary committees to assist the Exec- 
utive with its expanded role and responsibilities. Thus the govern- 
ment was able to wrap itself in the cloak of parliamentary reform 
while simultaneously guarding its prerogatives and rights. For the 
first time the government acknowledged parliamentarians' concerns 
about the Executive's burgeoning role in the nation as a whole. But 
rather than dismiss this argument and the concomitant reform pro- 
posals, government emphasized their agreement and called on Par- 
liament to assist the government in governing. The ensuing debate 
focused less on Parliament's constitutional responsibility to achieve 
executive accountability and more on defining Parliament's legiti- 
macy in "this modern society" and exploring all available means to 
govern a "complex industrial nation." In this endeavor, select com- 
mittees might be useful to government and satisfy reformers seeking 
a role for Parliament. 
Not all reformers were so easily swayed. Several Conservatives 
wished to "restore to Parliament its power and its will to exercise an 
effective influence on future policies and to control public expendi- 
ture" (HCD 75/76, 741:993). In particular, Conservatives argued for 
legislation to be much more carefully prepared and scrutinized. This 
would, of course, provide an opportunity for the Opposition party- 
in this case the Conservatives-to influence the proposed legislation 
of the majority party, i.e., Labour. Thus, the Conservative party 
could use institutional structures to influence the policies put forth 
by the Labour party. Given the fractious tendencies of the Parliamen- 
tary Labour Party, the Conservatives' influence could be more sub- 
stantive than if Labour were a relatively homogeneous, united party. 
As I will point out in later chapters, these same reflections were im- 
portant for the 1979 Select Committees. 
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The Labour government received its most striking criticism from 
members of its own party during this debate. Calls were repeatedly 
made for committees that would possess a pre-legislation function. 
But these Labour members also recognized the need for a change in 
how backbenchers perceived their role and the role of the House. In 
an especially long speech, William Hamilton acknowledged that the 
changes he and his colleagues advocated would not be possible be- 
cause there existed no sustained assertion of parliamentary will. He 
charged that too many members try to curry favor from party leaders, 
both for frontbench posts and for honorary titles: "We are bedeviled 
by the party system of Government. Let us take the example of the 
Whips. The House would be healthier if they were declared redun- 
dant. . . . We have a Procedure Committee and all the machinery 
that is needed to reform the procedures of the House; only the will of 
the House is lacking" (HCD 75/76, 741:1002-3). 
The second major point made during the debate was the oppor- 
tunities presented to backbenchers through select committee service. 
Several members of Parliament have often claimed that being a back-. 
bencher is particularly frustrating when one's party is in power. Not 
surprisingly then, Labour backbenchers sustained the debate on the 
issue of backbench participation in Parliament in its latter stages. 
Members pointed to the contributions backbenchers were able to 
make in the parliamentary process that would not have been possi- 
ble without the presence of select committees. They also noted that 
backbenchers were generally responsible and constructive in their in- 
quiries, and service provided them with access to the detailed infor- 
mation increasingly necessary for debates in the chamber. In short, 
past select committees could be judged successful because they had 
provided a role for the backbench-a matter the subsequent Proce- 
dure Committee would examine closely. 
Although Crossman has often been credited as the initial force 
behind committee reforms in the House, subsequent proceedings 
suggest less than enthusiastic support from him and his party's lead- 
ers. The Conservative leadership under Heath proved equally reluc- 
tant to accept committee activities that challenged Executive policies 
and prerogatives. But the experience of the specialist select commit- 
tees in the 1960s and later the Estimates and Expenditure committees 
highlights important parliamentary developments. First, members 
appeared willing and able to pursue inquiries independent of the 
government's priorities and concerns. When the government reacted 
to the committees' activities by placing formidable obstacles in the 
way of their proceedings (to the point of abolishing a committee), 
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committee members publicly challenged government ascendancy in 
the chamber and received cross-party support from other sympa- 
thetic members. Second, the government was politically unable to re- 
turn to the pre-1964 status quo; the abolition or termination of 
specialist select committees necessitated a replacement. While the 
Labour leadership may indeed have viewed these committees as an 
"experiment", its success or failure nevertheless now required yet an- 
other committee mechanism in the House. 
Both Labour and Conservative governments moved adroitly in 
creating similar successive committee systems (Estimates and Expen- 
ditures) that placated reformers' wishes for subjecting additional pol- 
icy areas to committee investigation. But just as governments in the 
past have used Parliament-through the chamber-to process their 
agendas, the Estimates and Expenditure committees were also seen 
as useful instruments for the government to seek budgetary efficien- 
cies and economies. Furthermore, those committees had large and 
vague remits and were hampered by shifting policy priorities and in- 
quiries. Few opportunities for specialization and in-depth investiga- 
tions existed, which of course made them acceptable to the Executive 
but ineffectual monitors of parliamentary reformers. 
While reformers often stressed the importance of committee ser- 
vice in enhancing informed debate on the floor of the House, they 
now began to suggest that informed debate was only a by-product of 
committee work. Parliamentary committees should be able to inves- 
tigate, monitor, and scrutinize government departments indepen- 
dently of any subsequent action in chamber. And governments 
should be responsible for their policies to Parliament-through select 
committees. Following a Procedure Committee report that recom- 
mended extended staff and resources for MPs in light of the in- 
creased demands on members, the committee once again announced 
an inquiry into the use of select committees. This report, the current 
committee system, and the attitudes of the committees' members are 
examined in the remaining chapters. 
The 1979 Select 
Committee 
Reforms 
The Select Committee on Procedure inquiry of 1977-78 was one of 
the most time-consuming and thorough investigations any Proce- 
dure Committee had undertaken. There were several factors that con- 
tributed to the committee's decision to investigate parliamentary 
reform and select committees once again. Chief among them was an 
acknowledgment of the unsatisfactory state of the current committee 
structure. The difficulties encountered by the proceedings of the Ex- 
penditure Committee and specialist committees had become highly 
politicized and publicized issues. In its subsequent report, the Select 
Committee on Procedure noted that the experience of these investi- 
gative committees was an important catalyst in determining the com- 
mittee's final recommendations. 
This chapter highlights the context of the political and parliamen- 
tary variables that influenced the committee's proceedings and deci- 
sions. More specifically, I will emphasize the way in which the 
expectations and understanding of parliamentary government ex- 
pressed in this report exposed a significant departure from previous 
reports and indeed parliamentary practice. 
Strained Relations between Specialist Committees 
and Government 
Shortly after the Procedure Committee began its investigation in De- 
cember 1977, there was an adjournment debate in the House on the 
recent exposure of the loss of more than £200 million through the 
speculative operations of the crown agents (HCD 77/78,574:1024-94). 
Importantly, the debate focused not primarily on the loss itself but 
rather on the inability of current parliamentary arrangements either 
to detect the missing millions or to monitor the crown agents. Mem- 
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bers of Parliament were indignant that the government was aware of 
the speculation losses but had failed to inform Parliament. Once 
again the House acted, or actually held a debate, only after the rev- 
elation was made by the Press. 
Members from all political parties called repeatedly for a system 
of select committees that would presumably prevent the occurrence 
of this sort of scandal. The debate also provided a forum to draw the 
attention of Procedure Committee members to this apparent break- 
down in scrutiny and urged committee members to view this situa- 
tion as a glaring example of the deficiencies in the present committee 
arrangements. Reformers did not seek more committees per se; they 
sought more effective committees. 
The Select Committee on Overseas Development had indeed be- 
gun an investigation of the crown agents but had abandoned its in- 
quiry for two reasons. First, the dissolution of Parliament for the 
February 1974 general election also meant that the select committee 
would be dissolved until it could be formally reconstituted in May. 
Second, one of the committee members, Mrs. Judith Hart, became 
minister of state for Overseas Development. The select committee 
chose not to proceed further with the crown agents inquiry in defer- 
ence to Mrs. Hart's promise to take action. After the second election 
in 1974, the minister finally established a committee of inquiry, pre- 
sided over by a judge, and, in the words of the Overseas Develop- 
ment chairman, "there did not seem to be a need for the committee to 
mount a further inquiry at the same time" (HCD 77/78, 574:1069-70). 
The committee's decision to eschew parliamentary scrutiny in defer- 
ence to a trusted minister and an extra-parliamentary investigating 
body was criticized by the press and by MPs during the December 
1977 debate. Parliamentary arrangements had failed initially to un- 
cover the scandal, and when the issue was exposed, the committee 
responsible abdicated its responsibilities to a government-appointed 
tribunal. 
Ironically, that this debate occurred at all was due to Mrs. Hart's 
refusal to commit the government to appointment of a tribunal under 
the Tribunals of Inquiry [Evidence] Act of 1921. Consequently, John 
Mendelson, a member of the minister's party, placed a motion to dis- 
cuss on the floor of the House the loss of the a 0 0  million. He argued: 
"The country is fed up with promises of further considerations. If we 
want a certain type of action we as a Parliament had better say 
so. . . . That is the decisive reason why I cannot accept my right hon. 
Friend's [Hart's] assurances on this matter" (HCD 77/78, 574:1091- 
94). In the subsequent vote, Mendelson's motion was approved 158 to 
126 over the objections of the government frontbench. 
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At the same time the attention of the House was being drawn to 
the crown agents affair, the Select Committee on Nationalised Indus- 
tries issued a series of reports detailing the difficulties encountered in 
its recent inquiry (HC 26-1,1977; HC 127-1, 1977; HC 238, 1978). In the 
first two reports of the session, the committee repeatedly drew atten- 
tion to the difficulty it had encountered in obtaining reliable infor- 
mation from both the British Steel Corporation (BSC) and the 
government departments. The committee's reports questioned the 
motives of the government and the BSC in adopting such an unco- 
operative relationship, and concluded that the BSC had either 
"turned a blind eye" to the economic realities facing it or had "delib- 
erately avoided revealing the true situation to the sub-committee . . . 
and also failed to make the true situation clear to the Department of 
Industry" (HC 238, 1978, vii; HC 127-1, 1977). 
These reports were intended not only to highlight the corpora- 
tion's management affairs but also to question the "proper relation- 
ship of Government Departments, nationalised industries and 
Parliament" (HC 238, 1978, xv). Indeed, the committee claimed in its 
conclusion to the Fifth Report that there was no need to summarize 
the particular findings of the report as its protracted relationship with 
the Executive was so starkly evident. The lessons learned from the 
BSC inquiry were, however, largely irrelevant to the corporation it- 
self. Instead, the committee focused on the broader issue of select 
committee tasks and powers: "This inquiry has proved beyond doubt 
that a strong Select Committee system is essential if the House is to 
carry out its proper task of examining the workings of Government 
Departments and public corporations. It is also essential, whatever 
structure is decided for Select Committees, that committees be pre- 
pared to use their full powers to send for such persons, papers and 
records as the thorough pursuit of their inquiries demands" (HC 238, 
1978, xiv). 
Withholding of information from parliamentary select commit- 
tees was a fundamental issue that divided reformers and anti-reform- 
ers and, in the main, frontbench and backbench. Unfortunately, 
Parliament adjourned for the Christmas recess shortly after the pub- 
lication of the Nationalised Industries Committee's Second Report. 
When it reconvened in January, however, a two-day debate was re- 
quested to consider a department's or agency's ability to withhold in- 
formation sought by a committee of the House. This issue also 
dominated Prime Minister's Question Time, in which Michael Foot, 
Leader of the House and an opponent of select committees, was 
standing in for Prime Minister Callaghan. As Leader of the Opposi- 
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tion, Margaret Thatcher led the attack and defended the rights of a 
select committee to obtain the information it requested: "Is not the 
Select Committee charged with the duty of making an objective as- 
sessment and reporting to the House? How can it do that if vital fig- 
ures and facts are denied to it? This is a publicly owned industry. 
Ought not the Select Committee to be in possession of the facts?" 
(HCD 78, 941:1855) 
Thatcher's persistent questioning of the government for its ap- 
parent support of denying full information to a select committee is 
important for two reasons. First, it suggested Conservative party 
support for strengthened parliamentary select committees. And sec- 
ond, it marked the first time that an Opposition Leader had cham- 
pioned the prerogatives of a select committee over the objections of 
the government frontbench. In the past, both frontbenches had rec- 
ognized their shared interests as competing Executives in maintain- 
ing hegemonic authority both in the chamber and in committee. 
Consequently, the Opposition frontbench would not challenge seri- 
ously and caustically the government's treatment of a select commit- 
tee. But Thatcher apparently chose to dispense with long-standing 
convention. 
In defense of his government's departmental refusal of informa- 
tion to the select committee, Michael Foot did not deny that docu- 
ments were withheld. Rather, he claimed the department's actions 
were not "out of the ordinary" and that in this respect both the BSC 
and the government had "abided exactly by the normal conventions 
in this matter" (HCD 78, 941:1855). But the premise of the commit- 
tee's inquiry and complaints asserted that the government could not 
ignore House of Commons committees. The conventions that Foot 
defended were precisely those arrangements that hampered Parlia- 
ment in fulfilling its constitutional role of accountability. 
These time-honored conventions, perpetuated by respective 
frontbenches, were under attack for undermining the House's con- 
stitutional position in parliamentary democracy. It was not a case of 
the House arrogating powers and responsibilities to itself. Reformers 
understood they were performing the duties to which they were ob- 
ligated by the constitution, despite the ruminations of the govern- 
ment and the informal but accepted conventions of the past. But 
conventions can only be successful when the parties entering into 
them mutually choose to maintain them. The government's reliance 
upon and support of conventions increasingly questioned by one of 
the principal actors necessitated an alternative defensive strategy by 
the government. A fellow Labour MP, critical of the department's 
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actions, questioned Foot on the government's stance on this affair. 
Again Foot maintained that automatic compliance with select com- 
mittee requests for information "would be a serious departure from 
the way in which select committees have previously operated (HCD 
78, 941:1855-59). By and large, committees in the past had operated 
in a manner similar to Foot's scenario. But the major point of the 
committee's reports and this debate was the legitimacy of these con- 
ventions. Foot would not concede any change that would undermine 
the Executive's superior role and prerogatives. Conservative MPs 
supported Sir Keith Joseph's motion to approve the committee's re- 
ports and implement the recommendations. One of the major recom- 
mendations was to hold a debate during government time prior to 
the announcement of the government's policy decisions so that the 
unanimous recommendations of the select committee could be taken 
into account by ministers. The result would be a routinized and for- 
mal pre-legislative role for the House. 
Since the government was unwilling to allow time for this de- 
bate, the Opposition granted at least one of the two days the com- 
mittee requested. The government's amendment required only that 
the House "take note" of the reports. The issue of the Executive's re- 
lationship with parliamentary select committees was no longer a pro- 
cedural question but rather a political issue, with the respective party 
leaderships taking opposing positions. This issue provided the Con- 
servatives with an opportunity to embarrass the government, which 
was one of the expected tasks of an Opposition in a debating forum. 
Dr. Russell Kerr, one of the Labour committee members who had 
moved a week before that the House "take note" of the reports, 
thought the Conservatives' tactics were a "brilliant parliamentary 
manoeuvre." He added: "Put simply, it is that the majority on the Se- 
lect Committee, namely the eight Labour Members, will be so em- 
barrassed by the terms of the Motion before us which, on one 
reading, means that we would have to vote against approving our 
own reports . . . and will be forced either to vote with the Opposition 
tonight or abstain" (HCD 78, 941:1058-59). What had become a party 
political issue divided the House largely on party lines. The Labour 
government won support for its amendment 302 to 254. 
The Parties' Stance on Reform 
Unlike past debates on select committee powers and reforms, there 
now appeared a fairly clear difference of opinion between the Labour 
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and Conservative frontbenches. To many, the Conservative party 
seemed the party of reform while the record of the 1960s and mid- 
1970s demonstrated Labour's relatively poor commitment to select 
committees-despite its association with the "Crossman Reforms." 
Because a government has a vested interest in maintaining Par- 
liament's relative subservience, one might expect Labour leaders to 
regard parliamentary reforms and reformers with more than slight 
trepidation and disdain. And whereas the Conservative party was 
relatively homogeneous and deferential to the party leadership, La- 
bour's leadership was confronted with clear factions within the party. 
Plagued by serious internal dissent, the Labour leadership was ap- 
prehensive about establishing new channels through which disgrun- 
tled and frustrated backbenchers could criticize party chieftains. 
There is an important difference between dealing with the internal 
discord of a political party (notably Labour) whose quarrels may at 
times find themselves in the press and a daily manifestation of this 
dissent played out between Parliament and the Executive. 
Ian Marsh has suggested that the left wing of the Labour party 
has not emphasized parliamentary reform because its "ideological 
roots in Marxism predisposes the left towards measures which build 
from class as the key political grouping" (Marsh, 1986, 17). But Marsh 
has conceded that the Left has been supportive of parliamentary re- 
form as a corrective to excessive bureaucratic power and as a step to- 
ward its goal of more direct, party-based participation. 
In contrast, my survey research indicates that the left wing of the 
Parliamentary Labour party is no less supportive of parliamentary 
reform and select committee assertiveness than other Labour MPs. 
While just over a third of the members interviewed placed them- 
selves in the left wing of their party, only 8 percent of all Labour MPs 
did not express a desire for further committee reforms and extension 
of powers. Moreover, all Labour MPs who served on a select com- 
mittee since 1979-regardless of ideological leaning-found select 
committee service important and rewarding. And of the more than 80 
percent who believed that the Executive had become too strong vis- 
a-vis Parliament, 90 percent stated that continued use and develop- 
ment of the departmentally related select committees was the best 
way to change the current imbalance of power. 
The only Labour MPs who consistently expressed dissatisfaction 
with select committees were indeed on the extreme left wing of the 
party, but they had not served on a committee and only constituted 
10 percent of Labour MPs interviewed. While other Labour MPs 
mentioned the important work of the committees in monitoring the 
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Executive, particularly the Thatcher government, whose policies 
were anathema to Labour, members of the Extreme Left opposed any 
reforms that supplemented or supported the parliamentary "estab- 
lishment." One member of the Extreme Left stated that Parliament's 
purpose was the "perpetuation of bourgeois democracy," and he dis- 
liked select committee proceedings because of the blurred party dis- 
tinctions they provoked: "They are there to achieve consensus, and I 
am not into consensus. The obligation of Labour MPs should be to 
the Labour and Trade Union movement only. You are drawn into 
discussions with them [non-Labour MPs] and have to go on trips 
with them outside the House and when your defenses are down the 
next thing you know you are socializing with them" (Interview, 
15 March 1987). 
By virtue of forming the government, Labour was forced to take 
a clear stand on the role of select committees and their powers. On 
the other hand, there was no need for the Conservative party to de- 
fine its position clearly. Select committee reports and the deteriorat- 
ing relations between the committees and the Executive provided the 
Opposition frontbench with precisely the type of evidence and argu- 
ments employed during Question Time each day on the floor of the 
House. Nevertheless, there was genuine support for extension of 
committee powers among many Conservative backbench MPs and a 
few on the frontbench. 
The experience of Conservative and Labour governments with 
parliamentary select committees also differed vastly. Labour had wit- 
nessed serious difficulties in their relationship with specialist com- 
mittees in the 1960s and mid- and late 1970s. But the Conservatives as 
government were limited in their experience to the 1970-74 period 
under Ted Heath. Their tenure in office conveniently coincided with 
the creation and operation of the relatively ineffectual Expenditure 
Committee. As I pointed out in the preceding chapter, this commit- 
tee-through its subcommittees-posed few challenges or problems 
for the Conservative government. The committee's inquiries focused 
primarily on questions of administration and cost-effectiveness. It 
tended to examine the bureaucracy's role in administering govern- 
ment policies rather than the merit of the policies themselves. The Ex- 
penditure Committee's activities were thus consistent with the 
Conservatives' traditional interest in parliamentary reform-to seek 
economies in the administration of national policies that entailed few 
political risks. Tory support for a Commons role in this endeavor had 
been a continuing theme among Conservatives that can be traced to 
Hill and Whichelow's What's Wrong with Britain? 
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Members' Concern with Scrutiny 
During its long inquiry, the Select Committee on Procedure gathered 
evidence from both opponents and supporters of further and exten- 
sive committee reforms. In its final report, the committee conclu- 
sively sided with the reformers. More than a decade of select 
committee activity had produced a substantial number of MPs who 
had been involved in committee service. And with declining turn- 
over rates in the House, a substantial number of MPs with successive 
election victories and growing seniority in the Commons favored 
continued parliamentary scrutiny through select committees. More- 
over, as the preceding chapters have suggested, senior figures from 
both political parties who had served on their respective front- 
benches were also committee members and during debates and in 
committee reports had supported the rights and powers of select 
committees. 
The premise of the Procedure Committee's ensuing recommen- 
dations reflected an endorsement of two persistent and related 
themes shared by parliamentary reformers who testified before the 
committee. First, reformers noted that government spending and 
programs continued to grow rapidly but the House had failed to 
achieve any effective or constitutional role of scrutiny through previ- 
ous reforms. Second, reformers asserted that the British public held 
Parliament in particularly low esteem precisely because of its inabil- 
ity to influence the Executive and hold it accountable. This latter view 
was also expressed in an Economist editorial that criticized the "un- 
dignified, inefficient, undemocratic and, above all, unparliamentary 
government that is Britain's lot today" (5 Nov. 1977, 11-16). 
During his testimony to the Procedure Committee, Edward du 
Cann, chairman of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), detailed 
Parliament's inability to monitor the Executive. He suggested that the 
House of Commons had "very much fallen behind other legislatures 
and the United States in particular" in performing its monitoring role 
(HC 588-11, 1978, 135-36). Du Cann and Procedure Committee mem- 
bers also would not accept the argument made by Enoch Powell that 
select committees were not needed because ministers were constitu- 
tionally answerable to the House-a ritual performed daily on the 
floor of the House. While du Cann accepted Powell's understand- 
ing that a minister is answerable to the House, he would not concede 
that effective accountability necessarily ensued: "In my view Minis- 
ters are not questioned by this House, not interrogated by this 
House, not examined by this House, in the detailed way in which 
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they should about the development of policy and its results. . . . I am 
saying Parliament is inefficient; Parliament is not surveying expendi- 
ture; Parliament is not examining Ministers; Parliament is not ques- 
tioning their policies in adequate depth. It is not giving adequate 
financial surveillance and I want to establish the machinery if it is 
possible which would enable that duty to be discharged (HC 588-11, 
1978, 143). 
Select Committees Created 
When the Procedure Committee finally issued its report in 1978, the 
lead article in the Times announced that the report "may prove to be 
a historic document in British parliamentary history." But it also ac- 
knowledged "all the forces of inertia and tradition are ranged against 
any substantial parliamentary reform" because "it would shift the 
balance of parliamentary activity" (4 Aug. 1978, 13). Admittedly, the 
tenor of the article suggested exaggerated optimism, but it was cor- 
rect in recognizing the institutional norms and interests inhibiting 
comprehensive reform. Moreover, the assessment by the Times did re- 
flect reformers' optimism for a report recommending substantial re- 
form in parliamentary procedure and practice. 
Walkland's assessment of the politics of parliamentary reform, 
written when the Procedure Committee had just begun its inquiry, 
rested on a simple proposition. This proposition, recognized by 
Redlich at the turn of the century, claimed that the primary detriment 
to House of Commons procedures-especially those that govern its 
relationship with the Executive-is its political structure. In the pre- 
vious chapters I discussed and analyzed this political relationship be- 
tween the Executive and the House through committee reform in the 
Commons. Reform proposals submitted by the government consis- 
tently sustained the government's prerogatives and ascendancy in 
the House. Walkland's pessimistic appraisal of procedural reform 
noted the political relationship between government and the House: 
"[This relationship] has been taken for granted by procedure commit- 
tees of the House, and the changes which have ensued have in no 
way been directed at the basic pre-suppositions of this political struc- 
ture" (Walkland, 1977, 191). 
As long as Procedure Committees accepted a priori this rela- 
tionship, subsequent reforms were indeed marginal. Continued 
maintenance of the authoritylhierarchical relationship by successive 
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governments continued to impede committee effectiveness, despite 
institutional and procedural reforms. 
When the Procedure Committee was appointed in 1976, the gov- 
ernment vigorously stressed that the committee should not seek fun- 
damental changes in the relationship between the executive and the 
legislature (Downs, 1985, 58). But the Procedure Committee rejected 
the government's warning and indeed challenged the "basic pre- 
suppositions of this political structure." The committee recognized 
that any reform would prove ineffectual if governments consistently 
remained assured of their legislation being passed, granting back- 
bencher~ a "worthwhile" but essentially marginal role on a commit- 
tee with few real powers. The committee also sought to alter the point 
at which select committees were consulted or informed of policy de- 
cisions. Rather than serving as reactive mechanisms to policies that 
had already been decided upon by the Executive, the Procedure 
Committee recommended that select committees "investigate the ac- 
tions of government at 'every' stage in the development of policy" 
(Downs, 1985, 158). This emphasis reflects a dramatic shift not only 
from an administrative to policy orientation, but also from the views 
expressed in previous testimony concerning the role of select com- 
mittees. Supporters of this interpretation claimed it was inappropri- 
ate, a break with tradition, and ill conceived to conduct inquiries in a 
policy field in which the government had not yet formed a firm policy 
position. 
Some scholars and parliamentarians have suggested that previ- 
ous Commons reforms resulted from the initiative of governments 
(Norton, 1985, 42; HCD 76, 902:991-92). Such unilateral action, they 
contend, resulted in the politicization of reform proposals that would 
as a matter of course be opposed by the Opposition party. Second, 
because the "onus for creating new committees rested with govern- 
ment" and it felt confident in abolishing them, select committees 
were thus in a sense the creature of government. 
This analysis assumes that the government's introduction of re- 
form proposals based on Procedure Committee reports amounts to 
unilateral initiative from the government. Granted, successive gov- 
ernments chose which committee reports and specific recommenda- 
tions contained therein to recommend to the House. Nevertheless, as 
these were "House of Commons matters," Procedure Committees 
undertook the necessary prerequisite inquiries and were responsible 
for addressing reform issues and consequently placing them on the 
government's agenda. An alternative and more plausible explanation 
should instead focus on the traditionally parallel attitudes of 
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legislative-Executive relationships and MPs' roles shared by members 
of the Procedure Committees and the government. 
The preceding chapters highlighted earlier Procedure Commit- 
tees' reluctance to question the accepted political relationship. In- 
stead, when Procedure Committees did claim that there was indeed 
a proper and legitimate role for parliamentary select committees, 
they universally sought a scrutiny-constitutional role for them, but 
without restricting the government's ability to govern. It is not sim- 
ply that governments initiated and monopolized procedural reform; 
rather, Procedural Committees offered recommendations generally 
consistent with the Executive's interests. Relations between the Ex- 
ecutive and the legislature became strained in the 1960s and 1970s 
when members of some of the specialist committees transgressed the 
Procedure Committee's intentions of legislative scrutiny through the 
existing political structure. 
As long as successive Procedure Committees and specialist com- 
mittees accommodated the Executive's political ascendancy in the 
House and worked within the parameters defined by that framework, 
governments accepted parliamentary committees that did not invade 
its policy domain. Indeed, that national policy was the exclusive pur- 
view of government was one of the key propositions governing 
Executive-legislative relationships. When select committee members 
interpreted their remit to include policy scrutiny and, moreover, 
thought policy input and activism were proper roles for themselves 
and their committees, government refused to cooperate and concede 
this role to them. In 1966, Crossman's support for procedural reform 
focused primarily on attempts to make the House more efficient. Af- 
ter a decade of experience with specialist committees, backbenchers 
wanted both efficiency and effectiveness. The 1977-78 Procedure 
Committee acknowledged these twin aims and asserted that the 
House should be involved at every stage of policy development and 
administration. Parliament must be involved and seen to be involved 
in influencing national policies. The report issued by the committee 
departed significantly from previous assumptions and conventions 
governing the House's relationship with the Executive. 
The initial section of the report addressed the relationship be- 
tween the executive and the legislature, a relationship the committee 
argued constituted the crucial feature of parliamentary government 
and one about which there was widespread concern in the country. 
But the committee did not agree with those who argued that these 
concerns could be addressed simply by processing the government's 
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agenda more expeditiously through the House and then finding a 
"worthwhile role" for the backbencher. Instead, the committee 
concluded: "The essence of the problem . . . is that the balance of 
advantage between Parliament and Government in the day to day 
working of the Constitution is now weighted in favour of the Gov- 
ernment to a degree which causes widespread anxiety and is inimical 
to the proper working of our parliamentary democracy" (HC 588-1, 
1978, viii). 
In addressing procedural reform, the committee dissented from 
previously held notions and government expectations of Parliament- 
as-processor. The committee acknowledged that in the past most 
changes in procedure were designed to permit the House "to deal 
with the greatly increased volume of public legislation" (HC 588-1, 
1978, xii). But the constitutional requirements of scrutiny, monitor- 
ing, and accountability by the House had lapsed seriously. The com- 
mittee's concern did not lie in designing institutional means and 
mechanisms through which the House could more expeditiously and 
efficiently "deal w i t h  the workload presented to it by the govern- 
ment. Rather, the committee desired to create the means necessary 
for the House to perform consistently its constitutional and historic 
role vis-a-vis the government. To this end, the report stated: "We 
have approached our task . . . with the aim of enabling the House as 
a whole to exercise effective control and stewardship over Ministers 
and the expanding bureaucracy of the modern state for which they 
are answerable, and to make the decisions of Parliament and Govern- 
ment more responsive to the wishes of the electorate" (HC 588-1, 
1978, viii). 
The committee's report also noted that the development of more 
effective means of scrutinizing the expenditure, administration, and 
policy of government departments as well as more adequate proce- 
dures for calling ministers and civil servants to account for their ac- 
tions has been a recurring theme of parliamentary reform proposals 
throughout this century. But the committee system that had devel- 
oped in response to the need to relieve the pressure of business on 
the floor of the House or to demands for the House to perform new 
functions involving detailed investigations unsuited to a large assem- 
bly was "unplanned and unstructured" and "decidedly patchy" (HC 
588-1, 1978, ix-li). Because the committee premised its recommenda- 
tions on the belief that the House must fulfill its legislative obliga- 
tions, piecemeal and sketchy scrutiny could no longer be the norm in 
the present-day Commons. The report charged: "The House should 
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no longer rest content with an incomplete and unsystematic scrutiny 
of the activities of the Executive merely as a result of historical acci- 
dent or sporadic pressures, and it is equally desirable for the different 
branches of the public service to be subject to an even and regular 
incidence of select committee investigation" (HC 588-1, 1978, lii). In 
defense of its strong position, the committee claimed it was quite 
clear that there was a widespread desire in and out of the House for 
a new select committee structure to achieve these aims. 
During the inquiry, the Procedure Committee reexamined the 
benefits and drawbacks of previous and existing specialist commit- 
tees. The committee concluded that "one of the main responsibilities" 
of any new committee system "should be to continue and develop the 
work of the Expenditure Committee and its sub-committees in exam- 
ining the expenditure and administration of the civil and public ser- 
vice" (HC 588-1, 1978, liii). But they acknowledged the weaknesses of 
this committee and, rather than make alterations to it, decided that 
an entire new system was appropriate. 
Perhaps most important, they recommended a committee system 
empowered with a much broader remit than had previously existed. 
As to the continuing problem of whether select committees should 
examine questions of administration only, the committee left little 
doubt: "We recommend . . . a system of new, independent, select 
committees, each charged with the examination of all aspects of ex- 
penditure, administration and policy in a field of administration 
within the responsibilities of a single government department or 2 or 
more related departments" (HC 588-1, 1978, lv). 
Above all, the Procedure Committee wished to avoid limiting the 
nature and scope of any future select committee inquiry, including 
questions of government policy. Indeed, the committee believed that 
many excellent reports of previous select committees had gained 
much of their impact and importance precisely because they involved 
"subjects of major political importance." And finally, the committee 
expressed a strong desire that committees' familiarity with their re- 
spective departments would eventually enable them to respond 
quickly to current problems and new policy proposals. 
In developing this role, the committee envisioned select commit- 
tees becoming "the eyes and ears" of the House, "drawing the atten- 
tion of Members to matters which require further political 
consideration." This function would then provide MPs with better in- 
formation sources in "scrutinizing and criticising the activities and 
proposals of the Executive" (HC 588-1, 1978, lxiii). The Select Com- 
mittee on Procedure sought to move the House and its committees 
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from Royal Commission-type inquiries, the publications of which 
usually came long after the initial subject had been removed from the 
political agenda. As indicated in some of the passages quoted above, 
as well as other parts of the report, select committees were to be 
timely, relevant, and influential in policy proposals. They were not to 
be an avenue to offer essentially post hoc, reactive reprobations of ad- 
ministrative practices. These were clear and significant departures 
from previous expectations of the role the House and its select com- 
mittees should play in the parliamentary process. 
It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to divorce parliamen- 
tary reform from the twin problem of legislative subservience, and 
clearly the Select Committee on Procedure understood this. The issue 
was not simply to create a system through which the executive might 
be monitored, but rather to establish the means of parliamentary 
scrutiny that would also work to achieve a more influential role for 
Parliament. Simple monitoring of the executive would be insufficient 
for parliamentary assertion; the ability to influence the government 
was crucial. 
Although the recommendations from the Select Committee on 
Procedure called for twelve departmentally related select commit- 
tees, the final total was raised to fourteen to allow for monitoring of 
the Scottish and Welsh offices as well. Given the desire to establish 
some means of monitoring the Executive and its departments, these 
recommendations are not particularly surprising; in fact, they are 
rather predictable. Other committee recommendations, however, 
seemed more than "of an evolutionary kind," and some members 
clearly thought them to be revolutionary. 
This Procedure Committee also differed from its predecessors in 
recognizing that its aim of providing the House with more effective 
means of scrutiny could be achieved only if the government's ability 
to control the new committee system was closely delimited. In order 
to pursue the duties required, the new departmental committees 
were to be granted a greater degree of independence. Therefore, the 
Procedure Committee sought to insulate committee members from 
Executive hegemony and the dominant value system "through the 
development of a normative 'sub-culture' and an alternative career 
structure within the House" (Judge, 1981, 92; HC 588-1, 1978, 
lxxviii-lxxix) . 
One recommendation in this report that appears innocuous 
enough at first sight was that chairpersons of select committees 
should receive extra payment for their additional parliamentary du- 
ties. Some incentive was to be built in to entice backbenchers to take 
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on the extra duties of chairing a select committee. Implicitly, since 
payment was to be offered, it would be expected that these chair- 
persons would be hard-working individuals, prodding and pushing 
their respective committees into significant parliamentary structures. 
Taken in isolation, the payment of committee chairs would be in- 
sufficient to ensure favorable backbench responses to the idea of com- 
mittee service. To further remove backbenchers from the pressure of 
party leaders, the new select committee members would be chosen 
by a newly created bipartisan Select Committee on Selection. This 
committee alone would be empowered to place, replace, and remove 
select committee members, and threats of removal and committee- 
packing, which had marred previous select committee proceedings, 
would be impossible to make. Prior to this new system, select com- 
mittee members were nominated by the House on a motion, usually 
after 10:OO PM, tabled by the deputy government chief whip after con- 
sultation with the other political parties and with interested mem- 
bers. The only opportunity open to members "who are aggrieved by 
the proposals" was to block the motion until the government 
changed its mind or provided time for debate. Such action, the report 
noted, "is naturally unpopular since it can involve open discussions 
in the House of the rival claims of Members for nomination to com- 
mittees" (HC 588-1, 1978, lxxv). But it was also unpopular with re- 
formers in the House because of the government's direct influence 
on committee membership. 
The decision rule has had a significant effect on events and has 
helped to ensure that the new committees will be free of any obliga- 
tion to follow party policies. Indeed, the selecting group, the Com- 
mittee of Selection, refused to pick anyone who had any official 
standing in the political parties: ministers, shadow ministers, whips, 
and private parliamentary secretaries (PI'S)-that is, anyone associ- 
ated with the frontbench party hierarchy. 
The principle that these MPs should not be members of investi- 
gatory select committees was upheld when the Committee of Selec- 
tion removed a PPS from the Energy Committee and an Opposition 
spokesman from the Committee on Welsh Affairs. In the latter case, 
the removal was resisted by the MP concerned, Alan Williams, who 
had been elected chairman of the select committee. Following de- 
bate, however, the House upheld the decision of the Committee of 
Selection by a vote of 127 to 0 (Parliamentary Affairs, Summer 1980). 
Despite conflicting evidence given during testimony on finding suf- 
ficient numbers of MPs to undertake committee service, the Proce- 
dure Committee did not believe that the new proposals would 
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impose significantly greater demands on members. The proposed 
system would entail only fifteen more members than the current sys- 
tem: Expenditure, forty-nine members; Nationalised Industries, fif- 
teen; Overseas Development, nine; Race Relations, ten; Science and 
Technology, fourteen; and PAC, eight. All of them were to be re- 
placed with the exception of PAC. 
All new committees would also be appointed under permanent 
standing orders, and their memberships set for the duration of each 
parliament. Both measures were designed to give a sense of continu- 
ity to the committees' work and to avoid the ad hoc nature of previ- 
ous select committees. Furthermore, permanent standing orders 
would make it impossible for a government dissatisfied with the re- 
ports of a particular committee simply to pass a resolution to have the 
committee "wound up," as had been done with the previous Select 
Committee on Agriculture. 
There was also to be an extension of the convention whereby 
members of the Opposition parties could chair certain committees 
while still maintaining a majority of government party members. On 
the one hand, Opposition leaders would be hard pressed to de- 
nounce these committees as tools of the government when fellow 
party members were chairing them. And on the other hand, mem- 
bers of the government might find it difficult to ignore recommenda- 
tions that apparently had the support of backbenchers from both 
sides of the House. Opposition chairmanships could be a means to 
whittle away at the adversarial nature of parliamentary politics, plac- 
ing a premium on consensus, and questioning the utility of party 
government. This, at least, was a reservation expressed by opponents 
of backbench assertiveness and parliamentary reform, as well as by 
members of the Extreme Left in the Labour party. 
Throughout the report, the Procedure Committee addressed the 
desirability of professional, full-time MPs in the House in contradis- 
tinction to the traditional notion of the MP as a part-time amateur. 
Committee members concluded that "the work of a Member of Par- 
liament should be a full-time job, particularly if the proposals in this 
Report for increasing parliamentary scrutiny of the Executive are ac- 
cepted." They further argued that any parliamentary arrangements 
designed to enable MPs to pursue outside employment conflicted 
with the committee's notion of a "modern and effective parliamen- 
tary system" (HC 588-1, 1978, cxvii). 
In order to encourage and reward those MPs who sought a full- 
time post in Parliament and a "possible career alternative" for those 
undertaking committee service, the report contained numerous 
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recommendations for extended staff and research support. The com- 
mittee's remit did not include an inquiry into staff services for 
members, but the committee noted that committee reform and mem- 
bers' staff were clearly linked. Members could not pursue the duties 
expected by the Procedure Committee nor could committees "secure 
greater surveillance of the Executive" without additional staffing and 
resources: "Any broad inquiry into the procedure and practice of the 
House must take account of one over-riding factor: the ability of 
Members, and of the institution as a whole, to undertake the total 
volume of work required to fulfill the traditional functions of the 
House, the new demands and expectations of constituent and inter- 
est groups, and any new functions designed to improve the efficiency 
of the House as a representative assembly. . . . [Wlhat is required is 
an acceptance by the House-and by the country at large-of the ur- 
gent need to provide Members with adequate assistance in perform- 
ing the increased work required by the House" (HC 588-1, 1978, xi). 
Contrary to the advice of the Clerk of the House and several other 
witnesses, the committee recommended full-time, expert staffs for 
the new select committees. The committee acknowledged the bene- 
fits of appointing temporary advisers with expertise in the relevant 
area of a given inquiry. But committee members were concerned with 
creating a corporate identity for each committee whose members and 
staff could develop long-term relationships with the corresponding 
departments, ministers, and officials. Temporary advisers were bet- 
ter suited to Royal Commission-type inquiries, but in order to sustain 
the influence and dialogue necessary for the committees "to examine 
the purposes and results of expenditure programs and to analyse the 
objectives and strategies behind the policies of departments," full- 
time, expert staffs were required (HC 588-1, 1978, lxxx). The report 
clearly suggested that although temporary advisers may have been 
adequate for the traditional post hoc inquiries into expenditure and 
administration, full-time staffs and advisers were required for the 
persistent monitoring and influence of departmental policies. 
Reformers in the House of Commons argued that since govern- 
ment departments had established their own philosophies over a pe- 
riod of time and since new measures took considerable time to 
negotiate, these processes should be opened up in order for the pub- 
lic and members of the House to make their views clear while prin- 
ciples were still being settled. Select committees were not intended to 
be tied to producing particular reports but were to collect informa- 
tion and let the House and public know what disputes existed and 
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what agreements were being reached within ministries and between 
ministers, civil servants, and interest groups. 
The superiority of information possessed by the Executive, cou- 
pled with its ability and indeed practice of withholding this informa- 
tion meant that members could neither accurately foresee what issues 
were being considered nor effectively articulate their own opinions 
and preferences before decisions were reached. A strengthening of 
select committees was intended to help remedy this situation. They 
were also designed to be able to address various subject areas more 
effectively than would be possible for the House of Commons as a 
whole. The ability to gather and process information without the 
spectre of party control looming overhead is a prerequisite for effec- 
tive legislative scrutiny. Many of the reformers assumed that a com- 
prehensive, bipartisan committee system was a necessary ingredient 
for parliamentary assertion. 
One of the most important, and controversial, recommendations 
made by the Select Committee on Procedure concerned the informa- 
tion to which the new select committees would have access. The com- 
mittee's justification for reexamining the power of select committees 
to secure necessary information was based in part on the conflict be- 
tween the Nationalised Industries Committee and British Steel. The 
circumstances of the case demonstrated to the committee the limited 
powers and the practical and procedural problems that could hinder 
a committee's inquiry. In Section 7 of the report, the committee rec- 
ommended that select committees should be empowered by the 
House to demand the presence of all persons, papers, and records a 
committee deemed necessary to carry on its inquiry. 
Historically, powers had been granted to select committees 
merely to send for persons, papers, and records. And it was noted 
that ministers in the past had created and then hidden behind con- 
ventions that prevented them from producing the information the 
committee required. The authors of the First Report acknowledged 
this problem and wished to break with those conventions "with a 
view to ensuring that such powers conform with the present require- 
ments of investigative select committees and can, if necessary, be en- 
forced (HC 588-1, 1978, lxxxviii). The problem was never identified 
with a particular political party, but seemed rather to be a government- 
Executive tendency that committee members thought needed to be 
rectified. 
A related problem that select committees encountered concerned 
the source of their powers. The Clerk of the House submitted a 
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memorandum to the Procedure Committee explaining that a select 
committee could not have delegated to it powers the House itself 
does not possess. Moreover, limitations had been imposed requiring 
the House to issue an Address to the Queen to obtain papers from a 
department headed by a secretary of state. It had been accepted since 
the middle of the last century, however, that a select committee with 
power to send for papers and records had no power to send for pa- 
pers which, if required by the House itself, would be sought by Ad- 
dress. Since most government departments were now headed by a 
secretary of state, the power of select committees to order the pro- 
duction of necessary papers was in practice limited to a few depart- 
ments. In the mid-1800s, four or five of the fourteen or fifteen Cabinet 
posts were secretaries of state. When the Procedure Committee un- 
dertook its inquiries, the number of secretaries of state in the Cabinet 
had risen to fifteen out of twenty-four. Of the departments to be mon- 
itored by the proposed committee system, only two, Treasury and 
Agriculture, were not headed by secretaries of state. The Procedure 
Committee found no justification for either the proliferation of secre- 
taries of state or the limitations imposed on committees to obtain in- 
formation from them. 
Second, select committees' power to require the attendance of 
persons did not extend to members of either House; those members 
who did respond to a committee's request to appear before it did so 
voluntarily. But their status as volunteers also cast doubt on their ob- 
ligation to answer all or any of the questions put to them. Further- 
more, there was a long-standing convention that committees 
requiring evidence from a government department usually left it to 
the department to nominate its witnesses. 
The Procedure Committee also reexamined the conventions guid- 
ing the relationship between the civil service and select committees. 
The committee sought, and eventually secured, a Civil Service Mem- 
orandum explaining what evidence and guidance was to be given by 
the Civil Service Department (CSD) to other government depart- 
ments concerning the treatment of requests from select committees 
for papers and records and for the attendance of departmental wit- 
nesses. The committee found the contents of the document to be 
largely unobjectionable. But members were "distressed with the ex- 
tension of the conventions guiding ministerial-civil servant secrecy 
to the internal dynamics of a department. Civil servants were ad- 
vised in the memo not to disclose information about " 'the level at 
which decisions were taken,' or about 'the methods by which a sub- 
ject is being reviewed. . . . ' They should 'refuse access to documents 
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relating to inter-departmental exchanges on policy issues,' and in re- 
sponse to requests for documents relating to the internal administra- 
tion of a Department, it would 'usually be more appropriate to offer 
specially prepared papers describing the organisation of the Depart- 
ment or particular parts of it, rather than existing documents such 
as departmental directories or organisation charts' " (HC 588-1, 
1978, xci-ii). 
The Procedure Committee concluded that such conventions 
would deny committees essential information in attempting to scru- 
tinize governmental departments. It recommended that "select com- 
mittees should regard any refusals to provide information of this 
kind . . . as a matter of serious concern which should be brought to 
the attention of the House" (HC 588-1,1978, xcii-ii). Because of these 
and several other conventions that hampered committees in their 
quest for information, the Procedure Committee recommended that 
the House confer upon committees the power to order the attendance 
of ministers and the production of papers and records by all minis- 
ters, including secretaries of state. 
Frontbenc h Response 
Michael Foot, Leader of the House in the late 1970s, was one of those 
most opposed to any parliamentary reform that would enhance the 
power and role of backbenchers. Only reluctantly did he direct 
the Select Committee on Procedure in 1977 to conduct its inquiry on 
committee reform. As a member of the Procedure Committee, he 
persistently defended the "chamber first" side when reviewing the 
role of the House and its relationship with the Executive. Only 
one other member of the committee joined Foot's objections to the fi- 
nal report and recommendations. And as Leader of the House he 
successfully blocked for months any debate on the report and its 
recommendations. 
Given Foot's reluctance to shift focus from the debating chamber, 
and the status of his party and his position within it, his opposition 
was not surprising. Foot opposed the establishment of a select com- 
mittee system on the grounds that such a system would be a poten- 
tially powerful channel through which latent backbench power could 
be exerted. In his testimony to the Select Committee on Procedure, 
he stressed that the role of the backbencher could be strengthened by 
making more time available for general debate. His testimony indi- 
cated that through debate MPs could "look," "listen," and "examine" 
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matters, but avoided the fundamental problem of members' partici- 
pating, influencing, and becoming involved in the governing pro- 
cess. Foot may have wanted to see members of Parliament participate 
more fully, but in his view their actual influence should nonetheless 
remain ineffectual, reactive, and negligible in any forum other than 
debate in the chamber. 
Foot's notion of Parliament as a forum of debate was supported 
by his view of the adversarial relationship in an Executive-dominated 
parliamentary system. His interpretation coincided with those of 
former Leaders of the House and Procedure Committee members 
that suggested that parliamentary reform should serve to facilitate 
the Executive's responsibilities and burdens: "Modern industrial so- 
cieties are so complex that you are bound to have all the time an Ex- 
ecutive that has to take powerful action to deal with economic 
problems, and Parliament must adapt itself to try and ensure that is 
possible. . . . It is a credit to the House of Commons not a debit that 
we have adapted as much as we have done. You cannot solve it by 
saying the Executive should not be so rapacious. All modern Execu- 
tives are rapacious, for very good reasons" (HC 588-11, 1978, 76). 
Moreover, like the members of Labour's Extreme Left whom I in- 
terviewed, Foot opposed select committees because of their consen- 
sus nature. Their work was in sharp contrast to the adversarial, 
partisan nature of the parent chamber. Foot stated in testimony: "I 
am suspicious of select committees, partly because they work on a 
non-partisan basis, and the basis of the House of Commons in my 
opinion is a party argument, and the basis of our democratic politics 
in this country is based on that in my judgment" (HC 588-11, 1978, 
68). But it was precisely this organization of legislative life around 
party politics that increasing numbers of MPs found objectionable. 
The continued norm of adversarial politics ritually performed on the 
floor of the House by the respective party leaderships reinforced the 
role of the backbencher as "lobby fodder." Policy positions were de- 
fined by opposing frontbenches, and it was the expected duty of the 
backbenches to support their respective frontbenches for what had 
become party policy. Furthermore, it left the individual MP with few 
structural channels through which to participate actively in the par- 
liamentary process and emasculated the institution's opportunities to 
perform its constitutional obligation of accountability. 
Richard Crossman's diaries reveal that during the early years of 
select committee experimentation, a majority of the Wilson govern- 
ment were fundamentally opposed to appearing before specialist 
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committees dealing with policy issues. James Callaghan called such a 
proposal an outrage (Crossman, 1976, 308). Ironically, the Select 
Committee on Procedure issued its most assertive recommendations 
for further parliamentary scrutiny during Callaghan's premiership. 
Had Callaghan been reelected, it is most unlikely that the recommen- 
dations would have been implemented. Foot and Callaghan were not 
alone in their opposition to increased parliamentary scrutiny and as- 
sertion. Ministers who had supported parliamentary reform through 
specialization and committee work before attaining executive office 
had become opponents of the extension of parliamentary power once 
they entered the confines of the Cabinet. 
When the Procedure Committee's recommendations were de- 
bated at Downing Street before the Labour government fell, only five 
members of the Cabinet spoke in favor of the reforms: Tony Benn, 
Shirley Williams, David Owen, William Rodgers, and Joel Barnett 
(Hennessey, 1980d, 14). That these particular persons should find 
themselves on the same side during a Cabinet debate seems unusual. 
They may not have found parliamentary assertion in and of itself es- 
pecially appealing, but rather hoped to see departmental select com- 
mittees function as checks on the excesses of opposing Labour 
factions. 
If previous governments had opposed the restrictions and con- 
straints select committees might impose upon them, the necessary 
question to address is why the Thatcher government was so quick to 
embrace an extension of reforms designed to challenge executive he- 
gemony and authority. What seems clear is the existence of a peculiar 
set of circumstances and predilections that allowed the Conservatives 
to support the Procedure Committee's recommendations. 
For one, the timing of the publication of the First Report toward 
the end of a parliament meant that promises made by the Opposition 
frontbench could less easily be forgotten in the eventuality of a return 
to office. While Labour was reluctant even to address the recommen- 
dations of the Procedure Committee and was correctly perceived as 
opposing the new reforms, the Conservatives, partly as a function of 
the adversarial relationship, supported the reform package. 
Second, the personal commitment of Norman St. John-Stevas 
was an important factor. As Shadow Leader of the House, he recog- 
nized that the old instruments of Question Time and the adjourn- 
ment debate had become inadequate as a mean of parliamentary 
control of the Executive. Claiming that the most important function 
of Parliament is to check the Executive, which includes scrutinizing 
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policies and holding ministers and civil servants to account for them, 
he supported the reform proposals. He too asserted that the balance 
of power and influence had steadily shifted from Westminster to 
Whitehall. And whereas the Executive had become more professional 
and the powers and resources of Whitehall had increased immeasur- 
ably, the legislature remained "dismally amateur" and MPs' available 
resources static and unchanged (St. John-Stevas, 1982, 21). 
Upon the fall of the Labour government, St. John-Stevas secured 
the insertion into the Conservative General Election Manifesto that a 
Tory government would give the House "an early opportunity" to 
come to a decision on the proposals put forward by the Procedure 
Committee. The 1979 manifesto proclaimed the Conservative party's 
concern for the erosion of the role of Parliament: "The traditional role 
of the legislature has suffered badly from the growth of government 
over the last quarter century. . . . [W]e will see that parliament and 
no other body stands at the centre of the nation's life and deci- 
sions. . . . We will seek to make it effective in its job of controlling the 
executive" (Marsh, 1986, 7). 
As Leader of the House, St. John-Stevas displayed a dedication to 
procedural reform that was significant in maintaining the momentum 
for change in the first session of the 1979 parliament. He also con- 
vinced a reluctant Cabinet and prime minister to support the re- 
forms, arguing that the duties of select committees would in fact be 
commensurate with the government's objective of monitoring the 
Whitehall bureaucracy. The ideological predilection of key Cabinet 
members, including the prime minister, for "rolling back the state" 
was consistent with St. John-Stevas's argument. Thatcher's vision of 
less state activity also meant greater restraint of bureaucratic discre- 
tion in policy formulation and implementation through closer minis- 
terial control of Whitehall departments. In this respect, an extension 
of the parliamentary select committee system could be rationalized as 
an invaluable ministerial aid in monitoring individual Whitehall 
departments. 
Clearly this was not the intention of parliamentary reformers, 
nor the effect of actual committee experience. One Conservative MP 
commented early in 1980 that had St. John-Stevas not acted so 
swiftly, the inertia and fear of backbench power that had afflicted 
many previous Labour ministers would probably have defeated him 
as well. Within only a few months after establishment of the select 
committees, there were five or fewer ministers who still supported 
the new committee system. He added, "It is a good thing Norman 
moved as quickly as he did in setting up the select committees. He 
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would not get it through now. The P.M. is violently opposed" (Hen- 
nessey, 1980d, 14). 
The third important factor was the considerable and growing 
backbench pressure to accept the First Report's recommendations. 
The strength of all-party consensus on the need for structural reform 
in the 1979 parliament was possibly greater than at any time in the 
preceding thirty years. The influx of new members with more "pro- 
fessional" attitudes toward their parliamentary duties, coupled with 
the experience of minority government and its wider scope for in- 
dependent and dissenting action for most of the post-1970 period, 
contributed to the widespread sense of dissatisfaction with the con- 
ventional backbench supportive role in the House. Although not suf- 
ficient conditions, all were necessary conditions for the passage of 
the 1979 select committee reforms. 
This Procedure Committee report did indeed mark a significant 
departure from previous inquiries and recommendations. Commit- 
tee members charged that Parliament's status was indeed subservi- 
ent to the Executive, and consequently needed to be rectified. While 
other Procedure Committees also acknowledged Parliament's weak- 
ened position, they also concurred that this was appropriate. Parlia- 
ment as processor and legitimator of government policies-coupled 
with the ability to raise and occasionally debate the great issues of the 
day-appeared to be enshrined in Constitutional practice, particu- 
larly in a system of party government. 
The 1977-78 Procedure Committee, however, based its inquiry 
and recommendations on an alternative assumption. Rather than ac- 
cepting government hegemony and party ascendancy as givens and 
then attempting to design committees to evaluate only the adminis- 
tration of policies, attention instead focused on strengthening Parlia- 
ment as an institution in its relationship with the Executive. The 
Procedure Committee premised its investigation on the notion that 
Parliament should assert its institutional authority and play a more 
active role. To this end, the committee sought to establish indepen- 
dent committees capable of monitoring and potentially influencing 
government policies and to insulate committees from party politics 
and possible recriminations. 
Although the necessary institutional structures-select commit- 
tees-may have been established, the other necessary ingredient in 
fulfilling the committee's aims was a sufficient number of backbench- 
ers whose attitudes about Parliament's role and their roles within it 
would coincide with those expressed by the committee in its report. 
Select committees without the "appropriate" men and women to 
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serve on them would only perpetuate and reflect the dilemma of the 
parent chamber-institutions with significant powers in theory but 
little interest, will, or ability to assert them. In the following chapter, 
I begin to explore and compare more systematically the attitudes of 
these committee and noncommittee members toward parliamentary 
service. 
Defining the Role of a 
Member of Parliament 
The preceding chapter highlighted the political realities of parliamen- 
tary reform: executive reluctance to strengthen legislative investiga- 
tory bodies, committee members' frustrations with imposed limitations 
in conducting inquiries, Procedure Committee assumptions about 
the proper role and powers of select committees in a parliamentary 
system, and changing orientations of MPs toward their roles as leg- 
islators. The Procedure Committee's report of 1978 was all the more 
pathbreaking because of what it expected of members of Parliament. 
For the proposed committee system to be successful, effective, or rel- 
evant, members' attitudes about their jobs, about Parliament, and 
about committee service necessarily had to differ from the assump- 
tions predicated in previous Procedure Committee reports. 
The committee's belief that the requisite attitudinal changes had 
indeed occurred, that MPs were in some ways different from those 
of, say, twenty years before, was supported by various behavioral ev- 
idence. Committee members were aware of the unprecedented back- 
bench dissent and rebellion in the 1960s and 1970s. They noted the 
increased calls for more staff and better resources, particularly by, but 
not limited to, recent entrants. They monitored the attempts of the 
then current committees to pursue broader, policy-related inquiries. 
And they took evidence from clerks, academics, and MPs who 
charged that while Parliament had apparently abdicated its constitu- 
tional role of accountability in recent years, members were seeking to 
"claw back this power they had lost. 
The Procedure Committee's report raised high expectations for 
the proposed departmentally related select committees. The new 
committees were to monitor, scrutinize, and influence government 
policies and their administration. They were to be the "eyes and ears" 
of the House in its relation with government departments. Further- 
more, the select committees were expected to be able to respond 
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quickly to current problems as well as maintain long-term oversight 
of expenditure programs of their respective departments. The result, 
Procedure Committee members hoped, would entail greater partici- 
pation and influence in the parliamentary process by backbenchers, 
increased accountability of the Executive to the legislature, better in- 
formation access to members of Parliament, and of course a reasser- 
tion of the House's role in policy formation and evaluation. To 
achieve these desired aims, the onus of responsibility would fall to 
the members of the new committees. Although the necessary insti- 
tutional structures were created, they would remain relatively inef- 
fectual without a corresponding interest, dedication, and will among 
their members. For the new system to be successful, the backbench- 
ers seeking places on the committees would need to possess attitudes 
commensurate with those expected and anticipated in the Procedure 
Committee's report. 
Awareness of the attitudes of legislators toward their roles in the 
legislature and their motivations and goals in the assembly assist one 
in deciphering how and why these members may react to or interpret 
various political phenomena. In this case, for example, knowing an 
MP's attitude about his or her role in the House, the emphasis placed 
on specialization, policy making, scrutinizing the Executive, and 
party loyalty provides a useful profile of the "type" of MP he or she 
best fits. Does one seem content with the generalist, party-loyal, 
chamber-oriented role characteristic of prior generations of back- 
bencher~? Or does one attempt to specialize in a given policy area, 
place less emphasis on loyalty to party leaders, and more generally 
pursue an active career in Parliament? Answering these questions be- 
comes crucial in understanding whether members are really willing 
and able to meet the current expectations and to perform differently 
than the previous procedure committees thought possible. New in- 
stitutionalized mechanisms may be created, but if the men and 
women serving on them do not share commonly held attitudes about 
using these processes, then the experiment is sure to fail. The com- 
bination of new institutions, such as select committees, and members 
with corresponding attitudes to make the committees function as in- 
tended creates a much more feasible environment for success. 
The Procedure Committee staked its proposals for a new commit- 
tee system as well as the accomplishments it was to achieve on the 
belief that the House of Commons was characterized much more by 
active professionals than by gentlemen amateurs. In fact, during the 
debates on the "Crossman Reforms" in 1966, opponents of select 
committees saw in this experiment "the thin end of a wedge which, 
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if driven home, they were afraid might exclude the part-time MP 
from the House altogether" (HCD 66/67, 738:492). To such an allega- 
tion Crossman replied that the composition of the House had 
changed since the war and that the Commons needed to adapt its 
procedures to the needs of newer members, particularly for those 
who sought to be full-time legislators. Twelve years later the 1978 
Procedure Committee claimed that an MP-as-part-time profession 
was indeed inconsistent with current parliamentary practice and ob- 
ligations. Full-time, professional MPs were expected to ensure the re- 
sponsibility of monitoring, influencing, and criticizing government 
policies and administration through select committee service. 
MPs' Career Backgrounds and Parliamentary Career Interests 
The change in the type of men and women coming to Parliament 
since the war that was noted by Crossman reflected a larger socio- 
economic trend in Great Britain. Like other western, industrialized 
societies, the postwar years marked a period of economic expansion, 
shifts in the labor force and industrial infrastructure, and an in- 
creased role for the national government in the management of the 
nation's social and economic standing (Halsey, 1986). From 1961 to 
1981, manual workers had declined from 60 percent of the workforce 
to less than 48 percent. And conversely in the same time period the 
white-collar, nonmanual workforce in Britain had increases sharply 
from just over a third of all workers to well over half (Halsey, 1986, 
163-64). And despite an increase in the number of persons in em- 
ployment, total employment in the manufacturing sector continued 
to decline, to less than 5.5 million workers by 1986. (See Figure 6.A.) 
While backbenchers had become increasingly restless in the 
House during the 1960s and 1970s with their leaders' policy deci- 
sions, successive Labour and Conservative governments had tried to 
bring business and labour to the bargaining table through a number 
of neo-corporatist arrangements. Instead of enshrining the consen- 
sus policies of the 1950s and the vision of a classless Britain with 
promises of near-full employment and a generously funded Welfare 
State, Great Britain witnessed increasingly sharp social cleavages and 
divides. Gallup found that the "class struggle" had not been laid to 
rest with the emergence of Butskellism. Nor was it only brought to 
the fore with Margaret Thatcher's version of conviction politics in the 
1980s. Rather, the 1960s and 1970s marked an era in which a majority 
of the British public believed a class struggle did indeed exist in their 
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country (Abercrombie and Warde, 1988, 165). As Figure 6.B indicates, 
less than half of Britons polled in 1964 felt that a class struggle existed 
in Great Britain, but by 1984 nearly three-fourths felt this way. And, 
while in 1964 almost 40 percent thought there was no longer any class 
struggle, only 20 percent held this view twenty years later. 
While the New Jerusalem envisaged by Beveridge and the plan- 
ners in Whitehall in the 1940s sought to protect the least well off in 
society, welfare provisions were targeted at the very young and the 
elderly. But by 1971, almost half of the poorest quintile in Britain were 
of working age, and by 1982 the proportion had risen to three- 
fourths. In short, the bottom 20 percent on the economic ladder in 
Britain were not the elderly but rather those of working age. And, in 
fact, the largest single group identified by family status were single 
men and women of working age. (See Figure 6.C.) 
The publication Social Trends presents a picture of Britain in the 
1970s and 1980s in which most of the population is better housed, 
better educated, and living longer than any other previous genera- 
tion. This increased standard of living comes at a high price, partic- 
ularly when the nation suffers from entrenched regional economic 
decline and the North-South divide has certainly become more ex- 
acerbated than perhaps at any time since the Industrial Revolution. 
Policy makers were then faced with this dilemma: the state has ac- 
cepted the responsibility of active, interventionist policies in Britain's 
social and economic affairs. But the costs to government to maintain 
this Social Contract, as Harold Wilson called it, had outpaced the 
Treasury's capacity to pay for it. Moreover, as Cain et al. (1987) so poi- 
gnantly demonstrated, voters were no longer willing to accept the 
passive, party-loyal actions of their local MPs when those decisions 
seemed to affect negatively their own personal condition or the eco- 
nomic conditions of the constituency as a whole. Despite the long- 
held assumptions about party loyalty, party voting, and supportive 
backbenchers in the Westminster Model, the British electorate had 
come to expect their members of Parliament to put the constituency's 
interest above the party's (Cain et al., 1987, 116). The economic pie 
appeared to be shrinking, but there were more demands on its 
pieces. Members needed to cultivate constituencies for the "Personal 
Vote"; party ties had loosened. Electors expected and rewarded good 
constituency men and women. Voters could not and would not be 
satisfied with traditional, part-time, amateur backbenchers who de- 
ferred all policy issues to party elites. 
In order for members of Parliament to pursue their legislative 
tasks on a full-time basis, however, most MPs have had to abandon, 
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FIGURE 6.A. EMPLOYMENT IN MANUFACTURING, 1966-1986 
FIGURE 6.B. PERCEPTIONS OF "CLASS STRUGGLE" 
Question: There used to be a lot of talk in politics about the "class snuggle." Do you think there is 
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FIGURE 6.C. COMPOSITION OF THE LOWEST INCOME QUINTILE BY 
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at least temporarily, careers in other fields. Only 7 percent of the MPs 
interviewed had pursued careers affiliated with their respective po- 
litical parties, and less than 3.6 percent worked in the Civil Service or 
Foreign Service. Consequently, approximately only one in ten MPs 
had had careers that could be considered to have any political or gov- 
ernment dimensions. If the job of an MP was to be considered a pro- 
fession, then an overwhelming majority were outsiders. Further, 
there is little opportunity for training in any analogous institution, as 
there would be in Canada, the United States, or Australia, for exam- 
ple, through service in state or provincial legislatures. For most, elec- 
tion to Parliament meant entering a new field and a new institutional 
setting. Figure 6.D shows the variety of occupational categories of 
MPs surveyed for this study. 
This figure also demonstrates more systematically the shifting oc- 
cupational backgrounds of MPs suggested by Crossman in 1966. It is 
clear that white-collar workers predominate. Farmers account for a 
mere 2.4 percent of the MPs, as do former officers in the armed ser- 
vices. Both groups were traditionally regarded as exemplifying the 
amateur, loyal, part-time backbencher, especially in the Conservative 
party. Figure 6.D suggests that these occupations have been eclipsed 
by others. Almost 40 percent of the MPs listed their occupations in 
the areas of education or upper-management positions for large com- 
panies. The other major white-collar jobs include finance and bank- 
ing, journalism, and engineering. By and large, from 1958 through 
the most recent parliamentary cohort of 1987, Conservative MPs 
largely come from professional and business backgrounds, with the 
ratio of professionals declining slightly and businesspeople increas- 
ing during that period. For Labour, there has been a marked decline 
of MPs-as-workers and an increase in members from the professions 
(Halsey, 1986, 316). 
Knowing that an MP is a banker rather than a barrister may offer 
little information about that member's attitude toward his or her role 
in Parliament. Nevertheless, the experiences gained in these occupa- 
tions are useful in understanding many legislators' perceptions of 
their current positions. Members of Parliament who entered politics 
after a career in a well paid white-collar occupation repeatedly men- 
tioned the frustration they encountered in their newly acquired pro- 
fession. MPs, regardless of age or party, complained of the lack of 
staff and supportive resources to enable them to pursue the active 
roles they had envisioned for themselves when they entered Parlia- 
ment. But they were even more vocal when discussing their frustra- 
tion in "getting things done" in Parliament because of the limited 
118 Reform in the House of Commons 
structural opportunities that would conceivably allow them to pro- 
cess their own interests and agendas. One Conservative MP elected 
in 1979 put it this way: "I find this place very frustrating, especially 
compared to the business world I was in and my experience in local 
government. There, in both instances, we got things done. This is my 
biggest criticism of this place; it is so difficult to get anything done" 
(Interview, 2 May 1987). And although he had been a PPS for the past 
five years, he had decided to abandon this first rung on the front- 
bench ladder in favor of a position on either the Select Committee on 
Trade and Industry or the Select Committee on Transport because 
these areas were important to his constituency interests. Feeling that 
his frontbench prospects after serving five years as a PPS were lim- 
ited, he decided to pursue select committee service precisely in order 
to pursue his interests, represent his constituency's interests, and 
generally "get things done." For him and others who were selected 
to serve, the frontbench no longer monopolized political access to 
the policy process. And, as will be pointed out below, for those who 
desired the frontbench route, an alternative-and perhaps more 
appropriate-avenue to follow other than the traditional backbench 
subservience lay in committee service. 
Another MP, elected in 1983, was representative of those who 
complained of the workload in the House and the lack of accom- 
panying resources to handle it: "The capacity of MPs to cope with the 
workload and the hours, and be expected to master the detail, is 
what no one else in any other profession would seriously be asked to 
do. I was an executive in industry for quite some time, and I would 
never be expected to do the sorts of tasks and master them without 
the backup in resources and staff" (Interview, 23 Feb. 1987). This 
comparative lack of professionalism and professionalization in the 
House had led him to adopt a more cavalier attitude toward his role 
and tenure as a legislator. Without substantial changes in his ability 
to pursue his role actively and at the level he expected of himself, he 
indicated that he would step down from national politics within the 
next five years. Interestingly, he went on the Select Committee on 
Energy because energy was a particularly important issue in his con- 
stituency and also because he could maintain relations and foster 
new contacts in the energy industry. Select committee service was 
important for both constituency and personal reasons, as he had 
worked in the energy industry prior to entering Parliament. And at 
age thirty-six, he intended to return to this field if his parliamentary 
career did not yield the results he demanded. Like many of his par- 
liamentary colleagues, he expected to take an active role in the 
House. He chose to eschew the amateur-gentleman legislative role. 
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But to be active and professional, more resources were necessary. 
Granting these resources, however, would not necessarily be in the 
Executive's best interest. 
The perceptions and attitudes of these two MPs are of course not 
universally held. But they do represent the attitudes of many former 
white-collar professionals interviewed. And as the House becomes 
more and more characterized by young, educated professionals, one 
can expect to see a similar rise in frustration among this legislative 
cohort unless they receive promotions to responsible frontbench po- 
sitions or find meaningful alternative roles on the backbench. 
Ronald Butt acknowledged in 1967 that the newest MPs were 
"invariably disappointed by what they find to be their positions and 
status once they arrive at Westminster" (Butt, 1967, 181). This disap- 
pointment, he added, was particularly acute for those men and 
women who entered politics "to get things done." Butt's analysis 
suggested, however, that the disappointment felt by new entrants 
was a perennial problem-or at least one that followed each general 
election. As they were socialized into the norms of the House, they 
accepted their relatively ineffectual and passive role, and further, he 
implied, these MPs' disappointment would soon dissipate. Although 
Butt noted the presence of disappointment, he failed to appreciate its 
pervasiveness among new MPs in the early and mid-1960s. And he 
also appears to have overlooked the increasing number of MPs who 
entered politics to pursue active careers in Parliament. The preceding 
chapters highlighted the fact that much of the impetus for parliamen- 
tary reform emanated from the new entrants of the 1960s. Barker and 
Rush's 1970 study confirmed this impression; they also found some 
association between the background of MPs and the extent to which 
they favored parliamentary reform (Barker and Rush, 1970). And in 
1981 Geoffrey Smith, parliamentary correspondent for the Times, ob- 
served: "The young, aspiring MP has not largely sacrificed any other 
career . . . in order to be lobby fodder for his party in the Commons 
and a glorified welfare officer for his constituents at home. He wants 
to determine policies, to influence events. He finds, however, that his 
opportunities for doing either are severely circumscribed on the back- 
benches and that his prospects of being called to the frontbench are 
limited by the laws of arithmetic. . . . This explains why there is 
mounting frustration among MPs and why it is the younger ones 
who are in general the most ardent supporters of parliamentary re- 
form" (Ornstein, 1981, 38-39). 
The prevalence of particular employment backgrounds among 
MPs is highlighted in a comparison of committee members from 1968 
to 1987. Three successive panels of committee members are profiled 
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FIGURE 6.E. OCCUPATIONS BEFORE ENTERING PARLIAMENT FOR 
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here. Because the departmental select committees were created in 
1979, there are no directly parallel units of analysis prior to this time. 
But in functional terms there were some corresponding committees 
in the 1960s and 1970s-the Estimates and Expenditure committees. 
(There were some other similar committees-Nationlised Industries, 
Agriculture, Science and Technology, and Overseas Development- 
that are comparable to current select committees, but the number of 
members on these past and current committees is so low that no 
meaningful interpretation could be made from the data.) Figures 6.E, 
6.F, and 6.G demonstrate the similarity between the committee mem- 
bers' backgrounds from the last Estimates Committee in 1968169, the 
last Expenditure Committee in 1977178, and the sample of select com- 
mittee members interviewed in 1986187 for this project. 
By and large, one does not find any glaring discrepancies in oc- 
cupational backgrounds. Members serving on the Estimates and Ex- 
penditure committees, however, were generally seen as aberrations 
in Parliament and were singled out as the "parliamentary work- 
horses," unlike their more reticent and genteel fellow backbenchers. 
During debates and testimony to successive procedure committees, 
these members displayed continued frustration with their inability to 
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FIGURE 6.F. OCCUPATIONS BEFORE ENTERING PARLIAMENT FOR 
MEMBERS OF 1977-1978 EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE 
Sources: Personal Interviews; 
Dod's Parliamentarv C a m o a i ~  
(London: Hansard Society, 1979); 
Times Guide to the H o u f  
Commons (London: Times 
Publishing. 1984). 
*No MPs fit this category. 
FIGURE 6.G. OCCUPATIONS BEFORE ENTERING PARLIAMENT FOR 
COMMITTEE MEMBERS INTERVIEWED, 1986-1987 
Upper management 
Political party work 
Civillforeign service 
Percent 5 5.5 10 15 20 
Sources: Personal Interviews; 
Dod's Parliamentarv Camoaig~! 
$=lo (London: Hansard Society, 1985): 
Times Guide to the House of 
Commons (London: Times 
Publishing, 1984). 
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pursue meaningful inquiries and to investigate policy decisions, and 
were generally disappointed with the apparent disdain shown them 
by party leaders. Frustrated and disappointed with their marginal- 
ized role in the policy process, these earlier committees faced high 
turnover rates and extremely low attendance rates. By the late 1970s, 
these committee members were less and less an aberration and more 
representative of the House as a whole. The old parliamentary com- 
mittees would have to give way to meet the desires increasingly ob- 
vious in the House. Parliament supported a minority government, 
and many in the House recognized that the time had come to mod- 
ernize Parliament's capacity for oversight to meet the needs and chal- 
lenges of an increasingly restless and rebelling backbench. 
This emphasis on carving out a role that includes an active, 
policy-influencing dimension also appears in the interview data I col- 
lected. Given a tacit recognition of pervasive frustration among re- 
cent entrants to the House, surely a parliamentary career must bring 
with it some rewards, some appeal to those who choose to seek re- 
election. To address this issue, members of Parliament were asked in 
an open-ended question, "As an MP, what do you find most appeal- 
ing about being in politics?" Table 6.1 gives a breakdown of the six 
response categories offered by MPs. Overall, approximately 60 per- 
cent stated that politics was appealing to them because of the involve- 
ment it offered in shaping national policies. Many, however, were 
quick to point out that although there were opportunities to involve 
oneself in national policy matters, this did not necessarily mean there 
were sufficient avenues for them in the House to be as active and in- 
volved as they would like. An MP could try to introduce a Private 
Member's Bill, for example, but the likelihood for passage is very 
slim. One could move for an emergency debate on a se1f:selected is- 
sue, but a favorable decision from the Speaker is by no means as- 
sured. The chances of being called upon in debate are few, and the 
likelihood of significantly altering or shaping policy in the chamber is 
even more remote. Frontbench MPs were also more likely than their 
backbench counterparts to stress a more directly involved and active 
component in policy making. One Labour spokesman said, "I like be- 
ing able to make some impact on public policy and actually being in- 
volved in this process at the national level to some degree." And 
another spokesman added, "For me, the most appealing part is the 
opportunity to get action on the areas one regards as important" (In- 
terview, 4 Feb. 1987). 
Frontbenchers should, and do, have greater capacity to "make an 
impact" or "get action," but for their backbench counterparts these 
opportunities are far more limited. For these MPs, then, there exist 
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TABLE 6.1. APPEAL OF BEING IN POLITICS FOR MPS 
Question: As a member of Parliament, what do you find most appealing about 
being in politics? 
Response All Members of 
Parliament 
% (N-84) 
Access to policy/ 60 50 
decision making 
Seat of power 35 29 
Serve 
constituents 21 l8 
Pursue ideology 11 9 
Good club 5 4 
Honor/privilege 4 3 
Conservative Labour Non-Select 
Committee 
Select 
Committee 
% (N-w 
--
too few formal, structural opportunities to participate actively in the 
formulation of national policies. This situation is especially apparent 
for members of the Opposition party. Given the Conservatives' con- 
tinued parliamentary majority during the past thirteen years, coupled 
with Mrs. Thatcher's distaste for consensus politics, the Parliamen- 
tary Labour party as a whole, and especially individual Labour MPs, 
have been unable to define or influence substantially the policy 
agenda since 1979. While MPs may find solace in shaping Labour's 
policy positions, implementation and action are only possible after 
some future Labour general election victory. 
One would expect, then, to find a marked difference between 
Conservative and Labour MPs in viewing "involvement" as an ap- 
pealing part of being in national politics. Labour has found little op- 
portunity to shape public policy since 1979 and, as a result, little 
access to the policy arena, a factor influencing their perception of its 
appeal. For many Labour MPs, the appeal of politics may at least tem- 
porarily be less important than other opportunities the job presents. 
Indeed, the data confirm this. While almost three-fourths of Conser- 
vative MPs stressed the appeal of "involvement," only 50 percent of 
Labour MPs did so. For Opposition MPs, there was virtually as much 
appeal for them in "being where the power is and decision made" as 
with actual involvement. Conversely, and as expected, less than half 
as many government as Labour MPs found this to be appealing to 
them. One of the longest serving MPs and a member of Labour's Na- 
tional Executive Committee explained it this way: "True, we are cur- 
rently in opposition, but one still feels one is sitting in the center of 
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being spun. You get a chance to know what is going on, a chance of 
being in the know. I do get a chance to know what is being discussed 
in government in Britain more than virtually anyone else" (Inter- 
view, 25 Feb. 1987). And as an SDP member remarked: "You may not 
always be in a position to substantially alter events, but you do get a 
ringside seat to what is going on" (Interview, 3 Feb. 1987). 
Whether one finds it appealing to be involved in decision-making 
or be present at the seat of power where decisions are made, the ev- 
idence suggests a commonly held concern among MPs with national 
policies and policy making. And while being formally locked out of 
the policy-making process over the course of several years, half of La- 
bour MPs still stressed the appeal of making decisions at the national 
level. This, too, may reflect some appreciation for articulating La- 
bour's position to be implemented in a future Labour government. 
As subsequent data analysis will indicate, this emphasis on the policy 
dimension of the legislator's role persists when members are asked 
further questions concerning their role in the House. 
The notion of MPs as amateurs, generalists, or part-timers once 
corresponded closely with the belief that they were in the House be- 
cause it was "the best club in Europe" and service was an honor and 
privilege bestowed upon them (Granada Television, 1973). But these 
parliamentary attributes have largely ceased to be significant entice- 
ments for men and women to enter Parliament. Nor do these factors 
appear to have significant appeal to current members. Less than 5 
percent of the MPs interviewed found whatever "club atmosphere" 
may exist appealing. Nonetheless, all of those who did mention this 
factor as an appealing part of national politics were Conservative 
members. An even smaller number (3.6 percent) mentioned the 
honor and privilege of serving as appealing to them. One Conserva- 
tive MP answered the question this way: "Well, basically for me I 
find it an honor to be here and a privilege to serve in the Mother of 
Parliaments. The fact, because of dates of birth and the rest of it, I've 
never really been in anything [other] than public service all my life. I 
was in the diplomatic service and after fifteen years of that it was ob- 
vious I really hadn't the capacity for commercial life. Parliament 
seemed the obvious career then" (Interview, 20 Jan. 1987). 
About 11 percent of the members interviewed stated they found 
being in politics appealing because it offered them the opportunity to 
articulate and champion a particular political philosophy or ideology. 
With the exception of a few LiberaYSDP MPs, these were self-styled 
ideologues who represented the Extreme Left in the Labour party 
and the Extreme Right in the Conservative party. But they had di- 
vergent, preconceived opinions concerning the utility of select com- 
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mittees as a means of pursuing their ideologically based goals. The 
Labour MPs, who indicated they came to Parliament to "champion 
the class struggle," were not interested in committee work because of 
what they perceived as the "sloppy consensus" that took place there. 
Conservative MPs did choose to serve on select committees where 
they attempted to pursue single-issue causes, e.g., removing Britain 
from the EEC. When they realized that select committees were an in- 
appropriate avenue to achieve these aims and an improper forum for 
class-based or adversarial politics, they resigned from their respec- 
tive committees. 
The Liberals, on the other hand, found select committee service a 
useful means to pursue what they identified as moderate, middle-of- 
the-road policies, which they felt by and large reflected Liberal party 
policies. One senior Liberal MP said of the appeal of politics: "[It is] 
the ability to get a platform for Liberalism as I understand it and rep- 
resent not just the views of my constituency-which are very impor- 
tant-but also as far as possible the views of Liberals throughout the 
country. I also correspond regularly with Liberals throughout Great 
Britain who have no Liberal MI?" And, as a long-serving member of 
one of the most prestigious select committees before becoming a 
party spokesman, he added, "I think many of the committee's find- 
ings have helped to move public opinion toward the Liberal and So- 
cial Democratic way of thinking" (Interview, 3 Feb. 1987). 
Describing the Job of an MP: The Participant's View 
Discovering what MPs find appealing about being in politics sheds 
light on their motivations and rationale for entering Parliament. It 
also highlights what an MP may do in the House to seek and receive 
job satisfaction. But this does not provide sufficient information to 
determine how an MP defines his or her job in the House. Clearly, 
many members find being at the seat of power and decision making 
quite appealing, but it is difficult to imagine that they see this as nec- 
essarily part of their jobs as members of Parliament. And mem- 
bers may undertake a series of mundane tasks that hold little appeal 
whatsoever. Consequently, a follow-up question asked them to de- 
scribe how they perceive their jobs as MPs, asking them, "What do 
you do here?" This question allowed MPs to define more precisely 
the duties and tasks they perform. Again, this was an open-ended 
question and the responses were subsequently coded into seven cat- 
egories encapsulating all the offered responses. These are presented 
in Table 6.2. 
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TABLE 6.2. MPS' DESCRIPTIONS OF THEIR JOBS 
Question: How do you describe your job as a member of Parliament? What do you do here? 
Response All Members of Conservative Labour Non-Select Select 
Parliament Committee Committee 
% (N-84) % (N41) % (N-38) % (N-24) % (N-60) 
- --- - -
Constituency 67 56 68 28 66 25 58 14 70 42 
work 
Makepolicy 31 26 34 14 29 11 25 6 33 20 
27 23 32 13 26 10 21 5 30 18 hard work 
Petition 
grievances 17 14 15 6 13 5 4 1 22 13 
Debates 14 12 12 5 18 7 25 6 10 6 
Supportparty 12 10 7 3 13 5 0 0 17 10 
Campaign for 
interests 1 0 8 0 0 1 3 5 8 2 1 0 6  
Although only one in five MPs found constituency work appeal- 
ing, two-thirds mentioned it as part of their job tasks. This was by far 
the most frequent response and was emphasized equally among La- 
bour and Conservative MPs. As a sub-sample of all MPs, however, 
those members who had not served on select committees were gen- 
erally less inclined to mention constituency work as part of their jobs. 
But this was mentioned in an equally high proportion (more than 2 to 
1) to other job components. 
The job of an MP has also meant a greater allocation of legislative 
time to constituency work than was the case even twenty years ago; 
but that does not mean the MP uniformly enjoys it at the same rate. 
This newly placed focus has been explored by several legislative 
scholars (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1979a, 1987). Alf Dubs, Oppo- 
sition spokesman on Race Relations and Immigration, spoke of his 
job as an MP in the following way: "I would say I spend most of my 
time, much to my surprise compared to what I thought before I got 
here, on individual constituent problems-far more than I thought I 
would. What is not clear to everybody is that the inner-city areas like 
my constituency [Battersea] have enormous weighty constituency 
problems compared to other areas. From watching the secretary go 
through the post bag, I find that inner city post bags are up to three 
times more than other ones. [Why?] Well, because there are a num- 
ber of inner-city problems-unemployment, social security, housing 
difficulties. So I spend far more of my time on that than I do on policy 
or other types ofthingsU (~nterview, 24 March 1987). Despite the at- 
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tention Dubs paid to constituent problems, he lost his seat, which 
Labour had held since 1896, in the 1987 general election-a result 
perhaps of an influx of Conservative voters in this recently gentrified 
area of London. 
Of course, one of the explanations for increased attention to con- 
stituent affairs and the gap that exists between it and the appeal one 
receives from it is the increased expectation among constituents that 
MPs will actively pursue this task. James Marsh points out that the 
change in attitude to, and scope of, constituency casework came in 
the 1960s "with the growth of community politics, which meant that 
local issues and problems were exploited by local parties, at that time 
usually the Liberal Party" (Marsh, 1985, 69). Some Conservative MPs 
who begrudgingly accepted this "glorified welfare officer" role also 
blamed the Liberals for their party's emphasis on "pavement 
politics." 
When describing their jobs as MPs, long-serving members from 
both parties were quick to point out the changes they have seen in 
constituent expectations and members' responses. Said one Conser- 
vative MP: "It is incredible how in the twenty-three years I have been 
in Parliament the workload has increased, especially from constitu- 
ents" (Interview, 5 Feb. 1987). But a few retiring Labour MPs disliked 
employing staffs to conduct constituency affairs. One senior retiring 
Labour MP stated: "This place has become too professional and the 
attitudes of the Members have changed a lot since I came in 1964. I 
am against all these research assistants and such, you lose contact 
with your local constituents and what is really going on in the world. 
With this professionalization, you find you don't get the attendance 
on the floor the way you used to" (Interview, 13 May 1987). These 
attitudes, however, were expressed only by members who had been 
elected to Parliament in 1964 or before. Overwhelmingly, MPs said 
they were in the House "to protect constituents if they get mucked 
around by government or departments" or "to take up the individual 
problems of my constituents. That is the bread and butter role-local 
politics." Another Labour MP who had been in Parliament for three 
decades and had served in Labour's frontbench continuously since 
1969 effectively summarized the attitudes expressed by most MPs: 
"You are there to influence events, but as a backbencher, you make a 
small contribution to those policies; you mostly do constituency in- 
terests. Select committees are important here as they afford you the 
opportunity to do something else" (Interview, 30 June 1987). 
Nevertheless, nearly a third of the MPs did describe their jobs in 
terms of influencing, shaping, or making policy. While 33 percent of 
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those MPs who had chosen select committee service described their 
jobs this way, only one in four non-select committee MPs did so. Fur- 
ther questioning revealed that select committees provided the avenue 
for policy involvement for many backbenchers while their non-select 
committee backbench colleagues lacked the structural opportunities 
to take part in the policy process. The Procedure Committee had 
hoped that committee service would indeed provide a useful means 
for increased backbench participation in policy areas. The initial im- 
pression suggests that select committees have indeed facilitated 
members' ability to fulfill this part of their job responsibility. 
The "job description" for MPs posited by the Westminster Model 
suggests a role orientation suited to and largely limited to activities 
in the chamber. Here the frontbenchers hold the monopoly of power 
and the party leaders determine the scope and nature of debate. The 
debate over the "chamber first" and "committee men" role gained 
prominence in the 1960s as members increasingly pressed for more 
active participation and influence through committee service. And 
those who worked on the early select committees pressed party lead- 
ers to allow more time for debating committee reports in the chamber. 
Long-serving MPs such as Enoch Powell and Michael Foot have 
persistently argued that the job of an MP is to argue the "great issues 
of the day" through the thrust and parry of debate on the floor of the 
House. This is the best way, they contend, to hold government ac- 
countable where it must defend its programs and policies under the 
glare of public scrutiny. On the other hand, supporters of select com- 
mittees maintain that MPs' ability to hold government accountable 
through scrutiny and criticism in the chamber is little more than a 
charade, given the lack of access to the detailed information neces- 
sary to perform this role at a realistically competent level. 
John Selwyn Gummer, a Conservative MP, articulated the views 
of reformers on enhancing the chamber's role through committee 
work. He complained that the chamber was not "effective enough 
because members concentrated upon the "ping pong of party politi- 
cal differences which are bound to arise if you haven't got an intel- 
ligent argument to put forward." He added: "What we are asking is 
for the kind of investigatory Select Committees which would make it 
possible for those of us who are debating and who wish to de- 
bate . . . but the fact is that we believe that we want to make the 
chamber more effective. . . . And what we are proposing is that we 
want the information about that which is being legislated about in 
the House of Commons, that information which is not available at the 
moment. . . . If we had such Select Committees I believe that the 
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FIGURE 6.H. ROLES MPS MOST WISH TO PLAY IN PARLIAMENT 
Question: Which of the following roles do you most wish to play in the House? 
Policy influencer 
Constitiuency representalive 
Supporter of party policies 
Debater 
Other 
All of above 
Percent5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
chamber would be a better place to be in, it would be a hotter and 
more difficult place for Ministers, it would be a more exacting place 
for back-benchers, but it would mean that the public for the first time 
for a long while would feel that its interests were properly repre- 
sented (Granada Television, 1973, 169-71). 
Despite the chamber-oriented role ascribed to members of Parlia- 
ment by the Westminster Model, few MPs emphasized this side of 
their own work when describing their jobs. Only 14 percent men- 
tioned participating in debates as part of their jobs, and less than one 
in eight mentioned supporting party manifestos or leaders-another 
facet of the subservient backbench role institutionalized through 
chamber-related activities. Members who have not chosen to partic- 
ipate in the new committee system may be expected to emphasize a 
stronger orientation toward work in the chamber. Indeed, this was 
precisely the case for 25 percent of those MPs. But the general decline 
among MPs in describing their jobs as supportive roles for the party 
was even more evident among non-select committee members; none 
of them mentioned this as a facet of their jobs. And again, only a few 
MPs (9.5 percent) stated that waging ideologically oriented cam- 
paigns was part of their job. All of these members were Labour MPs, 
and most of them were not members of the select committees, which 
are characterized by their consensus, bipartisan approach to politics. 
Members were also handed a closed-ended question toward the 
end of the interviews that asked them to select the role they most 
wished to play in Parliament. This exercise (shown in Figure 6.H) al- 
lowed them to articulate an ideal role, compared with what they ac- 
tually do or what they find appealing about it. Reflecting a desire to 
participate more actively in the policy process than their predeces- 
sors of a generation before, almost half of the MPs chose "policy in- 
fluencer" as the role they most wished to play in the House. Support 
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for this chosen role was much higher among Conservatives (61 per- 
cent) than among Labour (39 percent). Having enjoyed eight years of 
Tory rule in the House, Conservative MPs were better positioned 
than Labour MPs to expect and receive junior ministerial posts, select 
committee chairmanships, and Conservative-dominated select com- 
mittee positions. 
Approximately 29 percent of all respondents chose Constitu- 
ency Representative as the role they most wished to play, which is 
consistent with the number of MPs (27 percent) who mentioned 
constituency-related duties when describing their jobs. And again, 
one sees minimal support for being a Debater or a Supporter of Party 
Policies-roles that party leaders would especially like to see their 
party followers play in an executive-dominated arena legislature. Al- 
though none of the non-select committee MPs mentioned supporting 
their respective parties when asked to describe their jobs, one in five 
chose this response when presented with three other defined roles. 
These members all had senior positions within their respective par- 
liamentary parties-i.e., senior whips, vice-chairman of 1922 com- 
mittee, chairman of the Parliamentary Labour party-and expected 
party loyalty from their colleagues and in turn demonstrated loyalty 
to party leaders. 
In a follow-up question, members were handed another list of 
eight parliamentary duties and asked to rank them in order of im- 
portance. The eight possible duties were: 
Expressing voters' concerns about the national issues 
Dealing with constituents' personal problems 
Attending meetings in the constituency 
Supporting the party's leadership 
Making good public policy 
Contributing to debate 
Questioning ministers, government officials 
Committee work in the House 
This question was designed to include all aspects of a member's du- 
ties: representationlconstituency work, party loyalty, policy making, 
chamber and committee work. Once again the policy-making role 
elicited the most responses. Forty-two percent of MPs chose this duty 
as the most important. And, consistent with previous findings, con- 
stituency work followed, with 30 percent indicating "dealing with 
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constituents' personal problems" as the most important duty. To be 
sure, only 9 percent ranked "committee work in the House" at the 
top, but this figure was higher than for any of the other remaining 
duties. In sharp contrast to those MPs who argued that the proper 
role for Parliament and its members centered on debate in the cham- 
ber, only two members (2.6 percent) felt that "contributing to debate" 
was their most important duty. Only slightly more support (3.9 per- 
cent) was given to "supporting the party's leadership" and "ques- 
tioning ministers, government officials" in assigning these duties the 
top ranking. 
Members appear to view policy involvement and fulfilling their 
welfare officer roles for constituents as the two most important duties 
of their jobs. They do not, however, consider the passive role of sup- 
porting their respective party's leadership to be nearly as important, 
nor do they appear to interpret chamber-oriented activities-debat- 
ing and questioning-to be their most important duties. These re- 
sults are misleading, however. While both handling constituents' 
problems and policy involvement consistently rank high as members' 
second and third most important duties, "questioning ministers and 
government officials" was the most-often chosen option as the sec- 
ond and third ranked duty. And there is no contradiction between 
generally high support for this role and uniformly low support for 
contributing to debate, although both are usually associated with 
chamber-related activities. First, members indicated that debates are 
"by and large a farce," since the outcome of post-debate lobby divi- 
sions is generally already known. Their speeches may enter the pages 
of Hansard and an occasional reference found in the press, but their 
contributions to outcome remain negligible. Both oral and written 
questions to ministers, on the other hand, necessitate a response, 
and this remains one of the few avenues available to pry information 
from the government frontbench. The number of questions to min- 
isters has increased dramatically during the past twenty years. 
Second, since the introduction of the current committee system, 
the questioning of ministers and government officials has become a 
role performed both on the floor of the House and in the select com- 
mittees. In fact, committee members take particular pride and plea- 
sure in "grilling ministers," "extracting information," and keeping 
ministers and officials before committees until they have offered sat- 
isfactory responses to members' questions. Of the value in receiving 
testimony from ministers, Kevin McNamara, former member of the 
Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and Opposition spokesman for 
Defence, when interviewed offered the following: "I see that the 
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nature of the committees means that members on it are getting more 
information given to them by the departments than are members of 
the Opposition frontbench. I wish I as a frontbench spokesman could 
get access to the resources they [select committee members] have. 
I think it is a major error for the Labour party, but for democracy, 
you are making sure everybody is doing something" (Interview, 
2 Feb. 1987). 
Alf Dubs added: "I think the average backbencher gets the 
chance about once every four weeks to ask a question of the Home 
secretary or relevant minister. On a select committee, a small group 
of us can have a government minister for an hour, and I can perhaps 
question him myself for five or seven minutes at a time. So the ability 
to put government ministers and civil servants under pressure is in- 
comparable" (Interview, 24 March 1987). Rather than being con- 
cerned with changing the focus of MPs' jobs in holding government 
accountable, "chamber-first" members should acknowledge that the 
focus has not necessarily changed but the forum has. 
Role Performance and Role Desire 
The evidence presented thus far suggests a gap between what MPs 
want to do in the House of Commons, and what they are able to do. 
Making and influencing policy is considered to be their most impor- 
tant duty, they find it the most appealing part of being in politics, and 
it is the role they most wish to play. But constituency work is over- 
whelmingly used to describe what they actually do in Parliament. 
Policy making is a distant second. And while backbenchers increas- 
ingly advocate broader participation in shaping national policies, few 
structural channels are available. 
This bifurcation of expressed preferences and emphases on the 
one hand, and realistic opportunities to respond positively to them 
on the other, is supported by the number of MPs favoring increased 
backbench participation in the parliamentary process. Indeed, 70 
percent of the members interviewed favored more participation by 
backbenchers. Reflecting the divergent role orientations of the front- 
and backbenchers, the former were far less likely to support an ex- 
panded role for the latter. Speaking of backbenchers' ability to par- 
ticipate in the policy process, a former Labour home secretary 
explained: "It is there for those who know how to use it. There are 
different ways, but you need to learn how to do it" (Interview, 7 July 
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1987). Another Labour frontbencher concurred: "There is enough. It 
is a problem of perception. The work load has increased since I came 
in in 1966. One realizes from being a minister that the only people 
who change Whitehall is Whitehall. And this is the problem of the 
backbench; they do not accept the role of cabinet government. A 
good backbencher can still catch a minister. Select committees are a 
way of becoming more involved in specific areas, but it is difficult" 
(Interview, 2 July 1987). These MPs also stressed the chamber- 
oriented role for members, selecting "contributing to debate" as one 
the most important duties of their jobs. Moreover, they stated that a 
successful parliamentary career was defined by getting to the front- 
bench. By their own definition they were successful, but they had 
risen to their positions through pursuing a "traditional" backbench 
role-emphasizing party loyalty and eschewing committee work for 
debates in the chamber. 
While Conservative frontbenchers tended to agree with their La- 
bour counterparts, they were also more likely to stress their party 
policy committees as a means of allowing backbench participation in 
the policy process. A Conservative MP stated: "Well, that [backbench 
participation] works of course through the party committees. . . . 
There is a close link between them and the secretary of state of the 
department concerned. So both in terms of tactics and longer-term 
policies, those committees do have an important input to make (In- 
terview, 2 February 1987). And a minister of state agreed: "Well, I 
don't see how you can involve them much more than you already do 
because the governing process is very sensitive to the feelings of the 
backbenchers. . . . [Do you actively seek out the attitudes of back- 
bench opinion?] Oh yes, oh yes. You have to know what the general 
body of opinion is so that person [PPS] will go first of all to the 
opinion-forming backbench committees on your particular area of in- 
terest as a government minister, but will also spend a lot of time just 
chatting to colleagues over coffee, over a beer in the bar" (Interview, 
18 Feb. 1987). 
Clearly, opportunities do exist for backbenchers to discuss policy 
proposals with respective party leaders. But discussions are usually 
informal, not well-attended, and offer an essentially reactive role for 
backbenchers. Furthermore, ministers' primary concern rests in car- 
rying a substantial number of their party backbenchers in the ensu- 
ing division of lobbies on government-proposed policies. It is not to 
elicit policy proposals or ideas in the formulation stage. In many 
ways, the relationship and dynamics between ministers and party 
134 Reform in the House of Commons 
committees is similar to that of front- and backbenchers in the 
chamber and ministers and party followers in standing committees. 
Ministers lead, backbenchers follow. Ministers propose policy initia- 
tives, and backbenchers may oppose, but alternatives and amend- 
ments are rarely made and major changes put forth except when 
backbench revolts threaten passage. Despite ministers' assurances 
that backbenchers do have adequate means to participate in the pol- 
icy process and their opinions and advice are given due consider- 
ation, Norton points out that in recent years members have proved 
willing to vote against their own side on more occasions and in 
greater numbers and with more effect than has been the case since 
the post-1867 advent of party government (Norton, 1980b). 
Backbench dissent is of course one identifiable behavioral mani- 
festation of disaffection with the party leaderships' policy stances. 
Except for a very few backbenchers who chose to pursue a passive, 
relatively part-time party-loyal role in the House, virtually all back- 
bench MPs, representing all political parties, expressed a desire for 
greater participation. Some Conservative PPSs, who are somewhere 
in limbo between the front- and backbench, were extremely critical of 
current arrangements. One of them stated, "Government is in es- 
sence an autocracy appearing as a democracy through party" (Inter- 
view, 23 Feb. 1987). And another charged that the limitations 
imposed on backbench participation in the House were the root 
cause for Parliament's "loss of control over the Executive" (Interview, 
30 Jan. 1987). 
While Labour backbench MPs were equally critical, they were 
more likely to offer suggestions for increasing backbench participa- 
tion. Most commented that select committees provided "a good fo- 
rum for that" but urged stronger agenda-setting and legislation- 
drafting powers. Liberal and SDP MPs argued for a new 
constitutional settlement allowing for more backbench (and subse- 
quently third-party) participation. But there was also substantial dis- 
cussion among all Opposition party members of the perceived flaws 
in the current parliamentary system. Clare Short, a former member 
of the Home Affairs Select Committee and currently on Labour's 
frontbench, echoed the views of many. "I think the British parlia- 
mentary system is enormously defective and flawed. I think the Ex- 
ecutive is massively powerful; it sets the timetable, it has enormous 
resources-public relations, press, money. . . . And we have people 
in this place seeking to rise to the Executive-it isn't a parliament 
that does a good job of scrutinizing the Executive, and that's its only 
role. It is all muddled by loyalty to party and aspirations to high of- 
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fice . . . but there is also a total mood that diminishes its role and 
ability to put a check on the Executive. What we need to see here 
is an attitudinal change among members of Parliament about what 
they do here and what Parliament should be doing" (Interview, 
27 Jan. 1987). 
Frontbench MPs appear to have clear and identifiable percep- 
tions of the existence of meaningful participatory avenues that are 
available to backbenchers. In contrast, backbenchers do not share this 
optimism or believe these party-dominate structural channels pro- 
vide effective input and access to policy formulation. This divergence 
underscores the authority-hierarchical relationship that exists be- 
tween frontbenchers and backbenchers. Just as the two frontbenches 
shared a common interest in hindering previous select committee 
assertiveness, so too do its members guard their policy-making pre- 
rogatives, claiming that backbenchers have sufficient means to par- 
ticipate in the parliamentary process. 
The role orientation of the front- and backbenches also reflects 
the traditional duties and obligations of leaders and followers, re- 
spectively. It is not so much that the two groups have differing 
attitudes about the role of a member of Parliament. Rather, front- 
benchers tend to claim the activist, policy-shaping role as their exclu- 
sive domain. Broader backbench participation is viewed as an 
intrusion. Backbenchers by and large also support an activist, policy- 
shaping role for MPs, but their perception of who should be pursu- 
ing this role is a much more inclusive one. In short, they assert that 
Parliament should provide sufficient means for all its members who 
wish to lead an active role. Channels for participation must be broad- 
ened beyond occasional and perfunctory speeches on the floor of the 
House and discussions in party committees. As the next chapter 
highlights in greater detail, members want opportunities for Parlia- 
ment as an institution to be more actively involved in agenda setting 
and policy making. They reject the notion of allowing the majority 
party frontbench, i.e., the government, a monopoly in performing 
these duties. 
Although many legislators have reached the policy-influencing 
arena by carefully adhering to the norms of party loyalty, members 
interviewed in my group indicated that maintaining measured de- 
grees of independence and seeking policy-influencing positions are 
no longer incompatible. Party leaders increasingly rely upon knowl- 
edgeable, hard-working MPs with some specialization in particular 
policy fields, not obsequious supporters. In fact, almost 90 percent of 
the MPs considered themselves specialists in one or more policy 
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FIGURE 6.1. CONSEQUENCES OF VOTING AGAINST OR NOT 
SUPPORTING ONE'S PARTY 
Question: What are the consequences of voting against or abstaining from supporting party leaders' 
policy positions? 
fields. And when asked if conflicts had arisen between their personal 
beliefs or constituency interests and party policy, members over- 
whelmingly indicated in a follow-up question that such conflicts had 
indeed arisen. Moreover, despite their desire to be active in influenc- 
ing policy, members overwhelmingly indicated that there were few if 
any consequences in voting against or abstaining from supporting 
party leaders' policy positions. (See Figure 6.1). 
Finally, although MPs overwhelmingly advocated increased pol- 
icy influencing roles for themselves, less than a third stated that 
acquiring frontbench status necessarily defined a successful parlia- 
mentary career. And only 17 percent mentioned party loyalty as a 
means to achieve a successful parliamentary career. A senior Labour 
MP explained the change in party loyalty this way: "I really do think 
there are other means available to pursue a successful career without 
going to the frontbench. This place has changed a lot since I came 
here in 1945. Members work harder, less deference toward the front- 
bench. I think this has occurred since 1964, and with each new wave 
of intakes you get more dedicated, better educated, better quality 
Members. I think in the Labour Party one of the reasons is because 
the Constituency Labour Parties are much more demanding. They 
expect their Members to be much more aware of constituency prob- 
lems" (Interview, 25 February 1987). 
Both statistical and contextual analysis of MPs responses suggest 
members have different role orientations and actual parliamentary 
duties. Support for these various roles and duties is not random, 
however, and one does not find as many different answers to these 
survey questions as there are MPs-as some members expected there 
would be-but rather three general conclusions can be drawn. First, 
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one finds consistently high support for an interest and desire to be 
involved in policy formulation. Members of Parliament are more 
likely to mention their constituency related activities than any other 
task when describing their parliamentary duties, especially back- 
bencher~, but they do not find it the most appealing aspect of their 
jobs; policy involvement offers the most appeal. Second backbench- 
ers also want far more participation in the parliamentary process, 
and they overwhelmingly suggest that select committee work is prob- 
ably the best avenue available to achieve this goal. Frontbenchers, 
however, protect their policy-shaping monopoly by arguing that 
backbenchers have sufficient participation through party committees 
and the floor of the House. Backbenchers disagree. Third, and per- 
haps most importantly, one detects widespread frustration among 
backbenchers with that which they want to do as MPs, and that 
which is allowed them. If MPs do indeed want more participation, 
more resources, and more maneuverability in Parliament, what then 
are their attitudes toward Parliament and its role in contemporary na- 
tional politics? These issues are explored in the following chapter. 
MPs' Views on 
Parliament and i t s  Role 
The individual member of Parliament has a number of career paths 
available. An MP can be a successful debater, an active committee 
member, a constituency ombudsman, a frontbench spokesperson, or, 
if the constituency allows, a "gentleman legislator." With the excep- 
tion of the latter role, all of these potentially include some policy di- 
mension. One can attempt to influence policy on the floor of the 
House, scrutinize government policy through select committee ser- 
vice, formulate and articulate party policy on the frontbench, and re- 
dress constituents' grievances as well as champion salient issues and 
microsectional interests of the constituency. 
Whatever one might think Parliament's proper role should be in 
national politics, these routes do exist for its members to pursue. Suc- 
cess in securing one of these roles, especially a frontbench position, 
and in performing the necessary related tasks, largely depends on 
the individual. My research indicates that MPs do possess role ori- 
entations with corresponding goals, and that to achieve both, they 
must also adopt the appropriate strategies to secure their desired 
roles and subsequently satisfy their goals in the House. 
But the presence of other mitigating factors-lack of staff and re- 
sources to pursue constituency work, limited access to debate for a 
backbencher, and executive disdain for investigatory committees- 
intervene to hinder an MP's preferred and ideal role-route. As the 
preceding chapter illustrated, there is an apparent gap between the 
roles many members desire to pursue and those that Parliament as an 
institution allows, or at least renders feasible and likely. It is not sur- 
prising that in their interviews several members expressed frustra- 
tion with their perceived inability to pursue their desired career 
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routes in Parliament. This chapter, then, examines members' atti- 
tudes about Parliament's role in influencing national policies and the 
skills they as MPs require to function effectively in this institution. 
Routes in Parliament 
Unlike committees in a transformative legislature, such as the U.S. 
Congress and to some extent the German Bundestag, a committee 
with legislation-drafting and information-taking powers is rare in the 
British House of Commons. In fact, MPs use the term "Hybrid Com- 
mittee" to denote the existence of this seldom-used parliamentary 
committee. Richard Fenno pointed out that members of Congress 
seek committee posts that satisfy their goals in order to secure insti- 
tutional influence or address their particular agendas (Fenno, 1973). 
But in an arena legislature, correspondingly influential committees 
are virtually nonexistent. MPs in the House of Commons do have 
goals, desires, and agendas, but alternative pathways must be pur- 
sued to secure those goals, meet desires, and process agendas. Be- 
cause there is no institutionalized capacity for parliamentary select 
committees to write or introduce legislation and satisfy their goals in 
the same manner as congressional committee members, MPs pursue 
other channels and indeed defend these alternatives, e.g., debate in 
the chamber. 
When I asked members what personal qualities and skills an MP 
needed to be effective, their responses reflected qualities and skills 
necessary to pursue particular routes in Parliament. As Table 7.1 il- 
lustrates, those qualities and skills that correspond to respective par- 
liamentary pursuits received the most responses except for the 
necessity of being generally "hard-working." For example, MPs who 
mentioned verbal and communication skills were generally those 
who stressed Parliament's debating functions and relied upon those 
skills as members of their respective frontbenches. For this group of 
MPs in particular, the chamber was their institutionalized forum and 
avenue for regular policy criticism and defense. Significantly, too, 
frontbench MPs asserted that these skills were increasingly impor- 
tant in communicating with the nation through the media. While 
parliamentary scholars and commentators such as Bagehot have em- 
phasized Parliament's communicative function, many MPs use their 
formal position as members of the institution to gain valuable access 
to the electronic media in order "to be heard." They suggested that no 
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TABLE 7.1. QUALITIES AND SKILLS NEEDED TO BE 
EFFECTIVE AS AN MP 
Question: What personal qualities and skills does a member of Parliament need 
to do an effective job? 
Response All Members of Conservative Labour Non-Select Select 
Parliament Committee Committee 
% (N-84) % (N-41) % (N-38) % (N-24) % (N-60) 
--- - - -
Hard-working 48 40 49 20 47 18 29 7 54 33 
Communication 38 32 37 15 45 17 42 10 37 22 
Interesl/sincerity inconstituency 27 23 22 9 29 11 17 4 32 19 
Instrumental 20 17 29 12 11 4 17 4 22 13 
Expertise 14 12 20 8 11 54 13 3 15 9 
Variety/ 8 7 17 7 0 0 17 4 5 3 
Carve a role 8 7 7 3 1 1 4 2 1 5 3 2  
Objectivity 2 2 5 2 0 0 0 0 3 2  
Independence 2 2 0 0 5 2 8 2 0 0  
one listens in Parliament. As a current minister of state said: "You've 
got to be an exceedingly good communicator. Communication skills 
are absolutely essential in this House and particularly in this country 
today because it is very much making sure you are heard and your 
voice is heard and that you are approachable. It goes beyond the floor 
of the House; you are heard in the press and on the television. So you 
must be good at that and you must not be afraid of communication, 
because if you are you are lost" (Interview, 18 March 1987). 
Other members stressed that being sincere in wanting to assist 
constituents and "taking a genuine interest" in the affairs of the con- 
stituency were necessary qualities to be effective MPs. They were 
also most likely to present themselves as constituency men and 
women. Frontbenchers, whose time and energies are necessarily di- 
rected toward national and party policies, are less likely to interpret 
their jobs as oriented toward constituency affairs. Consequently, they 
are less likely to mention attributes such as "sincerity" and "interest" 
in constituency work as important in performing effectively. One 
indication of this is the low ratio (16.7 percent) of non-select commit- 
tee MPs, many of whom are frontbenchers, who mentioned these 
qualities. Moreover, several backbenchers who did mention these 
qualities and who thought of themselves as constituency men and 
women sought select committee assignments precisely because 
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these posts would assist them in being more effective constituency 
representatives. 
While "expertise" and "specialization" may not usually be con- 
sidered qualities or skills by social scientists, about 15 percent of the 
MPs interviewed mentioned these attributes. These responses ema- 
nated from frontbench spokesmen, select committee chairmen, and 
active junior MPs. What they all had in common were their goals to 
be influential and to be recognized and rewarded for their particular 
expertise. Specialization, they believed, was a necessary ingredient 
in securing desired parliamentary posts and enabled them to be ef- 
fective and influential in these positions. A Conservative chairman of 
one of the more prestigious select committees asserted: "Well, clearly 
it is a question of expertise. There are some members who are gen- 
eralists, but most of them who can make a contribution tend to spe- 
cialize to a greater or lesser extent. It's very difficult for the House to 
take any notice of someone who doesn't specialize at all. To that ex- 
tent, it's probably the select committees that rather brought out that 
aspect. . . . You've really got to get involved if you are going to do the 
job properly" (Interview, 2 Feb. 1987). 
The least frequent responses were those that did not correspond 
to institutionally defined career routes. Members who stressed the 
"jack-of-all-trades" role for MPs mentioned that doing an effective 
job necessitated a variety of skills and qualities, depending on the 
particular duties expected of them at a specific time. They were re- 
luctant to view themselves as either debaters, constituency ombuds- 
men, or committee men and did not pursue any single career route or 
display specific goals. Their task was to assume any one of a myriad 
of roles when the need arose. They thought they did them all. Con- 
sequently, they did not cultivate certain skills nor assert any personal 
qualities associated with specific roles that might have made them ef- 
fective MPs in corresponding career routes. 
While some MPs (8 percent) also mentioned that "carving out a 
role" for oneself led to effectiveness as an MP, they were not neces- 
sarily inclined to offer a preferred role nor the skills necessary to 
achieve it. To them, defining and pursuing any one of a number of 
alternative career routes would lead to job effectiveness. Like those 
MPs who suggested that a variety of skills were required to do the 
variety of tasks incumbent upon an MP, these members also agreed 
that there were alternative roles to pursue in the House. But, unlike 
the former group, these MPs emphasized focusing on one particular 
role. To be effective, one could not be a "jack-of-all-trades" in the 
House of Commons. 
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Perceived Importance of Parliament 
It is apparent that MPs recognize a number of career routes to pursue 
in Parliament. One can choose to pursue any one of these routes or a 
combination thereof because the institution provides at least nominal 
opportunities and expectations to do so. Moreover, the individual 
goals and pursuits of the members also translate into collective action 
of Parliament-as-institution. Parliament may have "declined" in im- 
portance as the "Decline of Parliament" literature of the 1960s and 
1970s suggested. Parliament, too, may have failed, is failing, or will 
fail to live up to the expectations placed upon it by many of its com- 
mentators and observers. But an institution's influence can only de- 
cline if it possesses certain powers and capacities to begin with. It 
fails to meet others' expectations when it apparently is unable or 
unwilling to assert its theoretical and formal powers as identified by 
its critics. 
Men and women who stand for Parliament and win do not want 
to sacrifice their previous careers for admission into an institution in- 
capable of satisfying their individual goals and objectives. Clearly not 
all members can reach all of their goals and objectives in any legis- 
lative institution, but even Parliament provides some opportunities 
for members' goal satisfaction. 
A House of Commons characterized by frontbench elites sup- 
ported by respective amateur, party loyal, part-time backbenchers, 
posed no dilemma for party government or the Westminster Model. 
But serious problems do arise when backbenchers are less likely to 
value strict party loyalty and to pursue activist, full-time legislative 
roles. That they can and do pursue such roles also reflects a changing 
attitude toward Parliament's role in the governing process. Under 
these circumstances, I expected to find support for an assertive role 
for Parliament, albeit with the recognized strictures and concomitant 
frustration imposed by party government and moribund procedures. 
I asked members about their attitudes toward Parliament with 
the following question: "In general, what would you say is the im- 
portance and power of Parliament today?" Table 7.2 gives the re- 
sponses to this open-ended question. With the exception of assisting 
constituents, the six most frequent responses made explicit refer- 
ences to executive-legislative dynamics. Members generally viewed 
Parliament's importance in its relation with the executive, not its 
institution-specific capacities. It is the links with the executive that 
appear to give Parliament its importance and power, not its autono- 
mous role in the governing process. While the Congressional Model 
includes a framework for executive-legislative relationships, there is 
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TABLE 7.2. THE IMPORTANCE AND POWER OF PARLIAMENT 
Question: In general, what would you say is the importance and power o f  Parliament 
today? 
Response All Members of Conservative 
Parliament 
% (N-84) % (N41) 
- -- 
Checkexecutive 45 38 42 21 
Debatelchallenge 44 37 50 16 
Give power to 
executive 21 18 24 8 
Marginal security 17 14 11 9 
Constituency aid 14 12 16 6 
Behind the scenes 12 10 5 8 
Policy for people 11 9 5 5 
Educate public 6 5 8 1 
Value for money 5 4 5 2 
Labour Non-Select 
Committee 
% (N-24) 
-  
21 5 
42 10 
Select 
Committee 
(Nw 
-- 
55 33 
45 23 
also a considerable domain for unilateral congressional activity. The 
Westminster Model, in contrast, is predicated upon a close and sym- 
biotic relationship between the executive and the legislature. Conse- 
quently, one might expect MPs' attitudes about Parliament to reflect 
that institution's relationship with its ascendant executive. 
Members of Parliament, nevertheless, offered two distinct inter- 
pretations of this relationship. Some emphasized Parliament's mon- 
itoring role and others stressed its supportive role. These were also 
mutually exclusive orientations; no one who mentioned checking1 
pressuring the executive or mounting challenges to the executive also 
believed that Parliament's importance and power rested on its ability 
to grant power to the executive. 
As shown in Table 7.2, Parliament's assertive constitutional au- 
thority received considerably more support than any other. Forty-five 
percent of MPs interviewed mentioned Parliament's power in check- 
ing and pressuring the executive. And almost as many mentioned 
mounting challenges to the executive through debates. Neither of 
these functions suggests a passive, supportive role for Parliament, 
but rather one that is responsive, active, and critical. The adversarial 
nature of parliamentary politics suggests that the Opposition party 
will perform these tasks, but my research further indicates that mem- 
bers of all political parties hold these to be important institutional 
powers. A Conservative PPS stated: "With a very large majority as 
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we now have, it [power and influence] is limited. What we do have is 
the power to call, to check the executive in a variety of different 
ways" (Interview, 23 Feb. 1987). A Social Democratic spokesman con- 
curred: "It is its attempt to try to reestablish some control over the 
executive. It is also important to do this procedurally and control the 
abuses of one-party government" (Interview, 3 Feb. 1987). And a 
former Labour home secretary emphasized mounting challenges on 
the floor of the House: "You can still bring down a minister or prime 
minister. Ronald Reagan would be out of office by now; Richard 
Nixon would have fallen much sooner. However, the House made a 
cock-up over M15, though; Mrs. Thatcher should never have been 
able to stand that. But I believe in the adversarial nature and style of 
this place. This is the style which gets ministers on an issue. I 
wouldn't want to lose that" (Interview, 7 July 1987). 
These remarks are representative of the attitudes expressed by 
MPs who emphasized fulfilling the constitutional responsibilities of 
scrutiny and challenge. For them, the formal constitutional obliga- 
tions and opportunities of Parliament as an institution eclipsed Par- 
liament as a forum-providing arena in which political parties do 
battle. The floor of the House may not be an effective avenue to pro- 
duce or alter policy options, but many MPs stress its importance and 
power in holding individual ministers accountable for their respec- 
tive departments' policies as well as forcing the government to an- 
swer charges in emergency debates. MPs were not suggesting that 
policy influence was unimportant to them but rather that Parlia- 
ment's institutional power and importance rested on its ability to cur- 
tail unbridled executive power. 
Ronald Butt concluded that the power of the House came from its 
ability to debate the great issues of the day and ultimately to bring 
down a government (Butt, 1967, 441). During debates on procedural 
reform, MPs have stressed Parliament's role in scrutinizing, influenc- 
ing, and publicizing government activity (HCD 75/76, 902:1051; HC 
588-1, 1978, vii). And Norton has argued that the central function of 
the House is scrutiny; its central role is to be a "watchdog" (Norton, 
1981a, 75). Butt, however, differs from these other observers by 
stressing Parliament's essentially reactive role. Its general function, 
according to Butt, is "to say 'yea' or 'nay' at the end of a process of 
policy rather than to be associated formally in its production." A re- 
versal of this situation "would be fundamentally to change its na- 
ture" (Butt, 1967, 83). Norton, on the other hand, offers a less static 
interpretation of Parliament's power and importance by emphasizing 
the fluidity of the Commons (Norton, 47). Lacking a formal, defini- 
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tive document stipulating the House's functions, Norton asserted, 
the Commons has evolved and continues to evolve as new functions 
are added and others are discarded. 
Members interviewed did indeed indicate a clear preference for 
maintaining the constitutional function of holding the executive ac- 
countable. And although many of them felt the imposition of party 
government and limitations of floor debates hampered them in these 
efforts, in fact they looked to the select committees to fulfill these 
tasks and subsequently bolster Parliament's power and importance in 
the governing process. A Labour whip identified Parliament's impor- 
tance and power this way: "The backbench power. That is why with 
our select committee system, whatever its problems, it's the first time 
we have had a system in which backbenchers can become very, very 
well informed on a particular subject and at the same time oversee 
the power of the executive. It is important that we keep that sys- 
tem. . . . People will say they will not enter a debate because there 
are all these expert backbenchers now. That is true, and I think that 
is good" (Interview 1 April 1987). Other MPs who interpreted Par- 
liament's power and importance in terms of the House's relationship 
with the executive were less optimistic about the institution's ability 
to hold the executive publicly accountable. One in five MPs stated 
that Parliament's power and importance emanated from its role in 
granting power to the executive. They were frustrated by this rela- 
tionship because of the lack of any accompanying reciprocity or re- 
spect from the executive. One left-wing Labour MP remarked: 
"Parliament has power and importance solely because it gives to the 
executive all the power it has to ride rough-shod over the rest of the 
country. Parliament simply gravitates power to the executive" (Inter- 
view, 1 July 1987). And a leader in the Liberal Party made this obser- 
vation: "Parliament is less important today than it once was, and by 
once I really mean that period to World War I, because I think people 
have allowed power to slip more and more into the hands of the ex- 
ecutive, and Parliament itself has become more and more of a talk- 
ing shop. Parliament, if it wanted to, could do something about 
that. That is why I don't despair of it as an institution" (Interview, 
20 Jan. 1987). 
But several MPs did "despair of it as an institution." They con- 
curred that Parliament's power and importance relied upon scrutiniz- 
ing the executive, but they were frustrated by Parliament's inability to 
perform that task adequately. From their perspective, scrutiny of the 
executive was marginal, and often ineffectual and meaningless. Nev- 
ertheless, MPs who served on one of the select committees were far 
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less likely to express this attitude than were those members who had 
no select committee service. The departmentally related select com- 
mittees were created primarily to scrutinize the executive. Accord- 
ingly, less than 12 percent of select committee members said that 
Parliament performed only marginal scrutiny over the executive, 
while almost 30 percent of MPs who had not served on one of the 
committees shared this view. 
Fewer still were the number of MPs who said that Parliament's 
importance and power emanated from "behind the scenes" activity. 
This relatively small number of MPs mentioned primarily their abil- 
ity to speak directly with cabinet ministers as fellow MPs-which 
they all quickly added was missing in congressional politics-who 
would assist them in remedying an especially complicated constitu- 
ency problem with Whitehall. They also mentioned the importance 
of party policy committees in influencing their respective parties' 
policy positions. One right-wing Conservative MP offered this anal- 
ysis: "I think the power is in the party committee systems. When 
Keith Joseph had a grand scheme to make students pay for their uni- 
versity tuition, that education committee, which is only usually at- 
tended by twenty to thirty each week, was suddenly attended by 
about 180, and Keith Joseph had announced that he had dropped his 
plan the following day because of this strength of, the opposition. The 
Foreign Affairs Committee is normally attended by about fifteen 
people, but when we had the Argentinian problem at its height with 
the Falkland Islands and people had the impression that the Foreign 
Office had let us down, there was a packed meeting which roasted 
Lord Carrington, and he resigned the following week. Thirdly, in the 
1922 Committee it was poor Leon Brittan who because of the criti- 
cisms there, he was forced to resign over the Westland thing. So the 
backbenchers do have power when they use it and show strength, 
conviction, and determination. And governments always have to re- 
spond to them. So I would say a lot of power of these MPs is done 
through these party committees" (Interview, 26 March 1967). 
Each of these examples is an illustration of a reaction by party 
members to party policy, however, not a parliamentary initiative to 
shape and influence the nature of government policy. What is more 
important is that so few of the members interviewed mentioned the 
informal, noninstitutionalized, and party dimensions of Parliament's 
influence and power. Despite the presence of informal norms and 
party politics, approximately 90 percent of the MPs interviewed men- 
tioned only Parliament's formal, institutional capabilities when high- 
lighting its power and importance. 
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The remaining responses focused on essentially non- 
executiveAegislative relationships. Members mentioned Parliament's 
ability to redress constituency grievances, pursue policies important 
to constituents, educate the public, and seek "value for money" in 
the administration of government policies. Only MPs who served on 
select committees mentioned Parliament's power and importance in 
these latter three areas. These three responses were also the least- 
often offered and were clearly eclipsed by MPs' larger concerns with 
achieving executive accountability. Bagehot's emphasis on Parlia- 
ment's educative function and prior Procedure Committees' emphasis 
on achieving fiscal economies found little support among MPs. 
Executive Power over the House 
Although more MPs mentioned the importance and power of mon- 
itoring the executive than gave any other response, one cannot con- 
clude that members also thought that Parliament performed this 
particular task better than any other. Just as there was a large gap be- 
tween the job-related tasks MPs thought were important to perform 
and those they were realistically allowed to perform, so too there was 
a similar gap between what members perceived as Parliament's 
power and importance and what it did best. When presented with a 
list of parliamentary tasks, only 6 percent of the MPs selected "mon- 
itoring the government's progress and policies" as the task best per- 
formed by Parliament. (See Table 7.3.) Only select committee 
members chose this option. And despite MPs' stated desire to be in- 
volved in policy-making, only one in ten-all of them select commit- 
tee members-stated that Parliament best performed the task of 
initiating policy. 
Chamber-related activities (i.e., debating and ratifyingldefeating 
government-sponsored legislation) were selected by nearly 80 per- 
cent of the MPs as the tasks best performed by Parliament. While 
debating received more support than any other task, many mem- 
bers were quick to point out that, although Parliament as an institu- 
tion performed this task exceptionally well, debates were generally 
unimportant in affecting policy outcomes or changes. Debating 
may be important for contacting a minister, airing Opposition griev- 
ances, or championing a personal cause, but it is ineffectual in policy 
formation. 
Clearly, Parliament is an arena legislature. It performs the asso- 
ciated tasks of debating quite well. Its formal and institutional power 
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TABLE 7.3. TASKS BEST PERFORMED BY PARLIAMENT 
Question: Which of the following tasks would you say Parliament performs best? 
Response All Members of Conservative Labour Non-Select Select 
Parliament Committee Committee 
% w-84) % W41) % w-38) % m-24) % w-a) 
- --- - -  
Debating 44 37 42 16 42 16 35 8 48 29 
Ratifying/ 
defeating 
Government 35 29 37 14 37 14 58 14 25 15 
legislation 
Initiatingpolicy 10 8 10 4 11 4 0 0 13 8 
Monitoring 
government 6 5 7 3 3 1 0 0 8 5  
Aiding 
constituency 5 4 2 1 8 3 8 2 3 2  
Other 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 1  
and influence rest on its ability to mount a challenge and fulfill its 
constitutional role vis-a-vis the executive on the floor of the House. 
But the opportunity to maintain consistent, day-to-day scrutiny and 
policy involvement appears extremely weak. Activity in the chamber 
is necessary to ratify or defeat proposed legislation, but again this 
provides the House an essentially reactive role. Moreover, while de- 
bates may force governments to defend their policies publicly, insti- 
tutional influence is usually only noticeable on issues of perceived 
critical importance or high political "sex appeal", e.g., entry into the 
EEC, capital punishment, MI5 activities. Salient issues and Question 
Time do draw large numbers to the chamber, but few members attend 
the daily, relatively mundane debates. 
Balance of Power 
Despite the recognition that Parliament does indeed do some things 
quite well, during testimony to the procedure committees consider- 
ing parliamentary reform and the accompanying debates, several 
backbench MPs drew attention to the need to "restore Parliament's 
power," "redress the imbalance" between the executive and the leg- 
islature, and "claw back power it had lost." But were these senti- 
ments shared by other members as well, or were they a reflection of 
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TABLE 7.4. A m E S  TOWARD EXECUTIVE POWER 
Question: Do you think the executive has become too powerful vis-a-vis Parliament in 
recent years? 
Response All Members Conservative Labour Non-Select Select 
of Parliament Committee Committee 
% (N-84) % (N41) % (N-38) % (N-24) % (N-60) 
- --- ----
Yes 76 64 71 29 82 31 71 17 78 47 
No 24 20 29 12 18 7 29 7 22 13 
the frustrations of a minority of MPs? If members' attitudes toward 
the balance of power between the two institutions convey an accep- 
tance of the present arrangement, then presumably MPs either are 
satisfied with their subservient status or perceive no imbalance be- 
tween the two. I hypothesized, however, that there would be a sig- 
nificant difference between what MPs wanted to do in Parliament 
and what Parliament as an institution realistically allowed them to 
do. This turned out to be the case. 
MPs could identify functions that gave Parliament power and 
rendered it important but, given the frustration, dissent, and rebel- 
lion identified by Norton coupled with the entrance of policy- 
interested members, I further presumed that most MPs shared a 
common perception of a too powerful executive. Immediately after 
allowing members to discuss the power and importance of Parlia- 
ment, I asked them, "Do you think the executive has become too 
powerful vis-a-vis Parliament in recent years?" I wished to avoid any 
previous discussion of Parliament's limitations and subservience that 
might color their responses to this question. If anything, MPs might 
be less likely to think the executive was too powerful having just 
recited Parliament's power and importance. Nevertheless, more 
than three-fourths of the MPs said the executive had indeed become 
too powerful. Table 7.4 gives their responses. Labour MPs were 
slightly more likely than Conservatives to respond "yes" to this ques- 
tion, as were select committee members compared to non-committee 
members, but these differences are small. There appears to be wide- 
spread recognition in each group that the executive has become too 
powerful. 
Several MPs volunteered details as to what they thought should 
be done to redress this perceived imbalance. Members who re- 
plied "yes" but did not immediately offer any remedies were then 
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TABLE 7.5. MEANS FOR CHANGING THE EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE 
BALANCE 
Question: What should be done to change the balance between the executive and the 
legislatur.? 
Response All Members of Conservative Labour Non-Select Select 
Parliament Committee Committee 
% (N-84) % (N-41) % (N-38) % (N-U) % (N-60) 
----------
Select 85 55 77 23 90 28 81 13 86 42 
committees 
Professional 
membersof 25 16 30 9 23 7 25 4 29 14 
Parliament 
Specialize1 
scrutiny 14 9 17 5 13 4 13 2 14 7 
Freedom of 
informationact O O 
Change 
parliamentary 6 4 0 0 13 4 13 2 4 2 
system 
Don't know 2 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 2 1  
TABLE 7.6. MPS' VISION OF A FUTURE PARLIAMENT 
Question: How would the Parliament you would like to see a generation from now differ 
from that of today? 
Response All Members of Conservative Labour Non-Select Select 
Parliament Committee Committee 
Morecommittee 49 41 44 18 55 21 54 13 47 
power 
More policy 
involved 
Betterresourres 27 23 27 11 29 11 13 3 33 20 
Better scrutiny 23 19 20 8 29 11 33 8 18 11 
Membership 
changes 
Efficient/ 
rationalized 19 16 24 10 13 5 21 5 18 11 
procedures 
New 
constitutional 13 11 5 2 11 4 4 1 17 10 
settlement 
Less Party 
influence 6 5 7 3 5 2 8 2 5 3  
No change 6 5 7 3 5 2 8 2 5 3  
Don't know 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 1  
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presented with a follow-up question asking them, "What should be 
done to change this imbalance?" Up to this point in the interview I 
had only asked questions about members' roles as MPs and the role 
of Parliament. At no time had I broached the subject of select com- 
mittees. Nevertheless, 85 percent of those MPs who stated that the 
executive had indeed become too powerful mentioned the depart- 
mentally related select committees as a means to restore the proper 
balance between the two institutions. (See Table 7.5.) 
Members who mentioned the contribution select committees 
could make in restoring a balance of power between the executive 
and Parliament were also likely to point out the growth and complex- 
ity of modern government and the relatively low access to informa- 
tion and resources available to MPs. A Labour chairperson of one 
select committee stated: "Departments have grown very strong be- 
cause of the nature of the complex society in which we live. MPs have 
gotten increased resources to deal with it and can get much informa- 
tion through select committee work" (Interview, 8 April 1987). A 
Conservative member of the Public Accounts Committee agreed: 
"Parliament has lost some power. The machine had taken over, partly 
because of the complex world in which we live and the institution's 
inability to cope with scrutiny functions. Select committees are very 
important here. They are here to stay and are much better than the 
Estimates and Expenditure Committees" (Interview, 29 April 1987). 
And a Labour chief whip added: "It has gotten worse since the war. 
Parliament must understand we vote the government money; the 
government does not vote us money! There is increasing disquiet 
on both sides of Parliament. There is a feeling that we cannot speak 
on the government bureaucracy because we do not have the re- 
sources. Select committees are a way to change all this" (Interview, 
12 Feb. 1987). 
The potential role of select committees in reasserting parliamen- 
tary influence also gained considerable support from former and cur- 
rent committee members (Hanson, 1970; Beloff and Peele, 1985; 
Coombes and Walkland, 1980). What is more surprising, however, is 
the ratio of non-select committee members (81 percent) who also 
mentioned select committees as a means to redress the perceived 
parliamentary-executive imbalance. Moreover, some MPs indicated 
that the executive had not become more powerful vis-a-vis Parlia- 
ment precisely because the new select committee system had re- 
stored, or was in the process of restoring, the proper balance of 
power. 
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Future for Parliament 
In addition to the select committees, several members stated that the 
current legislative-executive imbalance could be altered by a corre- 
sponding improvement in the attitudes of MPs toward Parliament 
and parliamentary service. And some also mentioned the need for 
members to specialize in particular policy fields and scrutinize the ex- 
ecutive far more extensively. Shifting attitudes about one's role to in- 
clude more active policy involvement, specialization, and legislative 
scrutiny are all necessary to redress the perceived imbalance as well 
as to ensure that select committees fulfill the expectations and obli- 
gations outlined by the 1978 Procedure Committee Report. 
Most of the questions addressed to members required them to ex- 
press their attitudes and perceptions about Parliament's role as an in- 
stitution and their roles within it. The creation of the new committee 
system in 1979 represented a significant change in parliamentary prac- 
tice and, as members pointed out in interviews, a potential catalyst 
for change in executive-legislative relations. In its 1978 report, the 
Procedure Committee repeatedly expressed the wish that parliamen- 
tary influence would be strengthened, that MPs would want to par- 
ticipate more actively in parliamentary proceedings, and that select 
committees would assist in restoring to Parliament power it had lost. 
Long-serving members noted the relative change in attitudes and 
activities of MPs of twenty to thirty years ago compared to more re- 
cent entrants. The phrase used most often to describe these new 
members was "more professional." And Parliament, veteran MPs as- 
serted, had been transformed by the energy and interests of the new 
recruits. On the one hand, the newest recruits, essentially those en- 
tering the House since 1979, were more apt to express frustration 
with their inability to take on the roles and tasks in Parliament they 
initially hoped to have. In view of the attitudinal change noted by 
many veteran MPs and the newer entrants' frustration with the 
House, all members were asked what further changes they would 
like to see in Parliament. ("How would the Parliament you would like 
to see a generation from now differ from that of today?") This ques- 
tion also allowed MPs to focus on reforms they thought to be impor- 
tant and urgent. Table 7.6 summarizes their responses. 
Given MPs' stated preferences for increased individual involve- 
ment, it is not surprising that the most frequent responses suggest 
that members want a more active role for Parliament in the policy 
process and a general restructuring of the legislative-executive rela- 
tionship. A strengthened select committee system was mentioned 
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more often than any other parliamentary change. One veteran La- 
bour frontbencher said this: "I would like to see more powerful select 
committees, and I would like to see the members be more assertive 
against the executive and exercising their traditional and constitu- 
tional rights" (Interview, 30 June 1987). And a Conservative MP who 
had been in Parliament for twenty-eight years added: "I would like to 
see the select committees take over the powers and process much 
more. They can only convince others and the government that they 
should take over more if they have success and are justified in doing 
so. This is the process they are involved in right now; they are legit- 
imating themselves" (Interview, 18 March 1987). 
This increased policy involvement and better scrutiny of the ex- 
ecutive-tasks usually associated with select committees-received 
strong support from Conservative and Labour MPs and from both se- 
lect committee and non-select committee members. And although 
only one in eight non-select committee members said they would like 
to see better supporting resources, a third of select committee mem- 
bers mentioned this. Perhaps most important, an overwhelming ma- 
jority sought a future legislature actively involved in the legislative 
process. 
Seventy-eight out of eighty-four MPs offered prescriptions that 
would assist in increasing Parliament's institutional role in the gov- 
erning process and reduce the governing party's hegemonic author- 
ity. Perhaps the former cannot realistically be achieved without the 
latter; nor is the government frontbench likely to abdicate willingly 
significant powers and prerogatives to its backbenchers and Opposi- 
tion MPs. 
What does clearly emerge from the interviews, nevertheless, is a 
consistently high expectation of the catalytic role select committees 
are to play in the House of Commons. Members assert that Parlia- 
ment's importance, power, and influence rest on its ability to chal- 
lenge the executive and hold it accountable. But they express 
frustration with an institution whose capacities for performing these 
tasks are eclipsed by its ability to perform well the passive, noncon- 
tributory roles these members lament. A substantial majority of MPs 
stated that the executive had indeed become too strong in disregard 
of the traditional and constitutional rights of the legislature. That this 
has been allowed to occur was blamed on the strength of party ma- 
chines in Parliament, weak backbenchers who secured their personal 
goals by placating party leaders, and the lack of institutionalized par- 
liamentary mechanisms to allow the House to pursue its traditional 
and constitutional roles. 
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Members also asserted, however, that the current executive- 
legislative imbalance could best be corrected by the new select com- 
mittees. One can hope for more "professional MPs" or that more 
members would choose to specialize and scrutinize, but a committee 
system whose task it is to scrutinize and indeed challenge the exec- 
utive must also be available and perceived to be worthwhile. It is to 
this new system that MPs may turn to fulfill their individual goals, 
pursue their respective role-routes, and increase Parliament's insti- 
tutional influence. Increasing select committee powers did, after all, 
receive more "reform-support" than any other reform proposal. The 
next chapter, then, examines in greater detail the way in which MPs 
interpret the significance and role of these select committees for 
themselves and for Parliament. 
MPs' Attitudes on 
1979 Select Committees 
The report of the 1977-78 Select Committee on Procedure had high 
expectations for the new select committees and for the men and 
women who would choose to serve on them. The previous chapter 
highlighted the extent to which members of Parliament also hoped 
these committees would restore a balance of power between the ex- 
ecutive and the legislature and serve as a vehicle for members to 
assume more active and influential roles in the parliamentary pro- 
cess. Select committees, it appears, could potentially assist both in 
asserting the institution's power and influence and in satisfying 
members' goals. 
This chapter focuses on MPs' attitudes toward select committees, 
addressing why some members chose committee service and others 
did not, why some committee members remained on and others left 
their respective committees. Where applicable, comparisons will be 
made between those who chose committee service and those who did 
not. The Procedure Committee in 1978 expressed a desire for a 
normative subculture to develop among committee members. Com- 
parisons between the two groups, therefore, will highlight the dif- 
ferences and similarities in their attitudes toward select committees. 
Why MPs Chose Select Committee Service 
Under the norms and rules of party government, backbenchers are 
expected to play a supporting role for their parties' leaders. Because 
party leaders are the granters of patronage, the authority rests with 
them not only to reward MPs with parliamentary and executive posts 
but also to remove noncooperative members from these positions. 
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Under this model, members of Parliament, particularly backbench- 
ers, are assumed to share common attitudes and demonstrate similar 
behavior about party loyalty and unity that facilitate their appoint- 
ment to preferred positions wherein individual goals can be satisfied. 
Criticism of the positions and policies of one's party leadership un- 
dermine an MP's probability of securing a preferred post through the 
traditional parliamentary patronage process. Criticism on the floor of 
the House, which gains notoriety both in Parliament and in the 
press, is met with even more disdain from the party hierarchy. 
The rationale for the select committee system, however, is pre- 
cisely to scrutinize, monitor, criticize, and publicize executive poli- 
cies. Are members "irrational" in choosing committee service and 
still seeking goal satisfaction? Is there an apparent contradiction be- 
tween criticizing party leaders and seeking patronage positions from 
them? The dynamics of the Westminster Model suggest an affirma- 
tive response to both questions. My research, in contrast, concludes 
that committee membership assists goal satisfaction and, further, that 
committee members may criticize party leaders and realistically still 
expect patronage positions from them. As such, committee service is 
not viewed as an impediment to a future frontbench position. 
Like members of other national legislatures, members of Parlia- 
ment encounter several demands on their limited time, but unlike 
legislators in many other industrialized democracies, they have ac- 
cess to comparatively few resources to assist them in meeting these 
demands. Clearly, select committee service entails yet another con- 
siderable commitment of time and energy from members. Notwith- 
standing the fact that these committees are unable to process or 
introduce legislation as in the U.S. Congress, scores of MPs never- 
theless ask to serve on them. Consequently, I asked select committee 
members why they chose to become members of their respective 
committees. Table 8.1 offers their reasons. 
More than half the members interviewed chose to serve on a 
committee because as backbenchers they would have more influence 
on a select committee than in any other parliamentary forum. They 
said they wanted to participate actively in influencing government 
policies and that select committee service offered this opportunity. 
One Conservative Home Affairs member remarked: "I've had fairly 
strong views and attitudes on issues that come under Home Affairs. 
Remember that I am on the center-right of my party on a number of 
issues-capital punishment, riot control, sentencing-controversies 
I've always been in. . . . Once I realized I was not being considered 
for a ministerial position in the new government, then the answer 
was to look elsewhere for influence. And the select committees pro- 
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TABLE 8.1. REASONS FOR CHOOSING A PARTICULAR COMMI'ITEE 
Question: Can you tell me why you chose to be on the Committee? 
Response All Members of Conservative Labour 
Parliament 
More influence ona 53 32 55 16 54 14 
select committee 
pO1ic~ interesu 53 32 48 14 58 
influence 15 
Had expertise 50 30 45 13 62 16 
Serve constituency 28 
interests 17 24 7 31 8 
Arena to specialize 20 12 21 6 19 5 
Check executive 12 7 3 1 19 5 
Post-ministerial 
role 5 3 3 1 8 2 
Had to 5 3 10 3 0 0 
vide that" (Interview, 27 Feb. 1987). A Labour MP on Health and So- 
cial Services stated: "I was interested in this subject. I did a lot of 
health work on the local authority; there is more interest and influ- 
ence here than on the backbench policy committee" (Interview, 5 
May 1987). And the Conservative chairman of one committee added: 
"A select committee I think is where it is starting to be where the real 
work in Parliament will be done. . . . We had to develop along some 
lines because the business of government was getting ever more com- 
plicated, complex, and technical. And backbenchers as individuals 
were simply making no impression or influence on it at all. So the 
only way to redress that was to have a formal structure to do this" 
(Interview, 23 Feb. 1987). 
These three MPs, along with twenty-nine of their committee col- 
leagues, mentioned their desire to influence national policies, and 
they perceived select committee service as the best means to secure 
this goal. An equal number of MPs, some of whom are in the above 
group, mentioned that they chose to serve on a committee because of 
particular policy interests. These policy interests ranged from devel- 
oping a national energy policy to providing health care for the elderly 
to recommending privately run penitentiaries. When one Conserva- 
tive MP was asked why he chose to be on the Trade and Industry 
Committee, he replied, "Purely devious purposes. I thought there 
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was a case for a detailed inquiry into Britain's trade deficit with the 
E E C  (Interview, 26 March 1987). And, indeed, the select committee 
conducted an inquiry and issued a report on this subject. 
Members of Parliament who offered either of the above responses 
demonstrated a common interest in pursuing an activist role as back- 
bencher~ in the policy process. They were less interested in scruti- 
nizing the management and budgets of their respective committees' 
departments than in influencing the direction and scope of the de- 
partments' policies. Select committee service offered active participa- 
tion in the parliamentary process and a significant departure from 
the essentially reactive backbench role posited by the Westminster 
Model. 
In 1970, Nevi1 Johnson examined the development of the nascent 
select committees from 1966 to 1970. His observations allowed him to 
conclude that "there are no grounds for believing that for most Mem- 
bers their role as a constituency grievance-man has been modified in 
favour of that of committee specialist. In short most Members in- 
volved in the new committee development are simply endeavoring to 
superimpose the extra work on to their existing roles as Members of 
the House" (Johnson, 1970, 240-41). But Johnson's conclusions, at 
least when compared with the post-1979 committee system, raise two 
fundamental problems. First, members indicated in interviews that 
"constituency grievance man" was only one of a handful of roles they 
wished to pursue. In fact, they wished to pursue a policy-influencing 
role by a 5-3 margin over a constituency ombudsman role. Nor is 
there any reason to believe that an MP must give lower priority to 
constituency demands in order to be a committee specialist, as 
Johnson suggests. Second, Johnson's claims that MPs are simply try- 
ing to take on extra work begs the question. Why would members 
choose committee service merely for the sake of more work? My re- 
search indicates that an overwhelming number of MPs (78 percent) 
chose select committee service primarily because it was the most ef- 
fective avenue to achieve the goals they had defined for themselves. 
They were not merely seeking to add to their parliamentary burdens. 
Table 8.1 further shows that half the members interviewed stated 
they went onto their committees because of the expertise they pos- 
sessed in their respective fields. Committee service provided them 
with a more effective forum to use and demonstrate their knowledge. 
Twenty-eight percent indicated that they joined a committee to serve 
constituency interests, and 20 percent thought committee service 
provided the best means to specialize in the House. Members also 
considered their previously acquired expertise and the opportunity 
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to specialize through committee work compatible with their desire to 
serve constituency interests. When asked about choosing committee 
service, one Conservative MP on the Agricultural Committee said: "It 
was solely for constituency reasons. I have a large greenhouse indus- 
try in my constituency, so horticulture was very important to me. I 
knew nothing about it. But being on this committee would allow me 
to learn and specialize in this area so important to my constituency" 
(Interview, 7 April 1987). A Labour MP on the Employment Commit- 
tee stated: "I had been research officer for the General Municipal 
Workers Union. I thought I had a lot to bring to this committee and 
I was interested in it from a broader, constituency point of view, or 
northern region point of view" (Interview, 5 Feb. 1987). 
Members of the Energy Committee and the Employment Com- 
mittee were especially interested in constituency affairs and the spe- 
cialist knowledge obtained through committee service. A Labour 
member of the Energy Committee explained his desire to serve on the 
committee: "There are two things you can do when you get here. 
First, you can be overawed by these demigods. Or, second, you can 
have a go at it. I wanted to get things done. If you want to learn any- 
thing, you go onto a select committee, and if you want to look out for 
interests as I did for my constituency in the energy field, you go onto 
a select committee" (Interview, 25 Feb. 1987). And one of his Conser- 
vative colleagues on the Energy Committee also stressed the constit- 
uency and specialization components of committee work. As a 
Scottish MP, he felt that energy, e.g., North Sea oil, was vital to the 
Scottish economy. Committee service allowed him to acquire exper- 
tise in this field which could be used later to the advantage of his 
constituents. 
Members clearly indicated that they were not eschewing policy 
influence and specialization for constituency service through com- 
mittee work. Rather, some select committees offered opportunities 
for potential policy influence and specialization that were also rele- 
vant to constituency-related issues. The Select Committee on the 
Treasury and Civil Service and the Select Committee on Foreign Af- 
fairs offered no opportunities to serve constituency needs, but were 
important and prestigious policy-oriented committees. Select com- 
mittees that were more likely to address members' constituency in- 
terests were also more likely to have a greater proportion of newer 
entrants. Not coincidentally, during the initial years of parliamentary 
tenure, an MP usually spends more time on constituency affairs and 
grooming the constituency than would be the case after two or three 
successive election victories. 
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TABLE 8.2. LINKS BETWEEN COMMITIEE SERVICE AND 
CONSTITUENCY ACTIVITY 
Question: Does being on this committee have any link to your constituency activity? 
(Amended for non-select committee members: Does being on a committee have any links to 
a member's constituency activity?) 
Response All Members of Conservative Labour 
Parliament 
% (N-84) % (N41) % (N-38) 
-----
Yes 61 51 56 23 63 24 
No 36 30 42 17 32 12 
Possibly 3 3 2 1 5 2  
Non-Select 
Committee 
% (N-24) 
-  
71 17 
25 6 
4 1 
Select 
Committee 
% (N-60) 
-
57 34 
40 24 
3 2 
In order to clarify the possible constituency component of com- 
mittee service, members were also directly asked if select committee 
service had any link to their constituency activities. Non-select com- 
mittee MPs were also asked if they thought committee service had 
any links to committee members' constituency activities. The results 
are summarized in Table 8.2. Although only 28 percent of committee 
members indicated that they joined their respective committees for 
constituency reasons, twice as many members claimed that a link ex- 
isted between their constituency activities and their committee work. 
Unfortunately, the sample of non-select committee MPs is relatively 
small, but there does appear to be a considerable gap between com- 
mittee members and non-committee members on the perceived asso- 
ciation of committee work and constituency activity. Seventy-one 
percent of non-committee members assumed that such a link did ex- 
ist, while only 57 percent of committee members claimed such a link. 
This difference could, of course, be a result of the question itself. 
Non-committee members may have thought of the potential links one 
might encounter on Agriculture, Energy, Employment, or Transport 
and responded affirmatively to the question. And, indeed, members 
of these committees also claimed constituency-committee links, while 
Foreign Affairs and the Treasury and Civil Service committee mem- 
bers claimed no such link for themselves. 
During several private conversations on this research project, 
some British academics were skeptical that any MP would seek com- 
mittee service for constituency reasons or admit any association be- 
tween the two. They claimed that unlike the American Congress, 
"pork-barrel politics" is "an alien feature" to British parliamentary 
life. It is true that select committees do not offer opportunities to draft 
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legislation that protects or promotes members' constituency inter- 
ests. Nevertheless, members can and do pursue inquiries and issue 
reports to influence government policies that affect members' constit- 
uencies. And they also seek committee assignments whose subject 
areas are relevant to their constituents in order to learn, gather ex- 
pertise, and familiarize themselves in these policy fields. Several 
committee members claimed that this service and expertise allowed 
them to be more effective representatives and gave them additional 
competence and respect when pursuing constituency interests on the 
floor of the House, with a minister, or on a party policy committee. 
Alf Dubs, a former Labour member of the Home Affairs Committee, 
stated: "Paradoxically, those people on a select committee are better 
equipped in terms of the familiarity of the subject matter than front- 
bench members whose job it is. And of course that is one of the rea- 
sons people objected to select committees here, because you build up 
a small core of MPs. I understand that, but equally you are building 
up a small core of specialized MPs on any subject there virtually is- 
housing, M15, whatever-and you will have a small core of MPs. So 
if you are going to have specialized MPs, let's have them fully knowl- 
edgeable" (Interview, 14 March 1987). 
Apparently, too, even the Defence Committee was able to meet 
some constituency interests. One MP gave an extraordinary account 
of his committee work and its links with his constituency activity: 
I used it [the committee post] quite shamelessly and quite openly to make 
contacts which would be useful for me in promoting Company A and Com- 
pany B. And I was very much involved in getting contracts and orders for 
Company A. It enabled me to obtain information about the various aircraft 
available, it enabled me to talk to people I would not ordinarily be able to talk 
to about the strengths and merits about the various aircraft. That in itself en- 
abled me to go back to my own firm-it was not a breach of privilege-it just 
opened doors for me. I could go back to the chairman of Company A and 
hear his answers to the queries and come back and promote his particular 
aircraft. . . . The same thing happened over which firm should be given the 
order for System X and was able to find out that Trade and Industry was be- 
having in a way which I did not think was entirely honorable in relation to 
how they looked at Company B, and [I] was able to counter that. I suppose 
that can work against me sometimes as well. But in both those cases, it was 
the first time in decades that Company A actually got an order for an aircraft, 
and it was certainly the first time in fifteen or twenty years that Company B 
has had a significant order for a new-built vessel. [Interview, 11 Feb. 19871 
Apparently there are opportunities for "pork-barrel politics" on non- 
legislation drafting parliamentary select committees. This activity 
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TABLE 8.3. CO-E MEMBERSHIP AS A STEPPING STONE 
Question: Is membership a stepping stone in one's career? 
Response All Members of Conse~ative Labour Non-Select Select 
Parliament Committee Committee 
% (N-84) % (N41) % (N-38) % (N-24) % 0) 
- --- - -- 
Yes 39 33 42 17 40 15 54 13 34 20 
Yes,forothers 25 21 20 8 29 11 NA NA 35 21 
Maybe 10 8 1 0  4 8 3 2 5  2 1 0  6 
No 26 22 29 12 24 9 4 9 22 13 
deviates substantially from the Procedure Committee's intention of 
creating objective, management-monitoring committees. 
For some members of Parliament committees foster specialization 
in particular policy fields, for others such service provides an avenue 
to pursue constituency interests or influence policy, and for still oth- 
ers it may satisfy a combination of these goals. But service on a com- 
mittee may provide other benefits to the individual member's 
parliamentary career. Party leaders have a shared interest in staffing 
their respective frontbenches with competent, knowledgeable men 
and women. Select committees could provide a new training ground 
for aspiring frontbenchers who have been given a forum to demon- 
strate their ability to learn a subject well, develop their inquisitive 
and analytical skills, and suggest new policy initiatives. 
Beloff and Peele reached this same conclusion when they re- 
flected on select committee work in the early 1980s. They noted, 
"Many MPs have found serving on them not merely rewarding in its 
own right, but a means to political advancement" (Beloff and Peele, 
1985, 148). John Golding, former Labour chairman of the Employ- 
ment Committee, refused a frontbench position in favor of retaining 
his committee post. He claimed, nevertheless, that other Labour MPs 
on his committee used their assignments "as an avenue of promotion 
towards the frontbench (Golding, 1984, 32). Select committee ser- 
vice, it appears, may bring rewards to backbenchers as well as party 
leaders. 
I asked both committee members and non-committee members if 
the expertise gained through committee work helped one's political 
career and if membership might indeed be considered a stepping 
stone. Table 8.3 offers their views. The responses from these mem- 
MP Attitudes on 1979 Select Committees 163 
bers suggest that committee service is not perceived as an end in it- 
self. An MP can obtain valuable information and expertise, and he 
can pursue his goals through committee service. But two-thirds of 
committee members interviewed also believed that committee mem- 
bership did indeed serve as a stepping stone in either their own or 
others' parliamentary careers. Conservative and Labour MPs gener- 
ally held similar attitudes. The largest gap emerged between commit- 
tee and non-committee members. A majority of non-committee 
members believed that committee service served as a stepping stone, 
but this was a substantially smaller proportion (54 percent) than for 
committee members (69 percent). Furthermore, non-committee 
members were more divided on this question than committee mem- 
bers and were more likely than committee members to claim that 
membership was not a stepping stone in an MP's parliamentary 
career. 
Non-committee members who held this latter view were primar- 
ily MPs who had been in Parliament for at least fifteen years, had 
never served on any previous select committees, and had not at- 
tained frontbench status. One such Conservative MP remarked: "The 
young ones would see this, but leaders do not see this. Careers are 
created by mishap" (Interview, 30 June 1987). And a Labour MP 
added: "The place to get noticed is still the floor. It is important to 
watch the new intake here" (Interview, 7 May 1987). Members of the 
"new intake," however, complained of the lack of opportunities to be 
noticed on the floor of the House and consistently revealed that they 
came to Parliament "to get things done," with goals and objectives to 
pursue. They too chose the relevant career paths in Parliament to 
meet these goals, which included committee service. Their careers 
were not "mishaps." 
A Conservative chairman of one of the select committees dis- 
agreed with the two MPs quoted above: "Several members of the 
committees have taken on ministerial posts, like Kenneth Baker who 
is now Secretary of State for Education, Freeman who is now junior 
minister at Defence. Yes, it does provide something of a stepping 
stone, particularly in government when you don't have the oppor- 
tunity to make a name for yourself on the floor of the House in Op- 
position" (Interview, 2 Feb. 1987). A former member of the Defence 
Committee who resigned his post to be a Labour whip also disputed 
the claims that party leaders pay little attention to committee mem- 
bers. He said: "It may not have helped mine, but certainly for others. 
You find out the quality of the people from their service on the com- 
mittee and their knowledge, and it is plenty helpful to us in the 
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whip's office. They used to say that being a whip was a route to the 
frontbench, but I think now that has been superseded by the select 
committees" (Interview, 1 April 1987). 
Several committee members stressed the importance of the "spe- 
cialist knowledge" and expertise they gathered from committee ser- 
vice. Specialization, they further asserted, also translated into respect 
from their colleagues. It put them in the limelight on various subjects 
where they were able to display their knowledge and talents before 
party leaders. One Environment Committee member relayed an ac- 
count of gaining recognition outside of Parliament for his expertise 
and committee service: "We've had debates on acid rain, and in one 
by-election [Brecon and Radnor] there was a large debate on acid 
rain. There was a special meeting called and there was a big turnout. 
As a member of the select committee, I was invited and two other 
members of the committee to speak as members of their party. It was 
the first time we ever had to debate publicly our views as developed 
from a select committee" (Interview, 20 Jan. 1987). 
To Stay, Move On, or Never Join? 
By the beginning of the 1986-87 parliamentary session, only 30 of the 
original 148 committee members remained on their respective com- 
mittees. When these members were asked why they stayed on their 
committees, 88 percent (N = 22) mentioned the interesting work they 
engaged in, and an equal number stated that their positions allowed 
them more influence than would otherwise be possible on the back- 
bench, and in several cases junior ministerial positions. (Obviously, 
several members mentioned both.) One Labour chair put it this way: 
"I stayed on because I was chair and our committee has done so 
much work which has been rewarding and important. It is a real 
source of power and influence" (Interview, 8 April 1987). Only one 
committee member claimed he maintained membership because he 
was unable to get dismissed from his committee; there were no back- 
bencher~ from his party in Wales available to replace him on the 
Welsh Affairs committee. 
Clearly, many MPs have left their committee assignments. Gavin 
Drewry reported that during the 1979-83 Parliament eighty-seven of 
the members who had been originally appointed ceased to serve on 
the committees. He observed: "Of these, one died and fifty-three 
were promoted to ministerial posts or the Opposition frontbench. 
Various reasons applied to the remaining thirty-three discharges 
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from the committees-change of party, resignation from Parliament, 
ill health-and disenchantment with the work is mentioned by mon- 
itors in only a few cases" (Drewry, 1985, 325). My interview panel of 
former committee members included those who had served in the 
1979-83 and 1983-87 Parliaments. And as Drewry reported that fifty- 
three committee members (61 percent) in the first Parliament were 
discharged to accept frontbench positions, a similar ratio (66 percent) 
of my interview sample reported the same reasons for leaving com- 
mittee service. (See Table 8.4.) 
Although the sub-samples become quite small when controlling 
for party affiliation, Labour and Conservative MPs left their commit- 
tees to go to their respective frontbenches in equal proportions. Clare 
Short, a Labour member of the Home Affairs Committee before mov- 
ing to the frontbench, described her departure from the committee: "I 
left because I was appointed to the frontbench. I was getting a little 
tired of the Home Affairs committee, and if I hadn't been given a po- 
sition on the frontbench, I wou!d have looked around for a new com- 
mittee. I don't think I would have just come right off and given up on 
them. I wouldn't mind sitting on the Treasury Select Committee. 
Certainly at least that gives you an excellent opportunity to educate 
yourself" (Interview, 27 Jan. 1987). 
I also examined the actual ratios of Conservative and Labour 
committee members who chose frontbench positions over committee 
service from 1979 through the most recently published Sessional Re- 
turns from 1991. These figures are presented in Tables 8.5, 8.6, and 
8.7 and are broken down by year, party, and committee. There is, of 
course, a time lag involved here; one would expect to find that fewer 
members who had served on the 1989-90 select committees had been 
granted frontbench positions in 1989-90 compared to those who had 
served in the early 1980s. Almost half of the members serving the two 
years on several of the committees were chosen by party leaders for 
positions on the government and Opposition frontbenches. The most 
popular committees for sending its members on to the frontbench 
were Employment, Environment, Home Affairs, Scottish Affairs, and 
Treasury and Civil Service. Education reform became a major policy 
topic during Mrs. Thatcher's second term (1983-87), and it is inter- 
esting to note the increased transfer rates from committee service to 
frontbench status during this time for the Select Committee on Edu- 
cation. And whereas members of the Foreign Affairs and Social Ser- 
vices committees left their posts for the frontbench in only modest 
numbers for most of the committees' tenure, during 1987-1990 they 
have had by far the largest ratio of frontbench appointments. 
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TABLE 8.4. REASONS FOR LEAVING A COMMITTEE 
Question: Why did you leave your Committee? 
Response 
Went to 
frontbench 
Sought other post 
Took too much 
time 
Disliked inquiries 
Boycottneft 
Parliament 
All Members of 
Parliament 
% (N-35) 
--
66 23 
9 3 
9 3 
9 3 
9 3 
Conservative 
% (N-14) 
--
71 10 
0 0 
17 1 
14 2 
7 1 
Labour 
% (N-17) 
--
7 1 12 
18 3 
6 1 
6 1 
0 0 
TABLE 8.5. RATIO OF CONSERVATIVE COh4MKEE MEMBERS WHO 
BECAME FRONTBENCHERS, MAY 1979-NOVEMBER 1990 
Select Committee 79/80 80181 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 
-----------
Agriculture 22.2 16.7 10.0 0.0 7.7 8.3 6.3 8.3 6.3 7.7 0.0 
Defence 0.0 0.0 7.1 7.7 9.1 9.1 9.1 8.3 9.1 9.1 15.4 
Education 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 23.1 23.1 25.0 15.4 15.4 16.7 
Employment 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 9.1 9.1 14.3 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Energy 16.7 16.7 8.3 7.7 0.0 0.0 7.7 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Environment 15.4 23.1 16.7 0.0 8.3 7.7 7.7 8.3 9.1 9.1 7.1 
ForeignAffairs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 9.1 8.3 0.0 9.1 18.2 15.4 
Home Affairs 9.1 7.7 8.3 8.3 0.0 9.1 9.1 15.4 0.0 0.0. 0.0 
ScottishAffairs 18.2 16.7 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 * * * 
SocialServices 23.1 17.7 26.3 18.8 15.4 15.4 7.7 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
TradeLndustry 0.0 0.0 10.0 9.9 9.1 7.1 14.3 18.2 16.7 26.7 25.0 
Transportation 9.1 8.3 8.3 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 9.1 
18.2 15.4 7.1 0.0 16.7 9.1 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Service 
WelshAffairs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 9.1 
Sources: House of Commons Sessional Returns, 1980-1990. 
*Following the 1987 election, the Conservatives did so poorly in Scotland that the party did not have 
enough members to staff both this committee and all its frontbench posts relating to Scotland. 
Consequently, this committee was dissolved. 
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TABLE 8.6. RATIO OF LABOUR COMMI'ITEE MEMBERS WHO BECAME 
FRONTBENCHERS, MAY 1979-NOVEMBER 1990 
Select Committee 79/80 80181 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 
-----------
Agriculture 11.1 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.7 8.3 
Defence 9.1 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 9.1 15.4 
Education 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 15.4 23.1 16.7 0.0 7.7 0.0 
Employment 44.4 45.5 36.4 27.3 18.2 18.2 21.4 25.0 9.1 7.7 7.7 
Energy 8.3 8.3 8.3 7.7 20.0 15.4 23.1 15.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Environment 30.8 30.8 16.7 8.3 8.3 15.4 7.7 0.0 0.0 9.1 7.1 
ForeignAffairs 18.2 15.4 23.1 13.3 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 27.3 27.3 23.1 
HomeAffairs 36.4 38.5 25.0 16.7 20.0 18.2 9.1 7.7 0.0 8.3 8.3 
ScottishAffairs 9.1 8.3 8.3 8.3 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 * * * 
SocialServices 46.1 41.2 21.1 25.0 7.7 7.7 7.7 14.3 0.0 8.3 0.0 
Tradebndustry 10.0 18.2 10.0 9.1 9.1 7.1 0.0 0.0 8.3 13.3 16.7 
Transportation 18.2 16.7 8.3 9.1 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 9.1 9.1 
27.3 30.8 21.4 16.7 8.3 9.1 8.3 8.3 18.2 15.4 7.7 Service 
Welsh Affairs 38.5 27.3 30.8 25.0 16.7 18.2 16.7 10.0 0.0 7.7 18.2 
Sources: House of Commons Sessional Returns. 1980-1990. 
'Following the 1987 election, the Conservatives did so poorly in Scotland that the party did not have 
enough members to staff both this committee and all its frontbench posts relating to Scotland. 
Consequently, this committee was dissolved. 
TABLE 8.7. RATIO OF ALL COMMI'ITEE MEMBERS WHO BECAME 
FRONTBENCHERS, MAY 1979-NOVEMBER 1990 
Select Committee 79/80 80181 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 
-----------
Agriculture 
Defence 
Education 
Employment 
Energy 
Environment 
Foreign Affairs 
Home Affairs 
Scottish Affairs 
Social Services 
Traddndustry 
Transportation 
Treasury/Civil 
Service 
WelshAffairs 38.5 27.3 30.8 25.0 16.7 18.2 16.7 10.0 0.0 15.4 27.3 
Sources: House of Commons Sessional Returns. 1980-1990. 
*Following the 1987 election, the Conservatives did so poorly in Scotland that the party did not have 
enough members to staff both this committee and all its frontbench posts relating to Scotland. 
Consequently, this committee was dissolved. 
168 Reform in the House of Commons 
TABLE 8.8. PERCENTAGE OF FRONTBENCHERS WHO HAD SERVED ON 
SELECT COMMITIEES, 1980-1990 
Year Labour % Conservative % Year Labour % Conservative % 
Sources: House of Commons Sessional Returns, 1980-1990. 
TABLE 8.9. PERCENTAGE OF 1983 FRONTBENCHERS WHO HAD 
SERVED ON MONITORING SELECT COhO4lTlTES, 1968-1979 
Year % Year % 
1%8-69 4.4 1 1974 9.56 
1%9-70 2.94 1974-75 13.24 
1970-71 6.62 1975-76 13.24 
1971-72 8.09 1976-77 11.03 
1972-73 5.88 1977-78 11.76 
1973-74 11.03 1978-79 9.56 
Sources: House of Commons Sessional Returns. 1969-1980. 
These figures are, of course, calculated using the total number of 
persons serving on a committee for a particular year, not the number 
of committee positions. So, for example, in 1988-89 the Social Ser- 
vices Committee witnessed several members leaving and being re- 
placed. The committee has only eleven posts, but because of that 
year's high turnover fifteen members of Parliament actually served 
on the committee that year. Six of the fifteen left for the frontbenches 
(40 percent), although there is in fact a possible total of eleven seats, 
for an adjusted ratio of 55 percent. These are extraordinary rates, 
given the often-repeated assumption that committee service could 
marginalize an MP in the House or, worse, be a clear impediment to 
movement up the ministerial ladder. Tables 8.5 and 8.6 also indicate 
that the Conservatives were initially more reluctant than Labour to 
seek committee personnel to people the frontbench. The Conserva- 
tive committee members left their committee posts in greater propor- 
tion than their Labour counterparts on only one committee- 
Agriculture. 
The degree to which the government and Opposition sought 
committee members for leadership positions is further highlighted in 
Table 8.8. This table demonstrates the percentage of the Conservative 
and Labour frontbenches who had served previously on one of the 
departmentally related select committees. Again, it is clear that La- 
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bour initially relied more heavily on committee members for front- 
bench posts than did the Conservatives. From 1980 through 1990, the 
persistent trend for both parties, however, indicates an increased use 
of committee members for both government and Opposition front- 
benches. From the midpoint in Mrs. Thatcher's career as prime min- 
ister to the present, the ratio of committee members making up the 
frontbenches seems to have settled at about a third. From a historical 
perspective, these rates, too, are extraordinary. While Labour and the 
Tories in 1990, after three general elections, would choose over a third 
of their frontbenches from these select committees, I found that in 
1983, after three general elections (1974 counted as one because of 
such low MP turnover from February to October), party leaders 
chose no more than 13 percent of their frontbenches from persons 
who had served on any of the comparable monitoring select commit- 
tees that were the precursors of the 1979 committees. (See Table 8.9.) 
Although movement from committee to frontbench has become 
rather commonplace, transfers from one committee to another are 
rare; members generally appear content with their original commit- 
tee assignments, and although some may wish to go to another com- 
mittee, transfer probability remains low. Several members mentioned 
that they informed the Committee of Selection of their preferred com- 
mittee assignments as well as alternates. The preferred committee as- 
signments invariably corresponded with one of the four great 
departments of state: Treasury, Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Home 
Affairs. One committee clerk informed me that there were over 
eighty applications from committee members and non-members for 
the two vacancies on the Defence Committee in the 1979-83 Parlia- 
ment (Interview, 25 June 1987; Downs, 1985, 52). The Committee of 
Selection, moreover, appears to give some preference to distin- 
guished members of the House. For example, Norman St. John- 
Stevas, who had not been a select committee member and did not 
have a background in Foreign Affairs, was appointed to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee in the 1983-84 session. He was, however, a former 
Leader of the House who had recommended the adoption of most of 
the 1977-78 Procedure Committee Report and persuaded a reluctant 
cabinet to introduce this new committee system. Ian Mikardo, a La- 
bour MP first sent to Parliament in 1945 and serving in his last Par- 
liament in 1984, was granted his request to move from the Trade and 
Industry Committee to the Foreign Affairs Committee. 
A few committee members moved to other parliamentary com- 
mittees or to positions in their parliamentary parties. As one MP ex- 
plained: "I didn't leave to go immediately to the frontbench [his 
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TABLE 8.10. ANNUAL TURNOVER RATES FOR SELECT COMMITI'EES BY 
SESSION, 1979180-1989190 
Select Committee 79/80 80181 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 .87/88 88/89 89/90 
-----------
Agriculture 
Defence 
Education 
Employment 
Energy 
Environment 
Foreign Affairs 
Home Affairs 
Scottish Affairs 
Social Services 
Tramdustry 
Transportation 
Treasury/Civil 
Service 
Welsh Affairs 
Sessional Average 
Sources: House of Commons Sessional Returns. 1980-1991. 
These turnover rates may differ from those offered by Gavin Drewry in New Se-. He 
calculated rates on the basis of turnover for a particular committee "slot." For example, if A was replaced 
by B. who was then replaced by C in one parliamentary session, Drewry counted only one turnover for 
this hypothetical committee. Consequently. person A's "slot" could be replaced five times in one 
session but Drewry would only count one turnover. Since there were in fact two new members and two 
replacements in this example. I counted two turnovers for this session. 
The figures for 1983184 and 1987B8 reflect turnover rates once the committees had been reestablished 
following the 1983 and 1987 general elections. 
"Following the 1987 election, the Conservatives did so poorly in Scotland that the party did not have 
enough members to staff both this committee and all its frontbench posts relating to Scotland. 
Consequently. this committee was dissolved. 
position when interviewed]. The powers that be wanted me on the 
Public Accounts Committee. So I did, because I wanted to serve my 
party the best way I could, and I considered it part of a promotion in 
my political career" (Interview, 4 Feb. 1987). Turnover rates also var- 
ied from committee to committee and from year to year. Table 8.10 
gives the turnover rates in membership for each of the committees in 
each parliamentary session from the committees' creation through 
1990. 
In both the 1979-83 and 1983-87 Parliaments, the combined av- 
erage turnover rates increased with each passing session, with one 
notable exception. During the final session of each Parliament, the 
trends in turnover rates were reversed and rates dropped below those 
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of the two previous years. Only three committees in the first Parlia- 
ment increased their turnover rates from the third session to the 
fourth. And in the second Parliament, only two committees in- 
creased their turnover rates from the third to the fourth session. De- 
spite the obvious trend for turnover rates to increase with each 
passing year in each Parliament, this pattern was reversed during a 
session when a general election was held. 
Electoral concerns may explain this phenomenon. Anticipating a 
general election in the fourth parliamentary session, party leaders 
began to assemble their frontbenches during the third session. This 
maneuver would allow each party to enter the general election cam- 
paign with party spokespersons who had been in their positions for 
at least a year, usually longer. Indeed, many committee members 
who moved to the frontbench did so during the third session of each 
Parliament. This third-year turnover of MPs to the frontbenches 
further highlights the degree to which frontbenches raid select 
committees for personnel and may be further empirical evidence of 
MPs' using committee status as a stepping stone in their parliamen- 
tary careers. 
In the years examined here from the last Parliament (1987-90), 
there was no sudden decline in the turnover rate for the third session; 
however, the prime minister was replaced, and politicians and pun- 
dits alike were unclear when the next general election would now 
take place. But in terms of overall committee stability, this last Par- 
liament also witnessed much lower turnover rates overall. 
The average annual turnover rate also varied by committee, rang- 
ing from 4 percent for the Transportation Committee to 17 percent for 
the Environment and Social Services committees. Table 8.11 ranks 
the fourteen select committees based on their average annual turn- 
over rates. These turnover rates suggest a substantial degree of mem- 
bership stability between committees and over time. Over the eleven- 
year period covered here, eight of the fourteen committees 
experienced average turnover rates within a margin of 6 percentage 
points of one another. In the 1979-83 Parliament, the committees av- 
eraged a yearly membership stability ratio of 86 percent. This figure 
increased slightly in the following Parliament to 89 percent, and in- 
creased slightly again for the third Parliament, to 90 percent. Further- 
more, only four committees had higher turnover rates in the 1983-87 
Parliament than in the 1979-83 Parliament, and only six had higher 
turnovers from the 1987-90 Parliament than the 1983-87 Parliament. 
The overall average turnover rate from 1979 to 1990 was only 12 per- 
cent. The desire of parliamentary reformers that these committees 
172 Reform in the House of Commons 
TABLE 8.1 1. AVERAGE TURNOVER RATES FOR SELECT COMMITIEES 
BY PERCENT OF MEMBERSHIP, 1979-1990 
Committee 11-year 1979-83 1983-87 1987-90 
average % average % average % average % 
Transportation 4 5 5 3 
Education 9 3 13 12 
Treasury/Civil 
Service 10 11 
Defence 
Welsh Affairs 
Foreign Affairs 
Home Affairs 
Tmde/Industry 
Employment 
Energy 
Scottish Affairs 
Agriculture 
Social Services 
Environment 
Committees' 
Average 
Sources: House of Commons Sessional Returns, 1980-1991. 
*Following the 1987 election, the Conservatives did so poorly in Scotland that the party 
did not have enough members to staff both this committee and all its frontbench posts 
relating to Scotland. Consequently, this committee was dissolved. 
would have low membership turnover and maintain a high level of 
continuity from year to year apparently has been borne out. Select 
committees may indeed be "settling in," as MPs remarked, and if the 
trend continues they may witness even lower turnover rates in the 
current Parliament, following the 1992 general election. 
Although the select committees may provide an alternative ca- 
reer structure for many members, promotion to the frontbench usu- 
ally entails more power and influence within the House as well. 
From a career perspective, committees may not replace the front- 
bench as a source of influence, but they are the appropriate avenue 
early in one's career to satisfy the twin goals of involvement and in- 
fluence, which can be continued and extended subsequently on the 
frontbench. Because committee membership is incompatible with a 
position on the frontbench, elevation to the frontbench also necessi- 
tates removal from a select committee. Members were asked if most 
MPs, given a choice between a frontbench position and remaining a 
MP Attitudes on 1979 Select Committees 173 
TABLE 8.12. PERCEIVED WILLINGNESS OF OTHER COMh4IlTEE 
MEMBERS TO MOVE TO THE FRONTBENCH 
Question: Is it true that almost anyone offered a position on the frontbench would be 
willing to relinquish a select committee post? 
Response All Members of Conservative 
Parliament 
% (N-84) % (N41) 
- -- 
Yes 96 81 100 41 
Unsure 2 2 0 0  
Labour Non-Select Select 
Committee Committee 
% (N-38) % (N-24) % (N-60) 
- - -
TABLE 8.13. WILLINGNESS OF INTERVIEWED COMMI'ITEE MEMBER TO 
MOVE TO THE FRONTBENCH 
Question: Would you be willing to relinquish your select committee assignment for a 
position on your frontbench? (Amended for non-select committee members: If you were a 
select committee member, would you be willing.. .?) 
Response All Members of Conservative Labour Non-Select Select 
Parliament Committee Committee 
% (N-84) % (Nrl-41) % (N-38) % (N-24) % (N-60) 
- - - - -  
Yes 61 51 63 26 61 23 75 18 55 33 
No 26 22 29 12 26 10 8 2 33 20 
Unsure 13 11 7 3 13 5 17 4 12 7 
committee member, would relinquish their select committee posts. 
Ninety-six percent believed that most committee members would 
choose the frontbench position. (See Table 8.12.) Again, this evidence 
suggests that while MPs who adopted an activist role for themselves 
initially chose committee service, they would accept a frontbench 
post to extend their power and influence in, for example, constitu- 
ency affairs and/or particular policy domains. All but three of eighty- 
four MPs believed most members would be willing to relinquish a 
select committee assignment for the frontbench. 
But in a follow-up question, I asked each MP if he or she would 
be willing to change status in their own case. As Table 8.13 demon- 
strates, these results are somewhat different. Again party affiliation 
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TABLE 8.14. REASONS FOR NOT CHOOSING COMMI'ITEE MEMBERSHIP 
Question: Can you tell me why you did not choose to be on a select committee? 
Response 
Other parliamentary1 
Party Post 
Unable to be placed 
Other committee work 
Constituency 
obligations 
Oppose select 
committees 
All Members of Conse~ative Labour 
Parliament 
did not account for any differentiation in members' responses. 
Whereas all Conservative MPs and nearly all Labour MPs believed 
most committee members would relinquish their posts, more than a 
quarter in each party said they themselves would not be willing to 
abandon their committee assignments for positions on the front- 
benches. Furthermore, whereas three-fourths of non-committee 
members thought they would give up their committee posts in this 
hypothetical scenario, only slightly more than half the committee 
members were certain they would do the same. Newer entrants were 
far more likely to give up their committee posts than were those with 
more than ten years in the House. The latter were especially unin- 
terested in exchanging their committee posts for junior ministerial 
positions. Most of these members recognized that the ministerial ba- 
ton would not be passed to them at this stage of their careers. For the 
newerlyounger cohort, however, committee status was indeed per- 
ceived as a first rung on the ladder of influence. This was the forum 
in which to be active, recognized, and rewarded by party leaders. A 
Conservative committeeman who had just been elected chairman of 
his committee said: "I would not take a junior job now. I would not be 
offered one in this administration, but I may be in the next one. It 
would have to be a pretty senior one for me to give up my power 
base, as it were. I wish I were in cabinet, but I am not considered one 
of 'us' [a Thatcherite Tory]. I would not take an undersecretary's job 
now because it is down in the pecking order from what I've got now. 
It is very much so a different parliamentary career path rather than 
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just sitting on the backbench (Interview, 23 Feb. 1987). Another 
Conservative MP from the Social Services Committee reflected the 
views of many new entrants who would relinquish their committee 
posts: "If you want to influence decisions and you are a good admin- 
istrator and the kind of person you feel safe with in making decisions, 
then clearly you want to get into the machine. The only way to get 
into the machine at the moment is to be in government" (Interview, 
30 Jan. 1987). 
The 1987 general election interrupted the final stages of my re- 
search, and consequently several MPs who had agreed to be inter- 
viewed either stood down from Parliament or had to cancel 
appointments due to reelection demands. I was, however, able to in- 
terview two dozen non-committee members whose views and atti- 
tudes have been included and summarized throughout this project. 
These members were asked why they did not request to be placed on 
a select committee. A few were current frontbenchers who were un- 
able to hold both positions and were unlikely to give up those lead- 
ership positions to move to a select committee. But their attitudes 
about Parliament and select committees were equally relevant and 
were consequently included in my survey. Table 8.14 offers the rea- 
sons why these MPs did not join a select committee. 
Nearly a third of these members actually wanted to be on a com- 
mittee; they viewed committees as the appropriate arenas in which to 
pursue their interests. But the number of positions available is finite, 
and there were no slots available for them. They were unable to be 
placed. Most of the remaining MPs in this cohort were unable to pur- 
sue committee service because their positions and time commitments 
lay elsewhere. Only two MPs, one right-wing Conservative and one 
left-wing Labour, opposed the committees on principle. The Conser- 
vative MP stated: "I don't believe in them, except those committees 
which have something specifically to do with the House itself-PAC, 
Procedure and the like. I am on the Procedure Committee. The de- 
partmental committees don't do anything in relation to the expecta- 
tions they had. They were founded on a constitutional myth and 
misconception; those that supported it thought they would emulate 
the American system, and you can't" (Interview, 30 June 1987). Ac- 
tually, the Procedure Committee's Report was quite specific that 
American-style congressional committees were not to be the model 
for the proposed select committees. The Labour MP added: "I was 
never on because they just mirror this place. I want to see them more 
adversarial. I believe in adversarial politics" (Interview, 15 Feb. 1987). 
On the other hand, frontbench MPs indicated that they would likely 
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request committee posts upon returning to the backbench. Some 
members, however, also viewed committees as forums primarily for 
the new entrants. A former home secretary offered this response: "I 
have been on the frontbench for many years. When I left the front- 
bench a couple years ago, I decided to spend quite a bit of time pur- 
suing other things that are important to me, and I do that by being 
active on other committees in the House. If I were a younger man, I 
think I would go on one of these committees. Younger members like 
being on the select committees. As the intakes change, the House 
will change. Local councillors come here and sit on the backbench 
with nothing to do" (Interview, 7 June 1987). 
The former home secretary was correct; younger members do 
seem to enjoy being on a select committee. They certainly prefer it to 
sitting on the backbench waiting for an opportunity to speak on the 
floor of the House or on a standing committee where the proposed 
government legislation is approved usually without amendments. 
But committee service also provides opportunities for mid-career 
MPs who consistently have been passed over for frontbench appoint- 
ments. It still offers them participatory routes, a degree of policy 
influence, the means to acquire or use expertise in a given field, and 
of course a complementary avenue by which to pursue constituency 
interests. 
The decision to choose committee service is not taken lightly. A 
member of Parliament will be expected to commit a substantial 
amount of personal and parliamentary time to select committee ser- 
vice. Not all inquiries are equally interesting, nor are the technical 
aspects easy to grasp. One must weigh the potential benefits of spe- 
cialization and recognition with the possible risks involved in criti- 
cizing party policy. Most members believed that deviation from "the 
party line" in committee was acceptable to and understood by party 
leaders. 
The Thatcher government, however, had several confrontations 
with the committees, their reports, and their powers. The prime min- 
ister's personal opposition to the new committees was widely ac- 
knowledged. Nevertheless, excluding secretaries of state, more than 
40 percent of the members of her third government, formed after the 
1987 general election, had been active members of the new select 
committee system. None of the members interviewed-whether La- 
bour, Conservative, Liberal, Social Democrat, or Ulster Unionist, 
backbench or frontbench, left or right-mentioned that some com- 
mittee members might be coopted to the frontbench. And, in fact, 
there are several Conservative committee members who have been 
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much more troublesome and effective in their opposition to current 
Conservative policies and who have had prior government experi- 
ence but who have been consistently ignored for promotion to the 
frontbench. The Thatcher government did not gain a reputation for 
coopting either committee or non-committee members. John Major's 
stance on select committees was as unclear as hers on many policy 
issues until the dissolution of Parliament and the general election 
campaign in spring 1992, which forced him to enunciate more clearly 
his government's policy position. He was further hindered by the po- 
litical reality of being thrust into the post of prime minister near the 
twilight of a Parliament, with a general election necessarily looming. 
Moreover, his party lagged Labour in most opinion polls, and he did 
not welcome further criticisms of his party's policies from parliamen- 
tary investigatory committees. 
Committee service not only assists in achieving members' goals 
but apparently may be a stepping stone as well. Despite the numbers 
who have gone on to frontbench posts, the annual average committee 
turnover remains low. Clearly, committee service must be rewarding 
to a majority of the members. In the next chapter I examine the ways 
in which committee members have found committee service reward- 
ing, how they describe their jobs and tasks as committee members, 
the qualities and skills they believe are necessary to be effective com- 
mittee men and women, and the role they believe committees now 
play in the parliamentary process and their hopes for the future. 
MPs on Select Committee 
Roles and Rewards 
The previous two chapters highlighted members' attitudes toward 
Parliament and toward their roles as members of Parliament. They 
also addressed why these MPs did or did not join a select committee 
and, if they did join, why they stayed or chose to leave. The duties 
and tasks of a committee member, however, differ substantially from 
those associated with the chamber-related activities noted in chapter 
6. Committee members need to specialize in a subject area, whereas 
on the floor of the House an MP may be expected to move adroitly 
from one subject to another as debate progresses. In debate, an MP's 
oratorical skills are crucial; in committee they are pointless. Ques- 
tions raised in chamber serve to score debating points or embarrass 
the opposition. In committee they are probing, sustained, and usu- 
ally-but not always-nonconfrontational. 
Both committee and chamber-oriented MPs consistently claimed 
that Parliament played a crucial role in holding the executive ac- 
countable for its policies. They differed, however, on the appropriate 
arena in which this institutional role should be performed. Because 
the activities in the two arenas are different from one another, I ex- 
pected to find different attitudes from committee members about 
their committee jobs and committees' role compared to those associ- 
ated with the parent chamber. 
This chapter, then, addresses the qualities and skills that MPs as- 
sume are important to be effective committee members, how mem- 
bers define their committee jobs, and how they perceive the role of 
select committees in the parliamentary process. Despite the limita- 
tions imposed on the power of committees to introduce legislation, to 
force a government to change policies, or even to ensure that reports 
are debated by the House, members still choose to serve. Conse- 
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TABLE 9.1. QUALITIES AND SKILLS NEEDED TO BE AN EFFECTIVE 
COMMITTEE MEMBER 
Question: What personal qualities and skills should someone have to be an effective select 
committee mernbef? 
Response All Members of Conservative Labour Non-Select Select 
Parliament Committee Committee 
s m-78) % w-37) % m-36) % (N-18) w ma) 
- - ------
Dedication 65 51 65 24 64 23 50 9 70 42 
Master detail 51 40 49 18 53 19 56 10 50 30 
Patience 31 24 31 12 28 10 22 4 34 20 
Goodquestioner 28 22 35 13 22 8 11 2 34 20 
Reachconsensus 13 10 16 6 11 4 17 3 12 7 
Independence 3 2 0 0 8 3 1 1 2 2 1  
quently, I examine why members find committee service rewarding, 
and whether further involvement in Parliament and access to debates 
stem from a member's committee position. 
Committee Members' Skills 
For an effective committee member, the skills nurtured for use in the 
chamber may have little bearing in the more intimate confines of a 
committee room. If indeed these arenas operate under different sets 
of parliamentary dynamics, the responses of MPs when asked what 
qualities and skills are important to be an effective MP should bear 
little similarity to those needed to be an effective committee member. 
Whereas members stressed the skills associated with different career 
routes in the former question, they were forced by the latter to con- 
sider those particular skills corresponding to a specific role route. 
Table 9.1 summarizes their responses. 
These qualities and skills are indeed quite different from those 
summarized in Table 7.1. When speaking about the job in Parliament 
generally, members did not stress mastering detailed material, toler- 
ance and patience, pursuing sustained questioning, or striving for 
consensus. None of these are particularly relevant to the chamber, 
but they are essential in committee. Earlier scholars who analyzed 
Parliament and its members often wrote authoritatively about the 
centrality of the chamber and the generalist nature of the members. 
On the skills necessary to be an effective MP, Jean Blonde1 wrote: 
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"They are Jack-of-all-trades, knowing a little of everything but really 
nothing in particular. . . . They must be able to grasp quickly the 
main points of a question with which they are not familiar. Moreover, 
they must have other talents: they must be able to argue a case in a 
debate with some cogency, they must be able to retort quickly and see 
the flaw in the other man's argument" (Blondel, 1965, 131). 
These "talents" employed in the thrust and parry of debate re- 
ceived no recognition as important qualities and skills for committee 
service. Most MPs (85 percent) said that dedication to committee ser- 
vice was an important quality. While Conservative and Labour MPs 
appear to give proportionately equal support to this particular qual- 
ity, there is a substantial difference between committee members and 
non-committee members. Moreover, members stressed dedication as 
needed for committee work, in contrast to their responses when 
asked about the necessary skills and qualities to be an effective MI? 
Those who stressed dedication emphasized the importance of "put- 
ting in a full day's work  because the era of part-time, amateur leg- 
islators was over. Those who mentioned dedication in response to the 
select committee question emphasized that one needed to be persis- 
tent during the inquiries and maintain attendance. One Labour 
chairperson remarked: "You must be interested and you must be 
willing to give up a lot of time elsewhere in the House. It entails a lot 
of traveling. You must be willing to give up other work  (Interview, 8 
April 1987). And a Conservative chairman added: "You must do a lot 
of preparation and be prepared to do hard work. . . . Our committee 
has attendance rates three times that of most. . . . People have 
started to get the idea since 1979 that by working together we turn 
the whole process into a much more constructive one" (Interview, 
23 Feb. 1987). 
A corollary to the dedication expected from committee members 
is the commitment and ability to master the technical and complex 
issues of successive inquiries. A committee member has access to 
technical and specialized information unavailable to non-committee 
backbenchers, and indeed he or she may benefit from this informa- 
tion access merely through sustained committee attendance. But an 
informal norm of active participation has emerged on the select com- 
mittees. Members are expected by their committee colleagues to mas- 
ter the detailed testimony, briefs, and memoranda supplied by 
committee witnesses. 
Some members expressed frustration with fellow members who 
did not meet these expectations. In a few cases, committee members 
from the slaggard's political party have attempted to have the inac- 
tive member dismissed from the committee by appealing to their 
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whips to offer him or her another post or enticement. Mastery of de- 
tail and active participation are not expected from backbenchers on 
the floor of the House, nor are they rewarded in a chamber arena for 
these pursuits. In the congressional model, the legislature is able to 
maintain its policy-making role precisely because of the division of 
labor through committees and subcommittees. The norms of defer- 
ence, trust, and reciprocity are maintained only when all members 
and party leaders are secure in the knowledge that all legislators are 
adequately performing the rigorous work of committee service. Like- 
wise for a select committee, its corporate influence can only be max- 
imized if all its members are committed and dedicated during the 
complicated technical inquiries they must also pursue. 
Approximately one-third of committee members, as opposed to 
only 11 percent of non-committee members, also stated that the "art 
of questioning" was an important skill to cultivate. In order to be ef- 
fective at this task, it is also necessary for a member to become suf- 
ficiently prepared in the technical merits of the inquiry. Whereas an 
MP may be allowed a single question and a follow-up on the floor of 
the House, where one is expected to think on one's feet and score 
political points, a member in committee may ask a series of questions 
and must be prepared to react with several questions as new infor- 
mation or issues arise during oral testimony from a committee wit- 
ness. As many committee members noted, and any observer of 
committee hearings will attest, it is an entirely different form of ques- 
tioning than what takes place in the chamber. 
Barristers, in particular, stressed the need to be skilled in ques- 
tioning. A Labour MP and former barrister on the Welsh Affairs 
Committee explained it this way: "A barrister's training is I think in- 
credibly important. You develop the cross-examination techniques 
necessary for a select committee. You learn you can give ministers too 
much rope and they hang themselves" (Interview, 3 Feb. 1987). A 
Liberal member of the Treasury and Civil Service Committee who 
was not a barrister nevertheless agreed: "Since the House is on the 
adversarial basis, not many MPs, unless they have been lawyers, 
have calculated the art of questioning, because that is not really how 
the House of Commons proceeds. I hope the strength of the select 
committees will be attracting to this place a new breed of member 
who is versed in the art of questioning. It has been one of the failures 
of the select committees that far too many of the members of the se- 
lect committees in my opinion don't realize the questioning impor- 
tance and tend to throw political sermons to persons they really 
ought to be probing. And that's going to take time to improve" (In- 
terview, 3 Feb. 1987). 
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Several committee members did indeed mention that questioning 
skills needed to be improved, but they also noted that committee 
members have continued to develop these skills since 1979. Members 
who first joined their committees in that year mentioned that they 
and many of their colleagues had had little experience in this type of 
forum and that probing and questioning during evidence-giving ses- 
sions was weak and less effective in these early committee years com- 
pared to recent committee inquiries. A Conservative member of the 
Energy Committee stated: "The ability to get information from peo- 
ple in a public arena is an important skill. My training as a barrister 
certainly helped. When I first went on, we were each allowed two 
questions, which meant we asked rather bland, informative type 
questions, but we could not sustain a line of questioning. But over 
the course of time, the committee has learned to fulfill this role" (In- 
terview, 25 Feb. 1987). 
The two other qualities and skills that members often mentioned 
were associated with maintaining a nonadversarial, collegial atmo- 
sphere on each committee. A third of committee members stressed 
the importance of being tolerant and patient with fellow members 
and, at times, with the pace of a particular inquiry. Approximately 
one in eight committee members mentioned the ability or willingness 
to strive for consensus in all the committees' proceedings. Members 
viewed the chamber, not the select committees, as the appropriate 
arena for partisan and ideological debate. 
Committees gained respect and recognition precisely because 
their proceedings were not guided by party political sentiments nor 
did they necessarily reflect the attitudes of the majority party mem- 
bers. Those few members who did choose committee work to pursue 
their parties' or their own political philosophies were soon discour- 
aged with committee service and returned to their pre-committee 
backbench positions. The message early on to civil servants, minis- 
ters, and other members was clear; committees are to be consensual, 
not adversarial. They are to investigate and to issue recommenda- 
tions, not to harangue ideologically opposed witnesses and merely 
repeat the party line. That does not mean, of course, that committee 
members are not aggressive questioners. 
The Role of Select Committees 
Members' assessments of the necessary skills and qualities of an ef- 
fective committee member differed from and presented a more spe- 
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TABLE 9.2. THE ROLE OF COMMlTIEES IN PARLIAMENT 
Question: In general, what is the role of these select committees in Padiament? 
Response All Members of Conservative Labour Non-Select Select 
Parliament Committee Committee 
% (N-84) % (N-41) % (N-38) % (N-24) % (N-60) 
----------
Monitor 81 68 81 33 79 30 83 20 80 48 
executive 
Bipartisan 55 46 59 24 50 19 25 6 67 40 
recommendations 
Buildbackbench 17 14 15 6 21 8 17 4 17 10 
specialists 
supply 1 1 9 7 3 1 6 6 8 2 1 2 7  
information 
Value formoney 10 8 10 4 8 3 0 0 13 8 
Topicalinquires 8 7 7 3 11 4 0 0 12 7 
Very limited 8 7 1 0 4 8 3 2 9 7 0 0  
cific orientation than their assessments of the skills and qualities 
necessary of an effective member of Parliament. Members may pur- 
sue alternative avenues of activity in Parliament that require different 
skills. As one of the available avenues, committee service necessitates 
certain arena-specific skills. And just as members perceived 
chamber-oriented skills to be different from committee skills, I ex- 
pected members to interpret the role of select committees, as a sub- 
unit of the parent chamber, differently from the role of Parliament 
generally. Members' responses to the role of select committees are 
summarized in Table 9.2. 
When members were asked to assess the power and importance 
of Parliament, the most frequent response they offered was that it 
was to check the executive. Similarly, when asked about the role of 
the select committees, more than 80 percent saw it as to monitor and 
scrutinize the executive. But Parliament's role in checking the exec- 
utive was usually defined by mounting challenges and debates on 
the floor of the House. The government dominates the proceedings 
and the House's agenda in this adversarial forum, and its policies are 
rarely influenced through Opposition and backbench speeches. 
In committee, however, backbenchers representing all political 
parties choose the subjects of their inquiries, spend as much time as 
they believe they need to examine current policies, gain access to 
184 Reform in the House of Commons 
more sources of information, and usually produce unanimous, bipar- 
tisan policy recommendations to influence government decisions. 
The role focus of Parliament in general and the select committees spe- 
cifically are similar, but the style and manner in which they pursue 
the checkinglmonitoring role differ substantially. Moreover, there is 
widespread agreement among Conservative and Labour MPs on the 
appropriate roles of Parliament and select committees. 
Kevin McNamara, a former member of the Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee and an Opposition spokesman for Defence when interviewed, 
stated: "They [the committees] are here to stay. They have achieved a 
remarkable victory in not allowing Margaret Thatcher to get the 
changes she wanted after Westland. I want to see them extended. 
They do the work of looking into options and means of policies. We 
should know the criteria of policy decisions" (Interview, 18 Nov. 
1987). And a long-serving Labour MP added: "They are to monitor, 
scrutinize government policies. We must claw back power from the 
executive" (Interview, 25 Feb. 1987). 
When members spoke of monitoring the executive through com- 
mittee service, they indicated that their actions often influenced the 
government's decision. They were able to be influential, several 
members claimed, because they produced bipartisan recommenda- 
tions and authoritative information. Scholars and MPs have sug- 
gested that an important role of the committees is the creation of 
informed public debate and a contribution to the environment of 
public appraisal and criticism (Price, 1986, 14; Walkland, 1979a, 253). 
While two-thirds of select committee members noted the importance 
of bipartisan recommendations, only a quarter of non-committee 
members mentioned this. Committee members recognized that their 
consensus approach and varied sources of information were key 
components in influencing and monitoring government policies. 
This nontraditional approach to parliamentary dynamics in the 
House worked best for MPs in committee. In order to satisfy their 
goals, meet the Procedure Committee's expectations, and undertake 
the activities the House entrusted to them, it would be absolutely in- 
appropriate to adopt the norms and dynamics of the chamber. As 
champions of adversarial politics, non-select committee frontbench- 
ers may have wanted the select committees to adopt another forum 
that would emphasize the parties' divide. But again committee mem- 
bers regarded this role from the beginning as inconsistent with their 
views on the role of committees and the role they, as committee 
members, wished to pursue. 
One Conservative committee member who was a former minister 
remarked: "The power of these select committees is being held in 
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public and their influence on the public and ministers. But also de- 
bated reports help. And based on bipartisan reports in debate, I have 
voted against the government. . . . Most importantly, it is fulfilling 
one of the traditional roles of Parliament: to monitor the executive. It 
brings to the fore matters of national importance-things that don't 
otherwise get a chance to get to the fore in such a complicated world" 
(Interview, 24 March 1987). And a Labour committee member agreed: 
"It is focus of information. You get the public to address themselves 
to many new and different issues. It is an attack on the executive's 
monopoly of expertise and justifications for policies" (Interview, 4 
Feb. 1987). An Opposition spokesman who had not served on a com- 
mittee also supported these committee members' observations: 
"They are a much more effective check on the executive. It gives 
higher information process and access for Parliament in general. Out- 
siders who testify also see Parliament working and dealing with a 
problem. This is important for legitimacy" (Interview, 22 June 1987). 
Although most members said they were able to acquire policy 
specialization and expertise through their inquiries, only 17 percent 
indicated that the role of select committees was specifically to create 
backbench specialists. And while the Procedure Committee hoped 
that information access would allow committees to examine the cost- 
effectiveness ("value for money") of government policies, only 13 per- 
cent of committee members interpreted this as a committee's role. 
Both committee members and committee clerks stated that commit- 
tees were far less interested in pursuing expenditure-oriented inquir- 
ies than in investigating and recommending policies. Examining the 
costs of policies appeared boring and uninteresting to most mem- 
bers. They preferred examining the merits and implications of vari- 
ous policies. Members recognized that they could not actually force 
government to alter its policies or adopt all their recommendations. 
They did believe, however, that their bipartisan approach to policy 
issues, the creation of a corps of knowledgeable and informed MPs, 
and their access to various information sources enabled them to mon- 
itor the government more effectively and influence the climate of 
opinion in which policy decisions were made. Governments would 
find it much more difficult to defend policies in the House and in the 
press when unanimous, bipartisan House of Commons reports con- 
tradicted government policy. 
Party ideologues who left their committees frustrated because 
they could not pursue their partisan agendas agreed that select 
committees played some role for Parliament and its members. In fact, 
every committee member interviewed mentioned some positive role 
for these committees. Non-committee members, however, were not 
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unanimously optimistic in their appraisal of the committees; 29 per- 
cent said that select committees played a very small role, or none at 
all, in Parliament. One Conservative MP, who opposed select com- 
mittees because he believed they were founded on a constitutional 
myth, stated: "They are there just to criticize. They can't have real 
power. They can probe more deeply than on the floor, but it is in a 
narrow part of the whole concept. It is really just an extension of 
Question Time, which is pretty worthless" (Interview, 30 June 1987). 
Another Conservative MP expressed disappointment with the com- 
mittees because they did not sufficiently assert their political powers: 
"They are disappointing. I wanted them to keep ministers on their 
toes. They should be called in three or four times a month. This 
would allow us to develop a House view on a subject. They have not; 
they have instead developed a Royal Commission type of inquiry, or 
else a quick short inquiry. They have missed the middle, admittedly 
boring, part" (Interview, 30 June 1987). 
The Job of a Select Committee Member 
During the interviews, select committee members pointed out that 
they chose committee service in order to influence government pol- 
icies. From their committee experience they concluded that for mem- 
bers to be effective they needed to be dedicated, tolerant, and 
consensus-oriented. Furthermore, members should master detailed 
testimony and the art of sustained and probing questioning. If they 
cultivated these skills, committee members believed they would 
achieve their goals of policy influence and would fulfill the select 
committees' roles summarized in Table 9.2. 
When members were asked to describe their jobs as members of 
select committees, their responses reflected job orientations that 
would facilitate fulfilling the role expectation of the committees as de- 
fined by committee members. But their descriptions of their jobs as 
MPs (as shown in Table 6.2) again differed from their perceptions 
about their jobs as committee members. (See Table 9.3.) When com- 
mittee members described their jobs as MPs, 70 percent mentioned 
their constituency duties. Despite the links between constituency 
and committee activities that many members said existed, no one re- 
ferred to any component of constituency work when describing their 
roles as committee members. Nor did any committee member men- 
tion supporting/advocating party positions and policies. Seventeen 
percent, however, did mention this role when describing their jobs as 
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TABLE 9.3. MP'S DESCRIPTIONS OF THEIR JOBS AS 
COh4MITIEE MEMBERS 
Question: How would you describe your job as a member of a select committee? 
Response 
Find truth 
Check executive 
Advise ministers 
Persistent work 
Discuss policies 
Effective 
opposition 
Redress grievances 
Frustratingboring 
All Members of 
Parliament 
(NW 
--
57 35 
47 29 
31 19 
27 17 
26 16 
Conservative Labour 
% (N-26) 
--
54 14 
54 14 
27 7 
23 6 
35 9 
12 3 
8 2 
0 0 
MPs. Committee members did not appear to perceive these two tra- 
ditional backbench roles-constituency ombudsman and party sup- 
porter-to be roles MPs pursue as members of select committees. 
What committee members did emphasize was "finding the objec- 
tive truth," as many MPs remarked (i.e., not relying on party- 
sponsored evidence and analysis) and checking the executive. They 
maintained that the willingness of committee members to shed party 
philosophies in committee proceedings allowed committees to pro- 
duce bipartisan, "objective" recommendations. They further sug- 
gested that the bipartisan approach necessarily made their reports 
objective. This may or may not actually be the case. The Defence 
Committee, for example, quite easily produces bipartisan, objective 
reports and recommendations. But its members shared a common at- 
titude about Britain's military role and nuclear status. Labour mem- 
bers who supported the party's then-official position on nuclear 
disarmament have not been placed on the committee. Consequently, 
the committee has not had members who differed from the funda- 
mental political consensus on defense policy. 
The reports may be bipartisan, but claims of objectivity and of 
conclusions based on all points of view also seem unjustified. Nev- 
ertheless, the bipartisan approach and collegial atmosphere fostered 
in committee by members willing to scrutinize and criticize party pol- 
icies does seem to strengthen the legitimacy of ensuing reports and 
recommendations. One government minister stated: "It is a foolish 
minister indeed who goes marching up the hill ignoring a bipartisan 
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report from his select committee. He should stop and say, 'Look, they 
might be on to something here' " (Interview, 18 March 1987). 
A common theme expressed when defining each of these roles, 
whether it was discussing policies, advising ministers, checking the 
executive, or keeping up to date with all the submitted testimony and 
memoranda, was the perceived ability to make innovative and pro- 
active contributions through committee service, to influence the pol- 
icy agenda. A Liberal MP stated: "We are to undertake a thorough 
investigation of the executive-monitor the government. We bring 
some authority from Parliament into other issues not being consid- 
ered-a proactive role which gives Parliament the role and credit for 
initiating and investigating issues and placing them on the national 
agendas" (Interview, 29 Feb. 1987). A Conservative committee chair- 
man agreed: "We are working very hard to claw back some of the 
power we have lost to the executive, and to do so not just reactively, 
but to do so on issues for which government does not yet have a pol- 
icy" (Interview, 23 Feb. 1987). 
A Labour MP, who emphasized his role advising ministers, also 
stressed the active, innovative dimensions: "The basic thing is to de- 
cide what to recommend to ministers. You get a better report because 
government doesn't have to take your recommendations. Since you 
are not forcing them to take a particular view and you set the agenda, 
you feel more free to bring forth new ideas and fresh approaches and 
philosophies" (Interview, 25 Feb. 1987). 
Benefiting from Committee Service 
Apparently committee members do find their committee work re- 
warding: yearly turnover rates are relatively low, select committees 
are perceived by their members as important arenas to fulfill their 
goals of influencing government policies, and these backbenchers 
maintain that their influence in committee is proactive, not reactive 
as it is in the chamber. I also asked members directly in what ways, if 
any, they found committee service rewarding. Only three committee 
members, all of whom were right-wing Conservatives, stated that 
they had not found their committee experiences rewarding. (See Ta- 
ble 9.4.) While noting the positive role performed by the committees 
and acknowledging their usefulness to Parliament, they said they did 
not receive personal rewards from their committee activities. In fact, 
they were frustrated and disappointed because they were unable to 
process their ideological goals. 
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TABLE 9.4. REWARDS RECEIVED THROUGH COMMI'ITEE SERVICE 
Question: In what ways, if any, would you say select committee membership 
is rewarding to you? 
Response 
Expertise/ 
knowledge/ 
specialization 
Influence policy 
Produce good 
reports 
U h t a n d  
government 
None 
All Members of Conservative 
Parliament 
% (Na) % (N-29) 
---  
Labour 
% (N-26) 
--
85 22 
31 8 
46 12 
0 0 
0 0 
The most common response to this question indicated consider- 
able member interest in acquiring information in a particular policy 
field. Eighty-five percent of committee members interviewed said 
they found committee membership rewarding because of the exper- 
tise, specialization, or education it gave them. Most members 
thought of themselves as policy specialists in one or more areas, and 
they also believed that it was important for them to specialize in the 
House for career reasons. One Conservative committee member 
stated: 
It is stimulating. It gives me great knowledge which I can use personally and 
in debates. The information you get on a select committee you do not get 
down on the floor. Later when we have a debate, I am in familiar territory. I 
know the parameters-intellectually, politically-of the subject. On Trans- 
port we did "Civil Nuclear Reactors." Now I can read a technical report with- 
out any problems, like the "Sizewell Report." The language is clear to me. 
And this is one of the things you get. You get to be multi-lingual, which is so 
true of all the professions in the modern world, and you have got to be able 
to get on the terms with these people. You've got to be able to understand 
their jargon. [Interview, 24 March 19871 
A Liberal MP added: "Oh, I think they are too numerous to mention. 
First of all it is a marvelous reeducation later in life. I wish personally 
I would have been able to go on as a young man. I would very much 
like to have seen these in Parliament when I first came in [1966]. I 
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found without it, Parliament had very little charm for me when I first 
got here-the adversarial nature seems to me almost entirely out- 
worn" (Interview, 3 Feb. 1987). A new Conservative entrant agreed: 
"I was getting terribly bored with the backbench. This was a chance 
to concentrate on a subject and help in the process and role of par- 
liamentary government. It was educational, and I could use this ed- 
ucation for input into my own party. It is not the job of an MP to be 
a generalist" (Interview, 23 Feb. 1987). And a Labour MP who had left 
committee service for a frontbench position said: "I would fight like 
Hell to get back on if I returned to the backbench (Interview, 25 Feb. 
1987). 
The educative service these committees provided their members 
was important to them because it increased their likelihood of becom- 
ing policy influencers. Without committee membership, their back- 
bench status offered them few opportunities to participate in policy 
influence or to acquire the knowledge and expertise necessary to 
evaluate policies and proposals. The only primary cue available to 
them in making evaluations came from party leaders and whips. 
Members could not offer reports and recommendations, cross- 
examine witnesses, or take evidence in this party-directed policy 
evaluation. What backbenchers could do was to vote "yea" or "nay" 
at the end of debate. 
While members were also rewarded by the influence committee 
status conferred upon them, they also found the committees' reports 
rewarding. Almost half of Labour MPs mentioned committee reports, 
compared with less than one in five Conservatives. For Labour mem- 
bers especially, these reports represented "objective" and indepen- 
dent analysis. These reports, they maintained, contributed to the 
public body of knowledge available on certain topics. As a result, 
committee reports offered alternative approaches and recommenda- 
tions which could not be easily dismissed because of the independent 
inquiry members undertook and the bipartisan conclusions reached. 
For Opposition members, this was a useful means to have the gov- 
ernment consider many, and adopt some, new policy proposals. 
Members' attitudes about the role of select committees, the role 
they play on them, and the rewards received from committee service 
suggest that committee members also become more involved in the 
parliamentary process through committee service. When members of 
Parliament were asked if committee membership assisted an MP in 
becoming more involved in the parliamentary process, more than 
three-fourths of those interviewed thought it did or probably did. 
(See Table 9.5.) Select committee members in particular were more 
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TABLE 9.5. PERCEPTIONS OF INCREASED PARLIAMENTARY 
INVOLVEMENT THROUGH COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP 
Question: Does a position on a select committee help a member of Parliament become more 
involved in the parliamentary process? 
Response All Members of Conservative 
Parliament 
% (N-84) % (N-41) 
---  
Yes, probably 77 65 78 32 
No 12 10 15 6 
Depends on 
subject 1 1 9 7 3  
Labour Non-Select Select 
Committee Committee 
% (N-38) % (N-24) % (N-60) 
- - -  
74 28 63 15 83 50 
11 4 2 1  5 8 5 
TABLE 9.6. PERCEPTIONS OF INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN DEBATES 
THROUGH COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP 
Question: Do wmmittee members have more access to debates due to their membership on 
a select wmmittee? 
Response 
Advantage on 
special subject 
More access 
generally 
Just a little 
Debated reports 
only 
All Members of Conservative Labour Non-Select 
Parliament Committee 
% '0-84) % (N-41) % (N-38) % (N-24) 
- - - - 
Select 
Committee 
% (N-60) 
-  
TABLE 9.7. PERCENTAGE OF BACKBENCH SPEAKERS WHO WERE 
COMMITEE MEMBERS 
Year % Year 
196869 39.00 1983-84 
1977-78 44.00 1984-85 
1979-80 28.77 1985-86 
1980-8 1 28.20 1986-87 
1981-82 29.67 1987-88 
1982-83 37.50 1988-89 
Sources: House of Commons Sessional Returns, 1970, 1979-1990; House of 
Commons Debates. 
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likely to state that their positions assisted them in becoming more in- 
volved in the parliamentary process. Nevertheless, almost two-thirds 
of non-committee members interviewed also held this view. It seems 
there is widespread recognition in the House that committee service 
is a propitious route to pursue for backbenchers interested in in- 
creased parliamentary participation. One Labour chairperson said: 
"Oh, very much so, yes. You become an expert. You may not be an 
expert over the whole range of a report, but you are on certain parts 
of it. You become more respected in the House and also in debates" 
(Interview, 8 April 1987). 
A Conservative committee member agreed: "We are far more in- 
volved than what is publicly admitted. Reports often only get luke- 
warm reception at first, but government does usually follow suit. We 
usually work as a catalyst. We either help the minister argue a case 
before the civil service. He can say, 'Hey, a select committee-an in- 
dependent body-looked at this.' Or it helps with a cabinet argument 
against colleagues or the chancellor for more money. Reports also in- 
fluence public opinion and special interests. We are influential 
within the informed circle of interests. Now the media gives coverage 
to select committees for comments. We are regarded as informed 
(Interview, 19 Nov. 1987). A Conservative MP who had served on a 
select committee summarized it this way: "Yes probably. You get 
more influence, more expertise. More boned up on policies. This ex- 
pertise can in turn be used at different levels: on party backbench 
committees, sheer reputation in the House, conversation over tea or 
in the bar. It enables you to talk to ministers and the press" (Inter- 
view, 12 May 1987). 
A current minister of state discussed her attitudes toward select 
committees as a former committee member and now as a government 
minister. She explained that her committee experience had taught her 
the value of committee inquiries and subsequent reports. And as a 
minister she continued to value the information select committees 
could provide her and her department. She stated: "The Education 
Committee just looked at primary education, and quite a lot of the 
stuff that is in that report is very useful to us and will help us to de- 
velop our policies. Because they have this ability to go out and look 
all over the country and in other countries as well, you read that re- 
port, and that is the collected wisdom they have spent a year looking 
at primary school education, how it developed in other countries, 
etc. So we ministers, we read it and in the end (A) we have to make 
a reply, but (B) we read it because we learn. We don't always agree 
with everything they come up with, but you can still learn" (Inter- 
view, 18 March 1987). 
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When the House of Commons debated the Procedure Commit- 
tee's recommendations to create this committee system, one of the 
persistent themes was the effect committee service would entail for 
the chamber. Opponents of the committees, or "floor-men," argued 
that attendance on the floor of the House would decline and the level 
of debate would suffer (Judge, 1986). But neither anticipated result 
has occurred. In fact, committee members want an increase in the 
number of reports debated. They also indicated that committee status 
made them more likely to be called upon in debates than if they were 
still non-committee backbenchers. Table 9.6 summarizes their views. 
MPs did state that committee membership assisted them in get- 
ting recognized in debates, but there was disagreement about the 
conditions under which this access was granted. A majority of com- 
mittee members claimed their committee service enabled them to be 
called on during debates on specialized subjects. And whereas 29 
percent of non-committee members thought committee service 
brought only slightly more access to debate, only 8 percent of com- 
mittee members gave this response. Furthermore, on the floor of the 
House during a debate, the practice has been established whereby 
the Speaker will recognize the government minister first, followed 
by the Opposition spokesperson, and then the relevant select com- 
mittee chair. 
In fact, however, less than a third of backbench members who 
contributed to debate on substantive motions of committee reports 
between 1979 and 1989 were members of one of the select commit- 
tees. (See Table 9.7.) Select committee members constitute roughly 30 
percent of backbenchers in the House; it does not appear that the 
"chamber first" members' fears of select committee members' domi- 
nating debates has been borne out by fact. In fact, it appears that the 
Speaker has taken great care to ensure that committee members do 
not monopolize parliamentary debates. They may carry greater 
weight, they may be more informed, they may be more influential 
cue-givers, but they do not take up more time in the chamber. Inter- 
estingly enough, as this table further shows, the experience on the 
floor of the House during debates germane to Estimates and Expen- 
diture Committee reports was not repeated with the new select com- 
mittees. Committee members' access to debate in these instances 
since 1979 has never reached its pre-1979 levels. 
The number of reports produced by the departmentally-related 
select committees and the number of reports debated in the House 
has also increased since 1979 but has fluctuated considerably, with 
noticeable declines during election years, when committees and their 
activities are automatically dissolved along with Parliament. As Table 
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9.8 demonstrates, the most significant change in the number of com- 
mittee reports produced rests in the increase of "Special Reports." 
These reports are generally one of two types: they are either investi- 
gations into particularly salient political issues or critiques of the 
government's responses to previous committee reports and recom- 
mendations. In both cases, however, these parliamentary committees 
have demonstrated their ability and willingness to comment publicly 
on government policy. These commentaries are then featured regu- 
larly in the print media as the views of an "all-party parliamentary 
committee" or "bi-partisan parliamentary committee." 
If committee members find their service rewarding and beneficial 
to them, and if they also perceive select committees as important 
tools to facilitate backbench participation and increase institutional 
influence, then I would expect to see fairly high attendance rates at 
committee meetings. Indeed, as Table 9.9 demonstrates, attendance 
rates are high. They are also higher than for similar committees be- 
fore 1979. Between 1979180 and 1989190, the average yearly attendance 
for all committees ranged from 80 percent to 72 percent. Attendance 
rates also dropped slightly daring election years (1983 and 1987), 
when members returned to their constituencies more often and spent 
more time there than in each of the previous three years. 
The rates are also considerably higher in comparison to the at- 
tendance rates of similar committees prior to the 1979 reforms. Be- 
tween 1967 and 1969, when select committees were created under the 
Crossman Reforms, average attendance at the Agriculture Committee 
was 50 percent, at the Education Committee 66 percent, and at the 
Science and Technology Committee 70 percent. Average attendance 
for the Estimates Committee was 36 percent and even lower for its 
subcommittees (Wiseman, 1970, 214). During the 1979-81 sessions, 
however, the new Select Committee on Agriculture averaged a 74 per- 
cent attendance rate, as did the Select Committee on Education, Sci- 
ence and Art. Over the course of eleven years, Agriculture averaged 
a 70 percent average attendance rate, and Education averaged 74 per- 
cent. As Figure 9.A illustrates, none of the select committees aver- 
aged less than 69 percent attendance over the eleven-year period. 
Differences in attendance rates also emerge between committees. 
As an indicator of personal committee appeal, such attendance rates 
are helpful. Many members said they tried to be assigned to one of 
the committees associated with the great departments of state-Trea- 
sury, Defence, Home Affairs, and Foreign Affairs. Members of these 
committees further claimed that there were several requests submit- 
ted to join the committees whenever a vacancy occurred. Not surpris- 
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TABLE 9.8. NUMBER OF COMMI?TEE REPORTS AND OF REPORTS 
DEBATED, 1979-1989 
Year Number of 
'=ports 
Number of 
special reports 
Number of both: 
reports and special 
reports 
43 
59 
64 
5 1 
74 
92 
79 
68 
74 
97 
Number of debates 
per Y W  0" 
committee reports 
4 
4 
7 
6 
15 
13 
18 
4 
20 
19 
TABLE 9.9. COMMI'l-IEE ATTENDANCE RATES (PERCENTAGES) 
1979- 1990 
Select Committee 79/80 80181 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 
-----------
Agriculture 
Defence 
Education 
Employment 
Energy 
Environment 
Foreign Affairs 
Home Affairs 
Scottish Affairs 
Social Services 
TradeLndustry 
Transportation 
TreasUV/civil 92 90 87 85 77 78 68 69 73 75 73 
Service 
Welsh Affairs 80 75 76 76 86 86 83 70 76 62 66 
SessionalAverage 80 75 75 73 73 73 72 70 75 72 72 
Sources: House of Commons Sessional Returns. 1980-1991. 
'Following the 1987 election. the Conservatives did so poorly in Scotland that the party did not have 
enough members to staff both this committee and all its frontbench posts relating to Scotland. 
Consequently, this committee was dissolved. 
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ingly, then, four of the five committees with the highest average 
attendance rates were these "prestige" committees. And, with the 
exception of Home Affairs, these committees also conducted more 
meetings than most of the remaining select committees. The Welsh 
Committee, for example, which had the second-highest attendance 
average, averaged only twenty-two meetings a year. Defence and For- 
eign Affairs each averaged more than forty meetings a year, but at- 
tendance was still quite high despite almost double the number of 
meetings of other committees. 
Select Committees in the Future 
Select committee members who were interviewed spoke proudly of 
their committee service and the achievements of their committees. 
They maintained that the committees had been effective in influenc- 
ing government policies and had also been instrumental in asserting 
Parliament's role in the governing process. But committee members 
also expressed disappointment with the limited powers granted se- 
lect committees. They certainly found their committee experiences 
rewarding, but many members wanted to see the committees' powers 
enhanced. Consequently, members of Parliament were asked in an 
open-ended question how the select committees they would like to 
see a generation from now would differ from the current committees. 
When members were asked a similar question about Parliament's sta- 
tus in the future, half replied they would like to see the role and pow- 
ers of select committees expanded. And in responding to the future 
of select committees, 80 percent said they would like to see more 
power and independence granted to the committees. Members' re- 
sponses are summarized in Table 9.10. 
Labour MPs were more likely than Conservatives to support 
stronger, more influential select committees, just as Labour was more 
likely to support a stronger role for select committees in future Par- 
liaments. And although committee members, compared to non- 
committee members, were slightly more supportive of stronger, more 
independent committees in the future, two-thirds of non-members 
also expressed a desire to see stronger committees in the future. 
Members indicated their desire to see select committees participate 
more actively in the pre-legislative phase of government policy andlor 
for committees to be able to guide departmental policy and personnel 
decisions. 
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TABLE 9.10. CHANGES DESIRED IN FUTURE COMMKIEES 
Question: How would the select committees you would like to see a generation from now 
differ from those of today? 
Response All Members of Conservative 
Parliament 
More power/ 
independence 
More resowes 
Better follow-ups 
Committed 
members of 
Parliament 
None 
Televised 
Labour Non-Select 
Committee 
Select 
Committee 
FIGURE 9.A. AVERAGE ATTENDANCE RATE PER SELECT 
COMMITTEE, 1979-1990 
Treasury and Civil Service 
Welsh Affairs 
Home Affairs 
Foreign Affairs 
Defence 
Employment 
Environment 
Education, Science and Art 
Agriculture 
Social Services 
Trade and Industry 
Transportation 
Scottish Affairs 
Energy 
Percent 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 
*Did not meet after 1987 
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Sir Humphrey Atkins, a former Defence Committee chairman 
and Opposition chief whip in the late 1970s, suggested to the Proce- 
dure Committee (1977-78) that select committees could indeed play a 
useful pre-legislative role. His proposal involved the committal of a 
bill first to a select committee, which would perform the fact- 
gathering functions. Subsequently, the bill would be referred to a 
standing committee which, armed with the select committee's report, 
would undertake the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill as cur- 
rently practiced. The Procedure Committee rejected Atkins's pro- 
posal on several grounds but primarily because of the anticipated 
party interference: "If government legislation were regularly referred 
to specialized select committees, the party leadership would have a 
natural and proper interest in influencing the proceedings of those 
committees, and many of the characteristics which select committees 
now possess would be lost" (HC 588-1, 1978, xv-xvii). Geoffrey 
Smith, parliamentary correspondent for Times, concurred: "If, how- 
ever, select committees were to be given real power, there is the dan- 
ger that they might then lose the very qualities that make them 
attractive: the greater readiness to examine evidence objectively and 
to consider issues on their merits without conducting every dialogue 
in terms of the party battle" (Ornstein, 1981, 48). 
Committee members interviewed, however, felt that their exper- 
tise, knowledge, and bipartisan approach to policy issues were not 
being effectively utilized under the current arrangements. They ob- 
jected to the role partisan standing committees played in the scrutiny 
and evaluation of proposed legislation. They also objected to the in- 
ability of select committees to introduce legislation based on commit- 
tee inquiries and reports. A member of Labour's National Executive 
Council who had not served on a select committee supported a leg- 
islative role for the committees: "I would like to see more hybrid com- 
mittees where these type of select committees would take all the 
evidence and also take part in drafting legislation" (Interview, 2 July 
1987). Most select committee members were more specific. One De- 
fence Committee member stated: "I'd like to see them as many Eu- 
ropeans committees, as built in to the budgetary process, so the 
Defence budget would be committed to scrutiny. I would like to see 
legislation referred to committees. There is more expertise in select 
committees, not standing committees. We don't currently have the 
power to reject Ministry of Defence appointments, but I would like 
to" (Interview, 27 Jan. 1987). 
Other committee members emphasized select committees as 
tools to assert a "House view" on an issue and to regain parliamen- 
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tary control and influence, which they believed the House had lost. 
This view was espoused by both Conservative and Labour MPs as 
well as new entrants and long-serving members. A Conservative 
elected in 1979 said, "I would like to see them stronger inasmuch as 
they can be a catalyst in regaining power from the executive" (Inter- 
view, 13 May 1987). And a Labour party spokesman first sent to Par- 
liament in 1962 added: "I'd like to see the next generation seeing 
them as a useful tool for parliamentary control. Parliament can get 
more involved in the running of the departments and their policies. 
I would like to see Parliament run more like local government. In the 
next Parliament you will see more members who have local govern- 
ment experience, and they will be restive" (Interview, 4 Feb. 1987). 
The other major response from members reflected a desire to 
have better resources and more staff available to the select commit- 
tees. Currently, each committee has one or two clerks who are re- 
sponsible for administrative details as well as for securing written 
testimony from witnesses, suggesting lines of questioning to commit- 
tee members, and writing final reports in consultation with commit- 
tee chairpersons. Committees also use temporary special advisers 
who assist them with the technical and complex issues of an inquiry. 
A few advisers are seconded to a committee for more than one in- 
quiry, but clerks and committee members appear to prefer temporary 
advisers whose particular background and expertise are compatible 
with certain inquiries. The exception is the Home Affairs Committee, 
which does not use specialist advisers in its inquiries. One committee 
clerk explained that he initiated "political" inquiries and the advisers 
drafted the initial "technical" reports (Interview, 19 June 1987). The 
Defence Committee does have one permanent adviser, the audit ad- 
viser, who was seconded from the Audit Office. The Scottish Affairs 
Committee also has one permanent adviser who resides in Scotland 
and is used exclusively for her comments on the Public Expenditure 
White Paper. 
One Conservative committee member said of committees in the 
future: "They would be fortified. The clerks would have more infra- 
structure. The advisers are super, and we could use more of them. I 
certainly wish these select committees were here when I came into 
the House. We have tried various schemes in the past, and I think 
these departmentally related select committees are the way to go" 
(Interview, 24 March 1987). A committee chairman added: "I would 
like to see them better staffed. I would like to see the committee sys- 
tem solider and more beefed-up advisers so that those members who 
need it can be better briefed. I want to train my boys to get used to 
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working in a committee environment and pick up and adopt those 
kinds of norms" (Interview, 23 Feb. 1987). 
Committee members hopeful of increased staffs for their commit- 
tees may find this particular goal difficult to fulfill. Whereas one- 
third of committee members wanted to see more staff, only 13 percent 
of non-committee members interviewed shared this interest. More- 
over, several committee members were disquieted with the prospect 
of large committee staffs. They anticipated that committees would be- 
come the products of the staffs and that members would become de- 
pendent upon them. Members often supported their claims by noting 
American congressional committees, which they perceived as being 
run by large staffs wherein members of Congress knew little about 
the technical merits and specific arguments of each inquiry. Members 
of Parliament did not want to abrogate their committee responsibility 
to staff members. Doing so would make the benefits gained-exper- 
tise to be used on the floor, with ministers, in the press, for constit- 
uents-a moot point. 
Increased staff and resources nevertheless may assist committee 
members in performing some of the duties and tasks associated with 
select committee service. More important for the future role of select 
committees, committee members appear able, and indeed willing, to 
assert the committees' potential influence through their own initia- 
tive. That they are able and willing to pursue actively roles as select 
committee members is not a function of the size of their staffs. 
Rather, committee members demonstrate and generally share requi- 
site attitudes about their jobs as committee members and the role se- 
lect committees should play in the parliamentary process. Members 
cultivate those skills that are important to undertake effective com- 
mittee work, dedicate considerable time and energy to committee ser- 
vice, and pursue inquiries and produce reports that may be critical 
of, or an alternative to, formal party positions. Members have found 
committee service rewarding, especially through information access 
and specialization opportunities. They benefit personally and profes- 
sionally, but they also emphasized that parliamentary government 
benefits from select committee activity. Select committee service may 
not be attractive to all members of Parliament, but even non- 
committee members recognize the role these committees have played 
in the House and their potential for development. Far from being 
"wound up" by the government, as was the case twenty years ago, 
these select committees, with their consistently high attendance rates 
and low annual turnover, appear to be a prominent feature of the 
parliamentary landscape that has served both Parliament and its 
members. 
10 
Conclusion and Assessment 
Observers of British legislative politics have long been aware of the 
importance of party government in understanding parliamentary 
politics. But the reliance on "party government" as a convenient vari- 
able to explain all legislative dynamics has outlived its usefulness. 
Loyalty to party leaders is insufficient in explaining why the 1979 se- 
lect committees were created or why members would seek positions 
on them. Members' desire to establish and then serve on these select 
committees is inconsistent with party government, but it is not nec- 
essarily inconsistent with parliamentary government. Committee 
members are not acting "irrationally," nor are they unaware of the 
many institutional constraints and informal norms that prevent select 
committees from assuming direct policy-making capacities similar to 
those of American congressional committees. 
One of the problems of analyzing these select committees lies in 
identifying their significance. Some observers, notably Norman St. 
John-Stevas and Edward du Cann, have argued that the creation of 
the new committees has marked a significant challenge to party gov- 
ernment and party dominance. On the other hand, David Judge and 
Philip Norton suggest that the new committee system may evolve 
into useful channels for backbench frustration and tools for parlia- 
mentary assertion. And finally, Richard Rose sees little if any chance 
of effective challenges to party government being mounted from 
these committees. Based on my own research and findings, I do not 
believe that such clear-cut considerations as offered by these various 
"schools" are acceptable. Rather, it appears that these committees 
were established as means of countering executive domination, that 
at times this domination has been challenged, that further challenges 
to party government and executive domination will continue, and 
that governments will continue to accept committee recommenda- 
tions when changing, introducing, or abolishing national policies. 
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An altered relationship between the legislature and the executive 
may indeed be a consequence of select committees' activity, but any 
attempt to assess the impact of the new committees is beset with the 
problem of multiple objectives. Attempts have been made to disen- 
tangle some of the conflicting perceptions of the purpose of select 
committees. The major objective, according to St. John-Stevas, is "to 
strengthen the accountability of ministers to the House for the dis- 
charge of their responsibilities" (HCD 79/80,974:1034). Consequently, 
the aim of the select committees is to scrutinize, monitor, and control 
the "expenditure, administration and policy of the principal govern- 
ment departments." 
A second, and related, function identified for select committees 
is that of providing the House of Commons and the public at large 
with factual information derived from the exhaustive, nonpartisan 
inquiries. This function is concerned partly with the need to secure a 
greater degree of openness in government, which is a prerequisite for 
proper executive accountability. It is further concerned with making 
generally available to the wider interested public volumes of valuable 
information, much of which, without the powers of committees to 
send for persons and papers, would remain untapped. 
Select committee also have a third and quite separate objective, 
namely, to influence the development and content of government 
policy rather than simply to monitor it. The chairman of the Home 
Affairs Committee, for example, noted in his report to the Liaison 
Committee: "Our purpose has been . . . to influence ministers in for- 
mation of policy" (HC 92, 1982, 52). This view of select committee 
work is one that has been endorsed by other committee members. 
The ways in which one might judge whether or not a specific 
committee or the committee system has been successful may in turn 
reflect one's perception of the intended goals. A committee that has 
monitored a particular department, scrutinized its expenditures, and 
forced ministers to defend their positions publicly during committee 
hearings will be judged successful and effective by those who sub- 
scribe to a narrow and formal interpretation of Standing Order 9, by 
which this committee system was created. This same committee 
would not, however, receive the same plaudits from those who ex- 
pect the committees actively and persistently to change, block, or for- 
mulate policies. 
The wording of Standing Order 9 has facilitated alternative inter- 
pretations and has ensured that members who strive to influence 
government policy will find justification for their actions. Previous 
committees were empowered to consider the expenditure and admin- 
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istration of policies by departments, but the post-1979 era marks the 
first time that the "policy of the principal government departments" 
was subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Moreover, committees have 
moved beyond mere scrutinizing/monitoring functions; select com- 
mittees have also sought to control and check the executive. These 
functions have necessitated an active role by committees and commit- 
tee members and have served to alter the relationship between the 
executive and members of Parliament. Consequently, committees can 
also justify their actions when they seek to control and check depart- 
mental policies. 
The proceedings and activities of the committees are the results 
of agreements and understandings between committee members. 
Unlike the parent chamber, committees do not proceed along well- 
defined or institutionalized rules of procedure. Several committees 
do not take votes on their reports precisely because members assid- 
uously cultivate compromises and consensus prior to any formal 
committee decision. One Conservative committee chairman re- 
marked that his committee voted on proposals "only because I've got 
a communist on the committee and he wants votes" (Interview, 25 
Feb. 1987). The way in which committee members perceive their own 
roles on committees directly affects committee dynamics and pro- 
ceedings. As Table 9.3 illustrates, members described their commit- 
tee jobs in terms of "finding the truth," "checking the executive," and 
"advising ministers." Their responses indicated that challenging the 
executive's monopoly of information and influencing executive poli- 
cies are not only possible through committee service but also the 
proper goals for committees to pursue. 
Of course, a persistent problem rests in deciding whether these 
committees have been effective or are simply outlets with no real in- 
fluence for frustrated backbenchers. This dilemma is best addressed 
by establishing the criteria by which the committees should be eval- 
uated. During the interviews, members were asked what criteria 
they would use to judge the committees' effectiveness. Their re- 
sponses are presented in Table 10.1. Members indicated that the most 
appropriate criterion for judging committee effectiveness was the 
committee's ability to influence policies. This was suggested as the 
most appropriate criterion by three-fourths of the members inter- 
viewed. In fact, this ratio held constant for committee and non- 
committee members, Labour and Conservative. More important, 
virtually all committee members indicated that the committees had 
been effective and successful in achieving policy influence. Only a 
few MPs, all of whom were non-committee members, accepted this 
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TABLE 10.1. CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
CO-S 
Question: How can one judge whether or not a committee has been "effective"? What 
criteria should we use? 
Response All Members of 
Parliament 
% (N-84) 
-  
Policy influence 75 63 
Quality reports 54 45 
Publicity 29 24 
Educate 19 16 
Value for money 3 2 
Don't know 6 5 
Conservative Non-Select 
Committee 
% (N-24) 
-  
75 1 8  
46 11 
13 3 
17 4 
0 0 
4 1 
Select 
Committee 
(Nm 
-- 
75 45 
57 34 
35 21 
20 12 
3 2 
7 4 
criterion but indicated that committees had not been successful in in- 
fluencing government policy. 
Committee members, on the other hand, were quick to point out 
specific examples in which the government's policies had changed 
due to committee proceedings and reports, such as repatriation of 
the Canadian Constitution. Moreover, committees have played an 
important role in prompting new legislation or administrative de- 
crees. In these cases, committees were not responding to new gov- 
ernment policy proposals but were instead nudging departments to 
reevaluate current practices and consider new options, such as post- 
natal care. 
Norton enunciates the views of many of the select committee 
skeptics. He notes that despite the production of reports, there is no 
guarantee that the reports will be debated by the House. In fact, very 
few reports have been debated. Second, though departments provide 
written responses to committee reports, ministers and officials are 
under no obligation to take any further action. Third, he maintains 
that the committees constitute only one of several "influencers upon" 
government: "In the formulation of policy the government will be 
influenced by its own political philosophy and, in some cases, by 
bodies external to the House of Commons. Select Committees are no 
more than proximate actors in the process" (Norton, 1986a, 75). 
These are the criticisms most often made about the select com- 
mittees. Indeed, several members stated they would like to see more 
of the committees' reports debated because they view them as au- 
thoritative research documents produced outside the normal con- 
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fines of party politics. The Procedure Committee's report of 1978 
recommended that eight days a year be devoted in the chamber to 
debating the committees' reports. The final recommendations sub- 
mitted by the government did not, however, include any such provi- 
sion. A subsequent Procedure Committee report (1981) nevertheless 
recommended that a number of days be set aside in the chamber for 
the select committees' review of departmental estimates. Again the 
government was reluctant to grant the eight days requested, but it 
did allow three days for such debate. With the exception of Private 
Members' Bills, this marked the first time in parliamentary history 
that the right to command time in the chamber was extended beyond 
the government or the formal Opposition. The decision as to what 
particular estimates should be debated on these days is made by the 
Liaison Committee, consisting of the select committee chairpersons. 
Some committees have been reluctant to investigate their depart- 
ments' estimates for a number of reasons. For one, committee mem- 
bers do not wish to repeat the experiences of the previous estimates 
committee in which inquiries were long and tedious, covering only a 
narrow part of a department's estimates. Second, conducting an in- 
quiry into departmental estimates necessarily leaves less time for 
other inquiries which members view as more salient and interesting. 
Third, the freedom to choose which topics the committees will inves- 
tigate allows the members to pursue inquiries that focus more pre- 
cisely on policy recommendations rather than merely reacting to the 
government's presentation of departmental estimates. Members find 
their committee work rewarding precisely because their inquiries are 
interesting, important, and relevant to them. The Treasury and Civil 
Service Select Committee routinely examines estimates and offers 
questions and possible areas of interest to other committees based on 
the annual Expenditure White Paper. Members of the Home Affairs 
Committee take no interest in examining this facet of their remit, de- 
spite the urging from the committee's clerk. 
On the other hand, the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs does 
examine its department's estimates. The committee clerk stated: "As 
for routine, we do the estimates yearly; committee members realize 
that policy issues are important here. They do not at all mind this 
kind of work, and in fact enjoy the estimates work precisely because 
of the policy dimensions involved" (Interview, 28 May 1987). Com- 
mittees have, moreover, used the estimates days for general policy 
debates rather than for discussions of whether the particular estimate 
is too large or too small. For example, the Trade and Industry Com- 
mittee initiated a debate in 1985 that was formally on an estimate but 
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actually was used to discuss more general questions about trade with 
China, a subject comprehensively investigated by the committee. A 
senior clerk wrote: "However, the system does allow a vigilant select 
committee to home in on a part of an estimate which it finds disturb- 
ing for some reason, take oral and written evidence about it from 
ministers, civil servants and others, persuade the Liaison Committee 
that the subject should be discussed, and table an amendment reduc- 
ing the estimate on one of the estimates days. That is a powerful po- 
tential weapon in a parliamentary scrutiny of government policy, but 
it does not amount to a proper system of thorough scrutiny of each 
year's estimates by the House of Commons" (Silk, 1987, 175). 
While it is also true that ministers and officials are under no ob- 
ligation to implement the committees' recommendations, they must 
nevertheless respond to each of them. The committee clerks have es- 
tablished contacts and working relationships with Whitehall officials 
who act as liaisons between the parliamentary committees and the 
government departments. These personal relationships appear to 
assist in reducing the adversarial relationship many members and 
civil servants initially believed would exist between them. Some com- 
mittees, such as Defence, have established follow-up procedures 
whereby they monitor the recommendations formally accepted by 
the departments. Others, such as Home Affairs, have yet to pursue 
follow-up inquiries. The clerk to the Defence Committee stated: "We 
do review recommendations. And a lot of the committee's influence 
rests here. In MOD [Ministry of Defence], we are known as HCDC 
(House of Commons Defence Committee), and when we make a rec- 
ommendation to which the ministry has to respond, they know we 
will review the status of our recommendations and the nature of the 
ministry's reply and the degree to which it was followed up and im- 
plemented. On the Falklands, we are updating our 1983 report. It has 
certainly made a difference on how they think and act-and that 
analysis is from officials in the policy departments at MOD!" (Inter- 
view, 12 June 1987). Moreover, in a reply to a parliamentary question 
in June 1986, the prime minister listed almost 150 select committee 
recommendations that had been accepted by the government be- 
tween March 1985 and March 1986 (Silk, 1987, 226). 
Select committee members also stressed the quality of the com- 
mittees' published reports. More than half the committee members 
stated that committees' "effectiveness" could be judged on the basis 
of the quality of the written reports. They took particular pride in 
producing reports that they perceived to be the definitive works on 
specialized subjects. And the legitimacy of these reports was bol- 
stered by the bipartisan recommendations and the usual unanimity 
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with which they were presented. At the very least committees pro- 
vided Parliament and the public with an analysis of a current policy 
problem. 
Much of the information gleaned during written and oral testi- 
mony was important to interest groups associated with the policy 
concerns of the departments monitored by the committees. Com- 
mittee hearings and subsequent reports were often the only means 
available to interest groups and interested parties to acquire the in- 
formation they sought from government officials. Given the restric- 
tions placed upon the rights of access to government information, 
coupled with the secrecy endemic in British government, committees 
have become an important tool for information gathering by several 
groups and individuals. 
Interest groups follow closely the proceedings of select commit- 
tees and consider opportunities to present evidence as important 
means of access to influencing the policy agenda. They ask to give 
evidence to committees and in turn are often asked to supply the 
committees with written and oral testimony. The director of Britain's 
largest lobbying firm indicated that his staff monitors all select com- 
mittee inquiries and advises his clients to participate in committee in- 
quiries whenever possible. He pointed out that his largest client, 
British Rail, is "in front of committees all the time." And although the 
committees have not provided a dramatic shift in the means used 
to lobby for policy input, they are "an added extra dimension, an 
additional factor which we believe important to utilize" (Interview, 23 
Jan. 1987). 
Reports can also be designed for a wider audience than Parlia- 
ment, the government, or the British public. The Select Committee 
on the Treasury and Civil Service, for example, conducted an inquiry 
into international finance which did not receive a government reply 
because none was expected. The committee clerk noted, "We were 
just making observations. The real audience was [Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul] Volker, the Fed and the Japanese finance minister" 
(Interview, 4 June 1987). Similarly, the Foreign Affairs committee's re- 
port on repatriation of the Canadian constitution influenced the de- 
cisions of both the Canadian and the British government. One 
committee member stated: 
Another thing which was very important were the effects we had on the 
changes in the Constitution in Canada. That all happened because I came in 
to my desk and found a plain brown envelope. And that plain brown enve- 
lope had what then became a very widely read Cabinet document from the 
French government containing statements about what the British reaction 
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was going to be to the request to transfer the constitution back, in which it 
said the British government would not object and the government would in- 
deed send it [the constitution] back directly. They were taking us for granted. 
It seemed to me it was a denial of democracy in Canadian terms for Trudeau 
to seek to do through the British Parliament what he could not get through 
his own. And therefore on that basis I persuaded my colleagues to go 
through with it. There was a lot of Conservatives who did not want to go 
through with it, but it was the responsibility of the British Parliament. The 
provinces took their case to the Supreme Court based on our report. [Inter- 
view, 2 Feb. 1987 
In order for reports to be more influential, several committees have 
changed the types of inquiries they will pursue. Follow-up inquiries 
are indeed important, but so too are inquiries that examine current, 
topical issues. Most important, committees are avoiding the Royal 
Commission type of inquiries that plagued the earlier estimates and 
expenditure committees as well as some of the new select committees 
during their early years. Both Environment and Agriculture commit- 
tees, for example, have tried to avoid these long inquiries in recent 
years. The Agriculture Committee's inquiry into Animal Welfare took 
a year to complete, and the committee devoted its entire time to that 
one subject. The Environment Committee also initially pursued long 
inquiries with which committee members soon grew bored and dis- 
interested. With the naming of a new chairman, however, the com- 
mittee soon began pursuing shorter, more topical inquiries focusing 
on "green issues." These included reports on acid rain, London's 
Green Belt, and radioactive waste. Members find these inquiries 
more appealing, particularly since they coincide with government re- 
views in these current and salient policy areas. 
In addition to the quality reports produced by these committees, 
members also measured effectiveness by the publicity received by 
committee proceedings and reports. Committees are monitored 
closely by the press, and several journalists, representing the "qual- 
ity" press, television, and radio are always present when a cabinet 
minister gives testimony before a committee. Committees also hold 
their own press conferences to announce reports, recommendations, 
and, if necessary, confrontations with the government. Reports that 
are critical of current policies receive considerable attention in the na- 
tional newspapers. Increasingly, the press seeks out committee mem- 
bers, particularly chairpersons, to comment on new government 
initiatives. Alternatively, committee chairs will send clear messages 
to the public and to the government about new proposals by calling 
publicly for immediate investigations by their committees. When the 
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Thatcher government, for example, decided to privatize the security 
forces guarding the Ministry of Defence's munitions storage and pro- 
duction facilities, the Defence Committee chairman immediately 
called his committee into session and asked for an immediate in- 
quiry. He further notified the press of his grave concern and the com- 
mittee's activities. The committee's initial skepticism of government 
policy produced a number of questions during debates in the cham- 
ber and attacks from both sides of the aisle. The government was 
forced to 'withdraw its proposal within days of its announcement. 
Some of the committees' work, however, receives scant attention 
despite the impact the inquiries and reports may have on shaping, 
influencing, or changing government policies. Members and clerks of 
each of the committees could identify specific reports that in some 
way contributed directly in affecting certain policies. The problem in 
terms of achieving recognition of the committees' impact was due to 
the nature of the subjects under investigation. Some simply have low 
political saliency and engender little widespread public interest or at- 
tention. For example, the Thatcher government decided to privatize 
government vehicle-testing stations. The Transport Committee's re- 
port unanimously criticized the government's policy, and eventually 
the government abandoned its proposals. Although committee mem- 
bers pointed to this report as an example of the committee's success 
and effectiveness, neither the report nor the government's subse- 
quent actions received publicity. The subject was not "politically 
sexy," one Conservative committee member observed. 
The operation of the select committees also has fostered new re- 
lationships with what had been a faceless bureaucracy in Whitehall. 
I asked members if ministers and civil servants are cooperative with 
the committees during inquiries. Their responses are summarized in 
Table 10.2. Over half of the committee members stated that both min- 
isters and civil servants were cooperative, and less than one in four 
said that neither group were cooperative with the committees. Both 
committee members and clerks were often quick to add that the re- 
lationship between ministers and civil servants on the one hand and 
committee personnel on the other had also changed significantly 
since 1979. 
In their first few years, committee questioning techniques were 
admittedly quite weak. Clare Short, a Labour member of the Home 
Affairs committee, charged that "ministers and civil servants got 
away with murder, and that's partly the fault of the committee. I 
think if we were more determined they could have been more coop- 
erative" (Interview, 27 Jan. 1987). A Conservative member of the 
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TABLE 10.2. PERCEIVED COOPERATION OF MINISTERS AND CIVIL 
SERVANTS WITH COMMITTEES 
Question: Generally speaking, do you fmd ministers and civil servants cooperative with 
your committee? 
Response 
Both cooperative 
Both 
uncooperative 
Depends on 
issue/personality 
Ministers only 
Civil servants 
only 
All Members 
of Parliament 
% (NW 
-- 
56 30 
Conservative 
Health and Social Services Committee put it this way: "They were al- 
ways cooperative in my experience, except where something like 
Westland occurred. Perhaps the select committees were being asked, 
without really having evolved naturally into this new role, to adopt a 
role which was still rather alien to them-that is, much more inves- 
tigative, prosecutorial role of an American committee rather than the 
more studied and objective role which select committees have at 
the moment. Normally the secretary of state or minister is ostensibly 
perfectly happy to come and talk. He won't necessarily agree with 
everything that is said; there were some sharp exchanges on the Em- 
ployment select committee between Labour chairmen and ministers 
and the odd sharp exchange between my Labour chairman [Renee 
Short] and the Health minister. But that's to be expected (Interview, 
20 Jan. 1987). 
Those committees with low membership turnover rates that con- 
tinually call upon ministers and officials to testify seem to have 
achieved the most cooperation from civil servants and ministers. In 
particular, the Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Treasury committees re- 
ceive considerable cooperation from their departments. The Defense 
Committee also gets access to classified and "secret" information pre- 
cisely because committee members can be trusted not to leak the in- 
formation. That a parliamentary committee, particularly one staffed 
by backbenchers only, should receive classified documents from the 
Ministry of Defence marks a fundamental change in the relationship 
between the ministry and Parliament. Even during the days of the 
estimates and expenditure committees, discussion, let alone scrutiny, 
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of defense issues was considered off limits and beyond the rights of 
parliamentary committees. On the other hand committees with high 
membership turnover and past histories of pursuing Royal Commis- 
sion type inquiries have not engendered the same degree of cooper- 
ation present on the "prestige" committees. One committee clerk 
remarked: 
Well, they [ministers and civil servants] understand that the committee does 
not have staying power. They are generally cooperative, but they can use de- 
laying tactics. Ministers seem more cooperative; they are in their environ- 
ment, as it were, whereas senior civil servants clearly do not like this 
parliamentary innovation. They are in a very much better position to know 
what could conceivably go wrong and be exposed. This kind of investigation 
must have created an intense workload, produce some animosity toward tes- 
tifying given the time involved in just telling them about policies. We have 
had a few battles over the sending of persons, papers and all that. But what 
we have done is to lay a trap for them. We start correspondence with the min- 
istry informing them of our needs and we get these letters back informing us 
that they do not have time right now, or do not have the information or what- 
ever. Essentially they are delaying tactics. Then the chairman goes to the sec- 
retary and tells them that the committee is pressing to go public with these 
correspondence which would be very embarrassing to the ministry. They 
have fallen for this twice. [Interview, 23 June 19871 
Members of all the committees, both Conservative and Labour, 
spoke with considerable pride, nevertheless, when recounting the 
occasions when ministers, and particularly civil servants, have been 
grilled mercilessly by the committee for showing disdain or contempt 
toward the committee and its proceedings. But these instances are 
also growing rarer. Civil servants appear to have altered their initial 
hostility to committees since 1979, particularly upon realizing that 
committees provide yet another way to increase leverage for policy 
initiatives with their ministers. Civil servants also take their sessions 
with select committees quite seriously. Sir Peter Middleton, perma- 
nent secretary to the Treasury, remarked that whereas officials would 
prepare for one or two hours before giving testimony to one of the 
previous select committees, civil servants will now often prepare for 
two to three days. The public forums also have necessitated and pro- 
duced what he termed "better, more cogent and sensible arguments" 
(Interview, 6 Feb. 1987). 
In addition to establishing informal liaisons and channels of com- 
munication with departmental officials, committee clerks also have 
actively prodded committee members and chairpersons to pursue 
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lines of questioning during oral testimony when the witnesses ap- 
pear evasive or have released important information that the commit- 
tee members apparently did not notice. Clerks have also actively 
intervened on the behalf of certain committee interests. For example, 
one clerk directed a Labour group on one committee to maneuver 
and install a willing Conservative chairman over the objections of the 
majority on the Committee who favored another Conservative MP 
known to be sympathetic to and supportive of the government. These 
events took place during unusual activities on the part of government 
whips, who wanted to influence the selection of the committee's new 
chairman: 
The whips were particularly active in the selection of the new chairman. Al- 
though he was a Conservative, he was put up by Labour upon the death of 
his predecessor. Procedurally, whoever takes the chair is in fact the presiding 
chairman. They came to me and asked what to do about getting around the 
whips who would be putting up a candidate for the committee. I told them 
they as a select committee could do whatever they wanted, and I instructed 
them how to go about it. They were rather surprised at this. They agreed on 
" X  and grabbed the chair the next time immediately prior to the meeting 
and moved to have " X  as chairman. Other committee members were still in 
the hall; they caught the opposition off guard, and the whips and other Con- 
servatives on the committee were none too pleased about it. [Interview, 23 
June 19871 
Ten years after the House introduced a new committee system 
based on the 1977178 Procedure Committee's recommendations, the 
Select Committee on Procedure undertook an exhaustive investiga- 
tion into the "Working of the Select Committee System" (HC 19-1, 
1990). Among other things, the 1990 committee examined how the se- 
lect committees had tackled the 1978 committee's expectation that 
this new system would monitor the "expenditure, policy and admin- 
istration" of departments. The committee confirmed what I have sug- 
gested above: the record of individual select committees in this area 
"has been mixed and "rather patchy" (HC 19-1, 1990, x). Committee 
members usually found inquiries focusing on the economical use of 
public funds in annual and supplementary budgetary outlays to be 
dull and tedious. While disappointed that the committees did not 
all systematically examine the estimates of their respective depart 
ments, the Procedure Committee did note that there were nonethe- 
less reasons to be encouraged: "Whilst undoubtedly the scrutiny of 
expenditure by departmentally-related Select Committees has left 
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something to be desired, there have also been some very positive re- 
sults. The total effort devoted to this subject is more sustained and 
more widely targeted than was possible under the previous Expen- 
diture Committee. There is now more detailed information available 
to the House about individual spending programmes than ever be- 
fore-even if there is still room for improvement-and this is a direct 
result of the new structure of Select Committees" (HC 19-1, 1990, xi). 
The committee was further encouraged by individual instances of 
committees undertaking these admittedly often dry investigations, 
and it highlighted some notable successes. The Energy Committee, 
for example, was the first body to alert Parliament and the public to 
the high and steeply rising cost of compensation for damage arising 
from coal-mining subsidence. This problem was first noticed during 
the committee's regular examination of the Energy Department's ex- 
penditure plans. The Defence Committee's persistent scrutiny of the 
Trident missile program highlighted time and cost overruns in the 
construction program for the warhead. These charges were originally 
rejected by the Ministry of Defence, but after five successive reports 
they were grudgingly acknowledged as true. The results of these in- 
quiries and others by the remaining select committees allowed the 
Procedure Committee to conclude: "It is extremely doubtful whether 
this sort of information about any of these very substantial spending 
programmes would have been available to the House, and certainly 
not in such detail, prior to the establishment of the departmentally- 
related Select Committees" (HC 19-1, 1990, xii). 
The examination of government policy is, by and large, the most 
important function for these committees to perform; it certainly has 
the highest profile and the most rewards for committee members. 
The committees have undertaken a range of investigations criticizing 
government policies, questioning new initiatives, and proposing 
their own recommendations. All of these require government re- 
sponses indicating what action the government will take, and if a 
committee's recommendations have not been accepted by the govern- 
ment an explanation is expected. Increasingly from 1982 to the 
present, select committees have chosen not to allow government in- 
action to proceed unchallenged. When committee recommendations 
are summarily dismissed, committees now often begin another 
round of investigations, testimony, and reports. 
One of the contributing factors to the committees' legitimating 
and respected authority is the process of identifying policy, drawing 
out the assumptions that underlie it, and eliciting explanations of its 
effectiveness. Bipartisan and unanimous parliamentary reports carry 
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greater authority than those designed by party loyalists, whose rec- 
ommendations essentially mirror the priorities and policies of the 
majority party. As my survey research suggested, and the witnesses 
to the Procedure Committee confirmed, the more a subject of an in- 
quiry passes into territory that is the subject of partisan controversy, 
the greater is the likelihood that unanimity within the committee will 
be harder to maintain and that any subsequent report will lose its im- 
pact (HC 19-1, 1990, xiii). During its first two years, the Environment 
Committee concentrated on housing and local government issues, 
particularly contentious issues with wide areas of disagreement 
among committee members. The committee continually produced 
minority and majority reports; the chairman noted that the commit- 
tee really made little impact. Since then, it has focused on less con- 
tentious issues, and the number of Divisions on Reports (instances 
where unanimity cannot be achieved and there is at least one dissent- 
ing vote) dropped from 159 in the 1979-83 Parliament to 30 in the 
1983-87 Parliament. 
But that is not to suggest that committees strive for consensus at 
the exclusion of politically sensitive issues. As of 1990, reports from 
the Employment Committee were virtually all unanimous, despite 
the high political content of its inquiries into industrial relations and 
trade union issues; the Energy Committee had had only sixteen di- 
visions in its ten years; the Agriculture Committee's reports had all 
been unanimous; and of the forty-five Social Services Committee re- 
ports, only four had been the subject of a division (HC 19-1, 1990, xii- 
xiii). As the ministers I interviewed noted, it is difficult for them to 
ignore the unanimous recommendations of a bipartisan select com- 
mittee, particularly when the minister's own party has a majority on 
the committee and in most cases the chairmanship as well. 
Very little attention is paid in the Procedure Committee's report 
to the select committees' commitment to investigating the adminis- 
tration of government policies. Committees simply very rarely, if 
ever, undertake these investigations. This is an ironic turn of events, 
as it is precisely this sort of activity that Margaret Thatcher assumed 
these parliamentary committees would be pursuing and would 
thereby assist the executive in controlling an obstinate and profligate 
civil service. Second, the investigation of administration was essen- 
tially the only intended purpose of earlier select committees, and a 
significant proposal of the 1978 Procedure Committee. Its successor, 
however, was little concerned about the lack of inquiries specifically 
addressing administration of government policies. 
When the Procedure Committee concluded its inquiry after con- 
sidering views of Select Committee members, the government, 
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through the Leader of the House and cabinet secretaries, academic 
observers, House of Commons staff, and unabashed critics (MPs and 
academics), overwhelmingly pronounced the new system an effec- 
tive success. In particular, the holding of ministers and officials to ac- 
count for their policies, actions, and decisions is now carried out by 
the committees in "a far more rigorous manner than is feasible on the 
floor of the House," and the approach adopted by the existing com- 
mittees in questioning witnesses is much more systematic and com- 
prehensive than was the case with the preceding Expenditure 
Committee (HC 19-1, 1990, lxxviii). In the concluding paragraph of 
its report, the Procedure Committee asks a number of rhetorical 
questions as another revealing test of their effectiveness, to imagine 
the consequences if the 1979 select committee system suddenly 
ceased to exist. The report concludes: "These questions, and the ob- 
vious replies to them, collectively suggest another. Would any gov- 
ernment in the foreseeable future be prepared to abolish the system 
of departmentally-related Select Committees? The fact that this last 
question virtually answers itself is in many ways the most eloquent 
testimony to the solid, unspectacular but undeniable achievements of 
the first decade of the new Committees" (HC 19-1, 1990, lxxxi). 
For the members themselves, though, two tiers of MPs, chamber- 
and committee-oriented, do not appear to have emerged, as many 
members speculated. What does seem to be evident is a large gap be- 
tween what members want to do in Parliament and what they can do. 
Similarly, there exists a gap between what MPs indicate should be 
the role of Parliament and the role it currently plays. These perceived 
gaps exist with both committee and non-committee members, indicat- 
ing that further reforms may be supported by larger numbers of MPs 
than the minority who have undertaken select committee service. 
There now exist, however, two separate sets of skills for members 
to cultivate to be successful and effective in Parliament. When asked 
what qualities and skills are necessary to be successful as members of 
Parliament, MPs stressed characteristics befitting the opportunities 
and challenges presented by the parent chamber. But the skills they 
perceived as necessary to be successful in committee reflect the dy- 
namics of an entirely different arena. The committees cannot be con- 
sidered as microcosms of the larger organization. Committees do not 
follow the rules and procedures of the House. They do not reflect the 
adversarial nature of the chamber. Committees do not value members 
who are not specialists. Committee members do not tolerate col- 
leagues who are not diligent and productive. Committee members do 
not gain respect or rewards from fellow party members for persis- 
tently supporting the party leaders' policies. 
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Committee assignments, however, do provide benefits to all the 
actors in Parliament, which may explain why committees have not 
engendered the persistent hostility from the frontbenches that their 
actions might otherwise suggest. The private benefits received by 
committee members are beneficial to other participants in Parliament 
and to the institution itself. These benefits-expertise, civil servant- 
MP relationships, in-depth investigations-are benefits potentially 
shared by all. Consequently, select committees can be viewed as pro- 
viding the following for Parliament and its members: 
1. Opportunities to acquire expertise and specialist knowledge for 
committee members. 
2. Institutionalized avenues to pursue more active roles in the House. 
3. Alternative means and display of other necessary skills for promo- 
tion to the frontbench. No longer are members necessarily required 
to play loyal party supporters whose career chances are defined 
largely by performances in the chamber. 
4. More informed debate and discussion in the chamber. Despite the 
reservations and fears of some members, attendance on the floor of 
the House has not decreased due to the committees' activities. 
5. An enlarged pool of informed personnel for the government and 
Opposition frontbenches to consider for promotion to a variety of 
policy areas. Select committees are another training ground for pro- 
spective frontbenchers. 
6. Another forum for the Opposition to criticize government policies. 
Reports are increasingly referred to in debate because they are unan- 
imous, bipartisan, and therefore "objective." The reports present a 
"House view" on a subject which the government cannot easily dis- 
credit for representing the views of the minority Opposition. 
7. Another forum for third parties whose opportunities presenting 
their views and influencing the policy are sharply curtailed outside 
of committee activity. 
Enlightenment theorists of the eighteenth century stressed and 
assumed the centrality of legislatures. The primary role of these in- 
stitutions in the political affairs of the nation was to make laws, in- 
deed, to legislate. For Locke, Montesquieu, and even Madison, 
representative bodies were not merely debating chambers; nor were 
they to function simply as checks on powerful executives. Legisla- 
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tures were the sole legitimate institution to embody and express pop- 
ular sovereignty, and as a consequence were the seat of policy- 
making. The empirical evidence of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries demonstrates that the ability of legislatures to control, or 
make, national policy is far more limited than these earlier theorists 
may well have imagined (Dodd, 1981). In conjunction with the con- 
straints on backbenchers imposed by party government, an institu- 
tion that embraced its role of increasing policy efficiency for the 
executive, and members who generally accepted the amateur, part- 
time nature of their jobs, other external variables contributed to the 
incapacity of legislatures to take an effective role in the policy pro- 
cess, i.e., the growing power of experts and specialists in bureaucra- 
cies in information-based societies (Huntington, 1968). The 1977178 
Procedure Committee recognized Parliament's gross inability to deal 
effectively with the technical and complex world it found itself in. 
Several committee members echoed this belief. 
In the short term, the committees appear to represent a consid- 
erable, indeed, a major, change in British legislative politics. A pre- 
requisite for the structural changes that allowed parliamentary 
assertion was an attitudinal change by MPs. A change in behavior 
has also been exhibited on the floor of the House, in debate, and in 
the division of lobbies. Several members remarked that they voted 
against government proposals precisely because of the contradictory 
evidence and recommendations contained in committee reports. 
The rhetoric of many parliamentary reformers would lead one to 
believe that a significant transformation of the British House of Com- 
mons is under way, the likes of which has not been seen for more 
than a century. Perhaps they are correct. But like any transformation, 
the consequences and effects of such a change are only gradual and 
not immediately noticeable. While the passage of time is the neces- 
sary ingredient for examining the change in legislative-executive re- 
lationships, the same is not true if closer attention is paid to the 
attitudes of backbenchers on select committees. The traditional no- 
tion of parliamentary subservience due to party government and 
disinterested, obsequious backbenchers is no longer a valid one. 
Members of Parliament may not be prepared to establish another 
"Golden Age" of Parliament, but it is clear that they are less predict- 
able and less willing to be regarded and used as lobby fodder than 
was the case even twenty years ago. 
Appendix A 
Questionnaire and Evaluation 
I. Open-ended Questions 
1. What do you find most appealing about being in politics and govern- 
ment? 
2. How would you describe the job of an MP? 
3. What personal qualities and skills does an MP need to do an effec- 
tive job? 
4. Do you think there should be more participation by backbenchers in pol- 
itics and government? If yes, what form? 
5. Do you consider yourself a full-time MP? Then you do not have employ- 
ment outside the House? 
6. What makes for a successful parliamentary career in your opinion? 
7. Do you consider yourself a "specialist" MP in certain policy areas? 
8. Do you consider your primary duty to represent the interests and needs 
of your constituency, or the party, or what? 
9. What percentage of your time is spent on constituency-related activities? 
10. What makes an MP a good representative? 
11. I want to turn to the inevitable conflict that must sometimes arise be- 
tween personal belief or constituency interests and party policy. Has this 
ever arisen for you? 
12. What are the consequences of voting against or abstaining from party 
leaders' policies? 
13. In general, what is the importancelpower of Parliament? 
14. Do you think the executive has become too powerful vis-a-vis Parliament 
in recent years? 
15. If yes, what can be done to change the situation? 
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16. How would the Parliament you'd like to see a generation from now differ 
from that of today? 
17. Do you think there is more consensus on your select committee than on 
the floor of the House in general? 
18. Why? 
19. What makes consensus or cooperation difficult? 
20. Can you tell me why you chose to be on the 
Committee? 
21. Did you have any goals you wished to pursue on the committee? 
22. Why did you stay on the committee? 
23. Why did you leave your committee? 
24. Why did you never go on a committee? 
25. How would you describe your job as a member of a select committee? 
26. What personal qualities or skills must a committee member have to be 
successful? 
27. What are the obligations and responsibilities of a select committee mem- 
ber to party leaders and politicians? 
28. In general, what is the role of these select committees in the parliamen- 
tary process? 
29. Does a position on a select committee help an MP become more involved 
in the parliamentary process? 
30. What is the role of the whips in placing members? 
31. Do they have any other contact with your committee? 
32. Is it true that almost anyone offered a position on the frontbench would 
be willing to relinquish his select committee position? 
33. Would you? 
34. Do you see your political career as being oriented toward the attainment 
of executive office? 
35. Are there other parliamentary career goals for you besides executive 
office? 
36. In what ways would you say that select committee membership is re- 
warding to you? 
37. Will the added expertise help your political career? Is membership a step- 
ping stone? 
38. What contributions do committee members make to debates on the floor 
of the House? 
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39. Does being on this committee have any link to your constituency 
activity? 
40. How can one judge whether or not a particular committee has been 
"effective?" What criteria should we use? 
41. How would the select committees you'd like to see a generation from 
now differ from those of today? 
42. Generally speaking, are ministers and civil servants cooperative with 
your committee? 
43. Has it ever been suggested that you or members of your committee have 
ever intruded upon the confidentiality of official advice given to minis- 
ters by senior civil servants? 
II. Closed-ended Questions 
44. Which of the following roles do you most wish to play in the House? 
- Constituency representative 
- Debater 
- Policy Maker 
- Supporter of party policies 
- Other (All) 
45. Which of the following duties do you consider to be the most important 
of your job? (Rank from 1 to 8, with 1 being the most important.) 
- Expressing voters' concerns about the national issues 
- Dealing with constituents' personal problems 
- Attending meetings in the constituency 
- Supporting the party's leadership 
- Making good public policy 
- Contributing to debate 
- Questioning ministers, government officials 
- Committee work in the House 
46. Which of the following tasks is Parliament best at performing? 
- Initiating public policy 
- Debating important national issues 
- Monitoring the governments's progress and policies 
- Ratifying or defeating government-sponsored legislation 
- Looking out for your constituency's interests 
- Other 
47. Which of the following would you say best describes your constituency? 
a. Mostly rural 
b. Rural and urban 
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c. Rural and suburban 
d. Suburban 
e. Suburban and urban 
f. Mostly urban 
48. How would you place yourself on the following ideological spectrum 
within your own party? Marking 0 indicates the most liberal position, 
and marking 10 indicates the most conservative position. 
0-1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10 
LIBERAL CONSERVATIVE 
Ill. Interview Evaluation 
1. Were there other persons present or within earshot during the interview? 
a. Yes, throughout 
b. Yes, at times 
c. No 
2. Estimation of respondent's frankness. 
a. Very frank 
b. Frank 
c. Not very frank 
d. Very evasive 
3. Estimate of respondent's cooperativeness throughout the interview. 
a. Very cooperative 
b. Cooperative 
c. Not very cooperative 
d. Very uncooperative 
4. General remarks about the interview. 
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